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On Thursday morning, 19th of January 2012, Eastman Kodak, “the 131-year-old
film pioneer" filed for bankruptcy after a long struggle to adapt to an increasingly
digital world. While Eastman Kodak suffered, its long-time rival Fujifilm was
doing rather well. Why did these two firms fare so differently, since both saw
the potential in this new emerging market. Surprisingly, Eastman Kodak was
even one of the first to build a digital camera in 1975. Steve Sasson, engineer
at Eastman Kodak, recalled the management’s reaction as “That is cute, but
don’t tell anyone about it"1. Another proof of denial comes in 1988 when
Sony released its first digital camera, after which an extensive research was
performed by Eastman Kodak to look at the future prospective of halide film
versus digital photography. What is now known as a fact was also the outcome
of the study. Digital photography had the potential to replace Eastman Kodak’s
established film business; however there would be no need for Eastman Kodak
to hurry, because it should take roughly ten years for this new market to take
off. The past has shown us that Eastman Kodak indeed dithered and did very
little to prepare for this new market. Also Fujifilm observed that its revenue
from film decreased from 60% of its total profit in 2000 to nearly zero in 2012.




2 Introduction Chapter 1
1.1.1 Timing of Investment Under Competition
What lesson do we learn from the Eastman Kodak-case? Timing is an important
aspect in an investment decision. Waiting too long before undertaking an
investment decision or changing the business-strategy, creates opportunities for
competitors in the market.
In Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis we show that it is optimal for a firm in
an oligopolistic market, to invest when its expected value of waiting for the
follower’s position in the market is equal to its value of immediate investment.
Where the value of a firm is based on expectations of future market develop-
ments. This principle is called the preemption mechanism (also known as rent
equalization) and the optimal moment to invest is defined as the preemption
moment. Where Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) pioneered the preemption mech-
anism, Smets (1991) and Smit and Ankum (1993) were the first to introduce
it to the theory of real options. Within the dynamic real options setting, the
incentive of the firm to invest before the optimal preemption moment is not
yet strong enough. Namely, the option value to invest at some point in the
future is still higher than the value of actually exercising the option. We assume
that firms are symmetric ex-ante investment, and therefore they face the same
investment decision. As a result, no firm shall enter yet. However, when a
firm waits too long with investment, the rival will preempt by investing slightly
earlier but such that its value of immediate investment is still higher than the
value of waiting with investment.
Regarding the Eastman Kodak example, the firm seemed not to have learned
from the history. Initially, the founder of Eastman Kodak was very well able to
make a new product investment at the correct time. That is, back in the days it
gave up a profitable dry-plate business to move to film, and later it invested in
color film even though this was still demonstrably inferior to black and white
film3. However, for the investment decision to move towards the digital world,
Eastman Kodak was lingering too long, missed the optimal investment moment,
and thereby gave the floor to its competitors who were more eager to invest.
Another example comes from the video rental industry, where Blockbuster
lost in the competition game from Netflix. This happened, even though Netflix
started its business only in the late nineties and Blockbuster was swelling in size
3http://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui/2012/01/18/how-kodak-failed/
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since its establishment in 1985 already. However, it was Netflix who had the
right timing to aggressively develop its own video-on-demand for its subscribers
that allowed for streaming right to the television. Blockbuster tried to copy
some moves, but it was to no avail. The firm was too late to join the video-
streaming game and was, besides that, unable to add some innovations of its
own. As a result, in 2010, Blockbuster had to file for bankruptcy4.
The preemption mechanism has obtained continuous attention in academia
since the early contributions of Smets (1991) and Smit and Ankum (1993).
Further applications involve among others Huisman and Kort (1999) and Bouis
et al. (2009). The latter stresses the importance to combine the real option
approach with a multi-decision maker framework. They state that “in the
western economies the extensive process of deregulation, combined with a
waive of mergers and acquisitions, has resulted in an oligopolistic structure
of a large number of sectors." Bouis et al. (2009) analyze oligopolistic market
structures in which they find the accordion effect. That is, in case of three firms,
an increase in uncertainty results in a bigger delay in the moment of third firm’s
investment compared to the second firm’s moment of investment. As a result,
the investment gap between the second and the third investor increases for an
increase in uncertainty. The optimal moment of investment of the first entrant
is more delayed compared to the second firm, therefore the investment gap
between the first two investors decreases. Bouis et al. (2009) refer to these
effects as the accordion effect. For very high levels of uncertainty, the first two
investors shall invest simultaneously. In Chapter 4 we extend the three-firm
oligopoly model of Bouis et al. (2009) by including different types of demand
structures and adding capacity optimization. We find that, due to capacity
optimization, the accordion effect vanishes, since it is dominated by the size
effect. Namely, a higher uncertainty leads to a larger capacity choice which
results in a delay of investment.
Capacity Size 1.1.2
Another aspect to take into consideration is the sizing effect, like Chapter 4
shows that taking capacity choice into account influences the accordion effect.
4http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/flowchart/2010/09/23/how-netflix-and-
blockbuster-killed-blockbuster
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Also Dangl (1999) and Hagspiel (2011) stress the importance of capacity opti-
mization in a real options setting. Capacity will be optimized in all subsequent
chapters, where each chapter places an additional focus on another topic in the
industrial organization literature. Chapter 2 considers capacity optimization
in a two product market where two firms choose between a product flexible
production technology and a dedicated production technology. The product
flexible technology allows a firm to deviate with the production of the two
products within one production line, where production with the dedicated tech-
nology is fixed. Chapter 3 and 4 show the sensitivity of the results with respect
to the chosen demand structure for a duopoly and an oligopoly, respectively.
Chapter 5 considers capacity optimization in an entry and exit market, where
we take into account that the firm faces a time lag behind the decision to resume
production where the firm prepares the production process.
Capacity Size and Different Demand Structures
Webvan Group, an e-commerce company established in the late nineties of last
century, focused on selling online groceries. Its initial plan was to open opera-
tions in 26 metropolitan areas. However due to mistakes like overestimating
demand and its enormous spending pattern, it had to file for bankruptcy in
July 2001. Blinded by the philosophy to “get big fast", they expanded far too
quickly into new cities, rather than cutting back and controlling costs in the
cities where its business was already developed. The firm was loosing nearly
125 million dollar per quarter on expensive automated warehouses, computer
systems, and vans to deliver the grocery products. However, since the customer
growth was not rapid enough to secure a profit, this business was doomed to
failure (Aspray et al. (2013)).
This is not a stand-alone example, also Boo.com5, Pets.com6 and eToys7
made the same mistake to pursue with grand scale investments in a market that
turned out too small for their business. These cases highlight the importance to
carefully make an assumption about future demand for the considered market.




Section 1.1 Motivation 5
and timing of investment) with respect to the choice of demand structure
into account. We consider the additive, multiplicative and iso-elastic demand
structure.
In Chapter 3 we find that when variable investment costs increase, firms
invest later and in a larger capacity under additive demand, whereas for the
multiplicative and iso-elastic demand functions the firms also invest later but
then in less capacity. Namely, under the additive demand structure the market
size increases when the firm waits for a higher demand level to invest, but
the multiplicative and iso-elastic demand structures are both restricted in its
market size. The multiplicative demand structure corresponds for example to
a market where there is only a limited amount of customers interested in this
product. Consider for instance the sale of agricultural machines, e.g. harvesters,
in a region like the Netherlands where the amount of acres and farmers is
limited. This results in an upper bound on demand. The additive demand
structure corresponds to the majority of the markets, here there is no obvious
cap on the market size. And last, the iso-elastic demand structure does pose a
limitation on the market size, but not as strict as in case of the multiplicative
demand structure. Reconsidering online grocer Webvan, the firm most likely
assumed future demand that corresponds to the additive demand structure,
since it invested in a very big capacity size under the assumption of large future
growth and high variable costs. In fact, the iso-elastic demand structure could
have been a better fit for their market. Namely, even though we are dealing
with a growing market, Aspray et al. (2013) points out that the target group is
only a small part of the population, i.e. young, female, college graduates with
a household income over 70.000 dollar.
Capacity Size and Flexibility/Commitment Issues
After the second world war, a new era in manufacturing arrived, new markets
were opened and firms were now competing in a global economy. However,
global competition also causes large fluctuations in product demand. Where in
the era before the second world war firms merely focussed on efficiency and
mass production, they where now also in need of a fast response to market
changes and consumer needs. The first Flexible Manufacturing System (FMS)
was named System 24 and designed in 1965 by Theo Williamson for the British
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producer of cigarette making equipment Molins. System 24 was an automated
system which was able to efficiently produce in small batches 24 hours a day,
as long as production continued. However, high development costs forced
the firm to close its entire machine tool division in 1973. At the same time
that Molins was folding, cheap micro-technology enabled other manufacturers,
like Kearney & Trecker and Cincinnaty Milacron, to develop affordable flexible
manufacturing systems. Still, it were the Japanese that took the technological
lead in FMS in 1977 (Forester (1989)).
An excellent and well known example comes from the automotive industry.
In the fifties and the sixties of last century the North American automotive
manufacturers dominated this industry. However, they relied on high-volume
and inflexible plants with two, or even three, assembly lines making the same
vehicle (Goyal et al. (2006)). This situation changed when Japan entered the
automotive industry with FMS that allowed them to produce multiple types
of cars on one single assembly line (Hagspiel (2011)). There are very few
car models now whose demand is large enough to justify dedicating an entire
plant to their production (Chappell (2005)). The response of the American
automotive industry was to also start investing in flexibility. There is plenty
of evidence that automotive manufacturers are striving for more and more
flexibility. For example Tesla Motors, who began producing the Tesla S, a luxury
sedan, in 2012. While the many robots in other auto factories typically perform
only one function, in the new Tesla factory a robot might even do up to four:
welding, riveting, bonding, and installing a component. Around the same
time, also Hyundai and Beijing Motors completed a mammoth factory outside
Beijing that can produce a million vehicles a year using more robots and fewer
people than the big factories of their competitors and with the same flexibility
as Tesla’s8.
In Chapter 2, two firms, an incumbent and an entrant, have the opportunity
to optimize the level of capacity for a flexible or a dedicated production facility.
8http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/new-wave-of-adept-robots-is-changing-
global-industry.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
Section 1.2 Outline of the Thesis 7
Capacity Size and Time lags
In August 2013 , the new owner of the Saab factory in Sweden, National Electric
Vehicle Sweden (NEVS), announced that they would soon start producing the
9-3 midsized car model. This model would be very similar to the model Saab
stopped producing in 2011. At the moment of the announcement, the company
had already recruited 300 employees. However, the start of the production was
still dependent on NEVS coming to an agreement with parts suppliers, which
still delayed the start of the production9.
This example illustrates that it takes time to resume operations at a pro-
duction facility. Investment and re-start decisions do not occur instantaneously.
Instead, firms face a time lag after the decision to resume production, where
it prepares for the production process. Namely, it takes time to find new em-
ployees and skill them to the level of the old employees before suspending the
firm. However, like Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) also mentioned, most models
of irreversible investment assume that a firm can start producing immediately
after the decision to (re-)start the production is made. In response to that,
Chapter 5 substitutes to the existing literature that incorporates a time lag after
the investment decision (e.g. Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and Sødal (2006)),
by additionally allowing a firm to optimize the level of its capacity.
Outline of the Thesis 1.2
This thesis consists of the introduction, which is followed by four chapters. In
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 capacity is optimized within a competitive environment.
Chapter 5 considers the optimal investment decisions of a monopolist.
In Chapter 2 we employ a three-stage duopoly game with two products.
Uncertainty is present in the sense that the firms do not know the demand
realization at the moment that the investment decisions are made. In the first
stage, the incumbent invests in a product flexible or a dedicated production
technology. With the dedicated production technology, it will produce both
products on separate production lines. The product flexible production technol-
ogy gives the incumbent the opportunity to assign the available capacity freely
9http://europe.autonews.com/article/20130821/ANE/130829983/saab-gets-ready-to-
restart-production
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to either one of the products. In the second stage, the entrant decides about its
optimal capacity size in its preferred production technology. Alternatively, it is
also possible that, given the capacity and technology choice of the incumbent,
it is optimal for the entrant to refrain from entering. After the second stage,
demand is resolved and a production game will be played in the last stage of the
game. The flexible production technology allows a firm to optimize production
quantities within the chosen capacity size.
We find that the dedicated investment option can give the incumbent such
a high ‘commitment value’, that it chooses the dedicated production technology
over the product flexible one. This shall occur when the economic environment
is not very uncertain. In this scenario, the entrant always chooses for the prod-
uct flexible technology. Because the entrant optimizes its optimal production
quantities given the (fixed) production quantities of the incumbent, it is also
easier for the incumbent to deter the flexible entrant from the market. This re-
sult changes when a highly uncertain market environment is considered. In this
situation, the entrant surprisingly chooses for the dedicated production tech-
nology. Namely, the incumbent prefers to be the only firm that can enjoy from
the advantages that come with the flexible production system. As a result, it
chooses its flexible capacity such high that the entrant is placed in an unpleasant
production scenario. Investing dedicated is than the best strategy of the entrant,
where it has the first mover’s advantage in the production game. Last, we find
that when firms sequentially make their investment decision, it will never occur
that both firms invest in the dedicated production technology. This contrary to
what Goyal and Netessine (2007) find for simultaneous investment decisions.
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by considering the effect of three
commonly used demand function, additive, multiplicative and iso-elastic de-
mand, on the optimal investment decisions in a duopoly. In this dynamic model,
uncertainty is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion. The firms have
the opportunity to optimize the timing of investment along with the size of
capacity. Under the assumption that firm roles are not predetermined, we find
that the additive and iso-elastic demand structure always lead to the situation
where the follower invests in a larger capacity size than the leader. However,
when uncertainty and constant costs are sufficiently high, the opposite result oc-
curs under the assumption of multiplicative demand. The use of multiplicative
demand implies a cap on the total market size. This could allow the Stackelberg
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leader to grab the biggest share of the total market size. Furthermore, we
find that an increase in variable investment costs can be explained by a direct
and an indirect effect. A slightly higher variable cost decreases the optimal
capacity (direct effect), but also delays investment which corresponds to a
larger capacity amount (indirect effect). In case of the additive demand the
indirect effect dominates, i.e. larger linear costs lead to a larger capacity choice.
This is contrary to the multiplicative and iso-elastic demand function, where
higher linear costs result in a later investment but smaller capacity, i.e. the
direct effect dominates.
In Chapter 4 an additional sensitivity analysis of the additive and multiplica-
tive demand structure is performed on the optimal investment decisions. This
chapter considers an oligopolistic market structure with three firms. We sub-
stitute the model of Bouis et al. (2009) by considering two demand structures
that allow for capacity choice, and optimize the size of capacity. Bouis et al.
(2009) find the accordion effect, i.e. a higher level of uncertainty increases the
third firm’s threshold, decreases the second firm’s threshold, and increases the
first firm’s threshold. For high enough uncertainty, it is optimal for the first two
investors to invest simultaneously. Under capacity optimization we find that
the accordion effect will not occur and is dominated by the size effect. The
size effect implies that a higher level of uncertainty results in a larger capacity
choice, which in turn delays investment.
Where the Chapter 2, 3 and 4 consider a competitive environment, Chap-
ter 5 considers a monopoly. The contribution of that chapter is two-fold. It
contributes to the literature of entry and exit models and to the literature of
time-lag models. We consider a model with additive demand, where a firm
has the opportunity to optimize the timing of investment along with the size of
its capacity. After investment, the firm has infinitely many options to resume
and close the operation against a fixed switching cost. Capacity optimization
dominates the switching triggers of the firm. Namely, without capacity opti-
mization, Sødal (2006) and Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) find that a firm delays
both decisions to resume and to close the production facility. Under capac-
ity optimization, a higher level of uncertainty increases the level of capacity,
which in turn increases the price intercept for which the firm makes zero profit.
The optimal moment to resume and close the operation lies around this price
intercept, due to the fixed switching costs. Thus, by including the capacity
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optimization, the firm hastens its decision to close the production facility for
higher levels of uncertainty.
In the second part of Chapter 5 we assume that there exists a positive time-
lag after the decision to resume the production. We find that the length of
the time lag has a positive effect on the size of capacity. Bar-Ilan and Strange
(1996) explain that the exit-decision truncates the downside potential of the
market. Under a positive level of uncertainty, the firm expects an increase in its
future revenue after the time lag. A longer time lag will only strengthen this
result, i.e. the firm expects an even larger future revenue. This results in an
increase of the firm’s capacity choice.
2Dedicated vs Product FlexibleProduction Technology: Strategic
Capacity Investment Choice
This chapter is based on Boonman et al. (2014a).
Abstract
This chapter studies the optimal investment strategies of an incumbent and a
potential entrant that can both choose between a product flexible technology
and a dedicated technology, in a two-product market characterized by uncertain
demand. The product flexible production technology has certain advantages,
especially when the economic environment is uncertain. On the other hand,
the dedicated production technology allows a firm to commit to production
quantities. This gives strategic advantages, which can outweigh the ‘value of
flexibility’.
It turns out that both firms prefer, for some scenarios, the dedicated produc-
tion technology. However, we find that in a game with sequential technology
choices, both firms investing dedicated, will not be an equilibrium. Especially
when the economic environment is more uncertain and one product is not
very profitable, the incumbent overinvests in product flexible capacity to force
the entrant to choose the dedicated technology. Then, the incumbent is the
only firm with the product flexible production technology, which results in a
relatively high payoff. In a similar situation but with equally profitable products,
the entrant chooses the dedicated production technology because it allows the
firm to commit to production quantities. This makes the entrant the first mover
in the production game.
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2.1 Introduction
Just two decades ago it was standard in the American and European automotive
industry to install separate production lines for each vehicle type that was
produced. Nowadays, most automotive manufacturers have started to invest
in Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS) that allow production of multiple
car types on a single production line. Flexible manufacturing systems were
first introduced by Japanese car manufacturers that developed this new way
of manufacturing when they entered the car industry. It is believed that their
increased market share in the automotive market is partly due to FMS (Goyal
et al. (2006)). The response of the American car industry was to also start
investing in flexibility. When demand of a vehicle type drops, the firm can
easily decide to shift a bigger part of the production capacity to another type
of car that is produced on the same production line. This type of flexibility
is in general referred to as product flexibility. The most important reason
that induces manufacturers to invest in FMS is that it is a good hedge against
uncertainty. In addition FMS is a way to respond to changes in competition.
Goyal et al. (2006) find that “automotive manufacturers use flexibility as a
‘competitive weapon’; flexibility is deployed in market segments in which there
are a larger number of flexible competitors".
However, there are many other industries in which product flexibility can
evoke several efficiencies in production. Think for example about bikes or
television sets. Within these industries, the manufactured products are quite
similar. Therefore, it is possible to produce them on the same production line.
The products in these industries are furthermore characterized by strongly
fluctuating sales. In the television industry for example, innovations occur on
a regular basis. Within a very short time frame the sales of a certain type of
television set can drop enormously, if an improved model is introduced. There-
fore, it is very desirable for a firm to be able to easily adapt the corresponding
production line for the production of a different television set. However, in this
chapter we show that a firm might also get value from committing to dedicated
production quantities.
This chapter proposes a three stage game, where in the first stage an incum-
bent invests in the optimal capacity amount of either a product flexible or a
dedicated production technology. The product flexible production technology
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allows a firm to produce both products on a single machine or production
line. An entrant has the option to enter the market in the second stage. Given
that the entrant invests, it will choose its optimal production technology and
capacity amount. These capacity decisions are made before demand uncertainty
is resolved. After the investment decision of the entrant, the market can go
‘up’ or ‘down’ with equal probability. In the final stage, the demand curve is
revealed, and a production game will be played.
Research on various types of flexibility is among others surveyed in Kroll
and Wasden (1990) and Karwowski and Rahimi (1990). Most of the litera-
ture on product flexibility primarily focuses on monopoly cases. Firms have
to determine the optimal investment type (flexible/dedicated), the optimal
(lumpy/incremental) capacity to invest in, and/or the utilization rate of the
capacity. Papers that discuss the value of flexibility of a monopolist are Fine
and Freud (1990), Van Mieghem (1998), Bish and Wang (2004), Chod and
Rudi (2005), Tomlin and Wang (2005), and Ceryan et al. (2012). Fine and
Freud (1990) consider a multi-product firm that assembles an optimal mix
of flexible and dedicated capacities, where uncertainty is modeled through
a revenue function with a discrete set of possible scenarios. They find that
optimal capacity and expected profit is increasing in demand variance, which is
consistent with our results. Bish and Wang (2004) and Chod and Rudi (2005)
confirm the result of Van Mieghem (1998) that in a two-product market flexible
capacity can be preferred due to financial reasons when products are perfectly
positively correlated.
All these contributions consider monopolies, where the strategic effect is not
taken into account when determining the choice between investing in flexible
or dedicated manufacturing systems. Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) extend
their monopoly model to a competition model where each firm makes decisions
about capacity investment, production quantity and price. A firm is flexible in
deciding which decision is postponed until after uncertainty is resolved. Patel
et al. (2012) empirically investigate how some firms are able to develop more
effective responses to environmental uncertainty using manufacturing flexibility.
Their findings show that environmental uncertainty affects firms performance
directly and indirectly through manufacturing flexibility and that operational
absorptive capacity (the extend to which a firm’s operational units can acquire,
assimilate, and transform external information) and operational ambidexterity
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(pursuing both exploration and exploitation) positively moderate these medi-
ated relationships. Considering product flexibility, Goyal and Netessine (2007)
find that also under competition each firm is willing to pay more for flexibility
under high demand uncertainty. For low levels of uncertainty, none of the firms
will invest in flexibility, while for inbetween levels of uncertainty, the firms de-
cide to invest in opposing production technologies. Goyal et al. (2006) explain
that when there is a high demand correlation between products, the value of
flexibility will be limited. Also Roller and Tombak (1990) and He et al. (2011)
consider the strategic value of product flexibility. However, in those papers
it is assumed that firms decide about their technology choice simultaneously.
Therefore they cannot analyze the concept of ’entry deterrence’. We extend this
approach by considering an incumbent-entrant situation.
Tseng (2004), Dewit and Leahy (2003) and Chang (1993) discuss flexibility
in an incumbent-entrant setting. However, they do not consider product flexi-
bility. Chang (1993) models an incumbent-entrant situation and shows that an
incumbent can use product design flexibility to deter entry. The incumbent has
an extra incentive to be flexible compared to a situation without a potential
entrant. Contrary to Chang (1993), we consider product flexibility. We show
that there are parameter combinations for which producing flexible makes it
more difficult for the incumbent to deter entry in comparison to producing
dedicated. This is due to the fact that a dedicated incumbent can commit to a
certain production quantity.
The paper most closely related to our analysis is Anand and Girotra (2007).
They consider two firms that have the opportunity to produce in a monopoly
market and a competitive market. By employing early differentiation, a firm
chooses the quantities for the monopoly market and the competitive market,
before demand uncertainty is resolved. Delayed differentiation gives the firm
the opportunity to initially produce an intermediate version of the product.
Once demand uncertainty is resolved, the product will be differentiated for sale
in either the monopoly market or the competitive market. They find that, when
an incumbent faces a potential entrant in one of its markets, early differentiation
is a better entry deterrence strategy than delayed differentiation. However, this
result is found under the assumption of only one competitive market, while
we assume that there are two competitive markets for the two firms. In a
later section Anand and Girotra (2007) consider the issue of two competitive
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markets, where they find that early differentiation is, for a range of parameter
values, the dominant strategy. This is however not shown under the assumption
of sequential investments. Another important difference to Anand and Girotra
(2007) is that, in our heterogeneous product market, the product quantity in
one market influences the price of the other product. Anand and Girotra (2007)
consider a different type of heterogeneity: They introduce correlation in the
demand intercept, between the monopoly market and the competitive market.
Similar to Anand and Girotra (2007), we show that investing in dedicated
production capacity could give the incumbent a higher (expected) profit than
investing in flexible production capacity. The ability to commit oneself to
production quantities gives strategic advantages. In particular, we find that
the incumbent chooses the dedicated technology when demand uncertainty
is low, products are equally profitable and quite substitutable. The ‘value of
commitment’, indicating that it can give value to a firm in a competitive setting
to make credible commitments, has long been advocated in the literature (Caves
and Porter (1977)). This could e.g. be in the form of a contract (Rey and Salanie
(1990)) or investments in a large capacity. Most important is that competitors
believe that the commitment is credible and it will become very difficult to
refrain from it. This gives the committed firm value and makes it able to deter
possible entrants.
Besides this form of commitment, which is known in the literature, we
find that in some scenarios the entrant can also benefit from being commit-
ted. In particular, when uncertainty is sufficiently low, products are equally
profitable and product substitutability is low, an entrant that faces a flexible
incumbent prefers investment in dedicated capacity. In such a situation, the
incumbent cannot influence the entrant’s production choice in the last stage,
which results in a relatively high profit for the entrant. In a similar situation
(i.e. low substitutability) but with a low profitability of one of the products and
a more uncertain economic environment, the entrant also prefers the dedicated
production choice. A higher uncertainty leads to a larger value of flexibility, i.e.
high enough for the incumbent to prefer to be the only firm benefiting from
the advantages of flexibility in the market. Therefore, the incumbent makes
a sufficiently large capacity investment so that the entrant prefers to invest in
the dedicated capacity.
Furthermore, we show that two dedicated firms cannot occur in an equi-
librium, in a sequential game. This is contrary to Goyal and Netessine (2007)
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that make the assumption of a simultaneous technology choice. An entrant that
observes a dedicated incumbent has no incentive to commit to its production
quantities.
This chapter is organized as follows. The general model is presented in
Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 the game is solved under appropriate assumptions.
Results are discussed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
We consider a three stage game with two firms, an incumbent (I) and a poten-
tial entrant (E). The profit maximizing firms are assumed to be risk neutral,
have full information and compete in a Cournot fashion. Demand of the two
products in the market, product 1 and product 2, is uncertain. At time t=0,
the incumbent has to choose between a dedicated and a flexible production
technology. With the dedicated technology it has to produce each product
on a separate production line. The flexible production technology allows to
produce two products with a single production capacity. The incumbent makes
its capacity decision at time t=0. At time t=1, the entrant determines whether
it is profitable to enter the market1. If the entrant enters the market, it will also
decide about the flexible/ dedicated production capacity at time t=1. At time
t=2, demand uncertainty is resolved.
The inverse demand functions are given by:
P1(q1,E, q2,E, q1,I , q2,I) = θ − (q1,E + q1,I)− γ(q2,E + q2,I), (2.1)
P2(q1,E, q2,E, q1,I , q2,I) = αθ − (q2,E + q2,I)− γ(q1,E + q1,I), (2.2)
where qi,E denotes the quantity of product i produced by the entrant and qi,I
the quantity of product i produced by the incumbent, for i ∈ {1, 2}. γ ∈ (0, 1) is
the substitutability parameter. Since flexible capacity tends to be used for sub-
1In case we would also give the incumbent the option not to invest, this is an indication
that the market is not profitable, and as a result also the entrant will not enter. Therefore this
scenario is neglected.
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stitutable products, we assume this parameter to be positive (Hagspiel (2011),
Chod and Rudi (2005)). α ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of the profitability of product
2. Product 1 is without loss of generality assumed to be the more profitable
product, except for the case of α = 1, when product 1 and product 2 are equally
profitable. The demand intercept dynamics are as follows: At time t=0, the
incumbent observes demand intercept parameter θ0. Uncertainty is present
in the sense that the demand intercept θ can go ‘up’ or ‘down’ after period 1.
More specifically: θ could go ‘up’ or ‘down’ by an amount equal to h, both with
probability p=12 . For tractability reasons this probability is fixed, we do not
intent to make the model more involved than necessary. An upward (down-
ward) shift of the demand intercept parameter will have a positive (negative)
effect on the price, and thus on the profit. Notice that the difference in the
intercept θ between an upward shift and a downward shift is equal to 2h.
Also, h denotes the uncertainty parameter (see Lemma 2.1 in Appendix 2.B.1).
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) give the inverse demand functions (also known as
the net-price functions). Variable production costs are denoted by parameter
c. Subtracting the variable costs from gross-price functions, one obtains the
net-price functions, denoted by P1 = p1 − c for product 1 and P2 = p2 − c for
product 2, with P1 and P2 formulated in equation (1) and (2), respectively.
We denote the flexible capacity level by KF, j, while K1, j (K2, j) is the ded-
icated capacity level corresponding to product 1 (2) of firm j ∈ {I , E}. The
costs corresponding to the investment in the flexible (dedicated) production
technology are given by CF (CD) per unit of capacity. For the analysis in Section
2.4, we assume that CF = CD in order to analyze the firm’s technology choice,
irrespective of the corresponding capacity cost. Total investment cost is CF KF, j
if firm j ∈ {I , E} chooses the flexible production capacity, and CD(K1, j + K2, j) if
it invests in the dedicated capacity.
When the entrant enters, it incurs an additional cost equal to f . These fixed
entry costs summarize potential costs arising from schooling, a new marketing
plan, or licenses that need to be purchased before being able to start producing
(see e.g. Tirole (1988)).
We impose the following assumption with its justifications below.
Assumption 2.1
Both firms produce up to capacity. For a dedicated firm j this means that
18 Dedicated vs Product Flexible Production Technology Chapter 2
q1, j = K1, j and q2, j = K2, j, with j ∈ {I , E} where I (E) denotes the incumbent
(entrant). For a flexible firm j with j ∈ {I , E}, we assume that q1, j + q2, j = KF, j.
Assumption 2.1, often called the ’market clearance assumption’, is widely
used in the literature (Chod and Rudi (2005), Deneckere et al. (1997), Anand
and Girotra (2007), and Goyal and Netessine (2007)). This assumption holds
for instance in case of large fixed costs. In such scenarios it can be very costly
to produce below the capacity level. Besides that, also knowledge will be lost.
Strict labor laws prevent that employees can easily be fired, and often a high
amount of money has to be paid for letting employees go. The car industry is
just one example where firms often prefer to cut prices and keep production
equal to full capacity, rather than underproducing (Mackintosh (2003)).
Both firms have to choose between a flexible and a dedicated production
capacity. In order to find the optimal production and capacity sizes, firm j
optimizes its expected future profits (Eθ (π j)), subtracted by investment costs.
For the production and capacity optimization problem considering a dedicated
capacity choice of firm j ∈ {I , E} is given by:
Capacity choice:
Π j = Max
K1, j≥0,K2, j≥0
{Eθ (π j)− CD(K1, j + K2, j)− 1{ j=E} f }
Production choice:
π j = Max
q1, j≥0,q2, j≥0
{(θ − (q1,E + q1,I)− γ(q2,E + q2,I))q1, j
+ (αθ − (q2,E + q2,I)− γ(q1,E + q1,I))q2, j}
s.t. q1, j = K1, j, q2, j = K2, j.
The production and capacity optimization problem when firm j ∈ {I , E} invests
flexible is given by:
Capacity choice:
Π j = Max
KF, j≥0
{Eθ (π j)− CF KF, j)− 1{ j=E} f }
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Production choice:
π j = Max
q1, j≥0,q2, j≥0
{(θ − (q1,E + q1,I)− γ(q2,E + q2,I))q1, j
+ (αθ − (q2,E + q2,I)− γ(q1,E + q1,I))q2, j}
s.t. q1, j + q2, j = KF, j.
Analysis of the Game-tree. 2.3
At time t=0, the incumbent has two options, investing dedicated or investing
flexible. The game-tree in Figure 2.1 illustrates the choices of the incumbent and
the entrant. In the following two sections, we look at both scenarios separately.
Section 2.3.1 derives the optimal capacity and quantity decisions for the two
firms when the incumbent invests dedicated. Section 2.3.2 solves the game-tree
when the incumbent chooses for the flexible capacity.
Incumbent Invests Dedicated 2.3.1
Assume that the incumbent decides at time t=0 to invest in the dedicated
production technology. At this time it also has to decide about the optimal size
of capacity to invest in. One time period later, at time t=1, the entrant has the
choice whether to enter with the dedicated or flexible production technology,
or to stay out of the market. If the entrant enters, it will decide about the
optimal capacity size at time t=1. Notice that this setup corresponds to a
Stackelberg game. Since the incumbent chooses its dedicated capacity at time
t=0, it fixes its production quantity before the entrant could do so. This will
give the incumbent a first mover advantage. At time t=2 a production game
takes place where both firms optimize their production quantities. Obviously,
the production amounts of the incumbent are fixed to its dedicated capacity
levels. This will also be the case for the entrant, if it chooses for the dedicated
capacity. If the entrant invests in the flexible production technology, it has to
determine the optimal production quantities.
Figure 2.2 shows the game tree in case the incumbent has chosen the ded-
icated production technology. There are eight possible outcomes for the firms,
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Figure 2.1: Game tree of the model.
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t=0 Dedicated incumbent











Figure 2.2: Game-tree, given that the incumbent invests dedicated.
each denoted by a letter. Six of the outcomes correspond to the situation where
the entrant enters (A,B,C,D,E,F), and two correspond to the case where the
entrant does not enter (G,H). After the investment decision of the entrant, the
market can go ‘up’ or ‘down’, due to demand uncertainty. The entrant needs
to have a strategy (i.e. production choice) for both possible outcomes (‘up’
or ‘down’). A flexible entrant has the possibility to produce only one of the
products or both products. It could for instance decide to produce only one
of the products in case the market goes ‘up’ in period 2, and produce both
products if the market goes ‘down’ in period 2. This strategy is labeled with AD.
In case the entrant decides to undertake investment, there are four possible
capacity amounts that it could potentially invest in, depending on the strategy
it would choose later. That is, it invests in capacity amount KF,E,AC , when it uses
strategy AC in combination with the product flexible capacity choice. Similarly,
it would invest in capacity amount KF,E,AD or KF,E,BD if it uses strategy AD or BD,
respectively, after investment in the product flexibility. The entrant invests in
(K1,E,EF , K2,E,EF) if it chooses for the dedicated production technology. Notice
that strategy BC is an infeasible strategy (see Lemma 1 in Appendix 2.B.2). It
occurs that a flexible firm rather wants to produce both products in the down-
scenario and only one product in the up-scenario. Hagspiel (2011) explains
that a firm will make use of the downside potential to produce both products
in order to increase total market size, when it faces low demand. If the entrant
decides not to invest, it uses strategy GH.
In order to solve this game-tree, we follow the subsequent steps that specify
how to derive the optimal production and capacity decision of the entrant and
the optimal capacity decision of the incumbent. The game is solved backwards,
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since we consider an incumbent-entrant situation (see the game-tree in Figure
2.2). Therefore, we start with the optimal decisions of the entrant.
1. Given the capacity choice of the incumbent (K1,I and K2,I), we de-
rive expressions for the optimal quantities and capacities of the
entrant. Recall that, given the dedicated technology choice of the
incumbent, only the entrant has the choice between strategies; i.e.
strategies AD, AC, BD, EF or GH. The entrant’s profit for each possible
outcome can be derived and subsequently the expected profit for each of
its strategy choices. For each strategy, it will optimize its corresponding
capacity and quantit(y)(ies).
2. Identify the feasibility conditions of the entrant’s strategies as a
function of K1,I and K2,I . The capacity choice of the incumbent deter-
mines if a strategy from the entrant is feasible. There are two criteria
for a strategy to be feasible. First, given K1,I and K2,I , the entrant’s
endogenously determined optimal capacity and quantit(y)(ies), that
correspond to this strategy, should be nonnegative. Secondly, given
K1,I and K2,I , a feasible strategy gives the entrant a higher profit than
any of its other strategies. As a consequence, the (K1,I , K2,I)-plane can
be divided in five regions which only overlap on the boundaries. Each
region corresponds to a feasible strategy of the entrant. To illustrate,
Figure 2.3 shows the optimal feasible strategies of the entrant for each
capacity combination of the incumbent firm. Notice, even though the
entrant makes optimal decisions for each potential incumbent’s capac-
ity choice that it can face (technology choice, quantity and capacity
optimization), it is the incumbent that determines the strategy choice
of the entrant by choosing its capacities. This is due to the leader’s first
mover advantage.
3. The incumbent finds the optimal (K∗1,I , K
∗
2,I) in all five regions. This
leads to five possible candidates for the optimal incumbent’s capacity
choice corresponding to each of the entrant’s strategies.
4. Given (K∗1,I , K
∗
2,I) for all five regions, choose the region (i.e. strategy
of the entrant) that gives the incumbent the highest profit.
The following proposition represents the first and second step for the derivation
of an optimal solution. It states the optimal capacities and production quantities
of the entrant. Those are derived by maximizing the respective expected profit















Figure 2.3: The optimal feasible regions of the five strategies of the
entrant. Parameter values are γ=0.2, α=0.8, θ=100,
CF = CD=10 and f =100. Notice that strategy EF, where
the incumbent and the entrant choose the dedicated
technology, does not have a feasible region in this fig-
ure. In Proposition 2.4 we show that this holds for all
parameter regions.
functions for strategy EF, BD, AD and AC. It also formulates the conditions that
should hold for each of the entrant’s strategies to be feasible. (All proofs of
subsequent propositions can be found in the Appendix 2.A.3.) Preferably, we
would like to present concise feasibility conditions in Table 2.1. However due
to messy expressions of the entrants expected optimal profit, this is impossible.
Now that we know that the entrant has to choose a strategy, the notations
for profit, capacity and production quantities need to be expanded. A flexible
entrant that chooses strategy M, and faces market outcome N once demand is
resolved obtains profit πE,M , invests in capacity KF,E,M and produces q1,E,B,BD of
product 1 and q2,E,B,BD of product 2. A dedicated entrant obtains profit πE,M ,
and invests in capacities K1,E,M and K2,E,M .
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Proposition 2.1
Table 2.1 presents for each strategy the entrant’s optimal capacities, optimal
quantities and feasibility conditions as a function of the incumbents capacities K1,I
and K2,I . In case the entrant decides not to invest, i.e. strategy GH, its profit and
capacities are equal to zero. This strategy is optimal when K1,I and K2,I are so
high that the other strategies result in a negative expected profit for the entrant.
The only set of values where the strategies can be overlapping are the boundaries
between these corresponding regions.
The entrant chooses its optimal feasible strategy for each possible capacity
choice of the incumbent, however it is the investment decision of the incumbent,
(K1,I , K2,I), that will eventually determine which of the strategies the entrant
will choose. Hence, the incumbent can ‘manipulate’ the strategy choice of the
entrant. In the third step towards the optimal solution, the incumbent finds,
within each feasible region for a strategy of the entrant, the capacity choice that
gives a maximal profit. As an illustration, let us consider strategy BD, which
is a possible strategy when the entrant invests in the flexible capacity. This
illustration subsequently explains why we are forced to bend towards numerical
analysis, the analytical expressions get so messy that it does not lead to valuable
conclusions. There are two possibilities. The optimal capacity choice of the
incumbent lays either within the interior of the region that belongs to strategy
BD, or it results in one of the following possible boundary solutions:
1. The production quantity of product 2 of the entrant is zero.
2. The total flexible capacity of the entrant is zero.
3. The total profit of the entrant is zero.
The following proposition introduces the possible capacity choices of the in-
cumbent considering the entrant’s strategy BD.
Proposition 2.2
(i) If the optimal capacities of the incumbent lie within the interior of the region
















2 CF − CD
1+ γ
. (2.4)
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(ii) If the optimal capacities resulting from (2.3) and (2.4) lie outside the region
that belong to strategy BD, the optimal capacities are equal to one of the following
boundary solutions: The boundary solution for the case that the production
quantity of product 2 of the entrant is zero is equal to
K∗1,I =0.5θ + γK
∗











The boundary solution for the case that the capacity of the entrant is equal to zero
is given by:
K∗1,I =










The boundary solution for the case that the entrant’s profit is equal to zero is
implicitly determined by the following equation
















16(1− γ2)2(CF + γK1,I −αθ )2
− 8(1− γ2)
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4CF(1− γ)(CF + K1,I(1+ γ)− θ (1+α))
+ (1−α)2h2(1+ γ) + 2θ 2(1+α2 − 2αγ)


















For the other four regions the optimal capacities of the incumbent can be
derived in a similar way. In fact the optimization process of the incumbent’s
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Strategy BD
























































4 (3−α)θ q1,E,A,AD = KF,E,AD
+ 14 (3+ γ)K1,I q2,E,A,AD = 0




























q1,E,C ,AC = KF,E,AC
q2,E,C ,AC = 0
Strategy EF
E[πE,EF ]≥ 0 E[πE,EF ]≥ E[πE,ψ] ∀ψ ∈ {BD, AD, AC}
K1,E,EF =
θ (1−αγ)−CD(1−γ)
2(1−γ2) q1,E,E,EF = K1,E,EF
K2,E,EF =
θ (α−γ)−CD(1−γ)
2(1−γ2) q2,E,E,EF = K2,E,EF
q1,E,F,EF = K1,E,EF
q2,E,F,EF = K2,E,EF
Table 2.1: Feasibility conditions for each strategy of the entrant.
Denote the profit of the entrant that uses strategy BD
with πE,BD. KF,E,BD denotes the optimal flexible capac-
ity of the entrant, given that it produces two products
if the market goes ‘down’ at time t=2 and two prod-
ucts if the market goes ‘up’ at time t=2 (Strategy BD).
And q1,E,B,BD denotes the quantity produced if the mar-
ket goes ‘up’ (outcome B) of product 1, for the case
that the entrant chooses strategy BD. The other profits,
capacities and quantities are defined similarly.
capacity is analytically quite involved due to the messy expressions and the
many cases that arise. Therefore, we use the software program Mathematica to
numerically solve the restricted optimization problem of the incumbent within
each region.
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Incumbent Invests Flexible 2.3.2
When the incumbent invests in the flexible production technology, the produc-
tion amounts of the incumbent are not predetermined. When the entrant also
invests in the flexible production technology, both firms choose simultaneously
optimal production quantities at the last stage. Therefore, one has to determine
a Nash equilibrium in this case, instead of a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the 16 possible outcomes that could occur when the
incumbent invests in the flexible production technology (I-Y). Considering that
t=0 Flexible incumbent

























Figure 2.4: Game-tree, given that the incumbent invests flexible.
there is uncertainty about an up- or downward shift of the market, 24 possible
scenarios1 arise. If the firms choose outcome J in case the market goes ‘up’ and
outcome N in case the market goes ‘down’, the combination is called scenario
JN. Notice that some of these scenarios can be eliminated immediately. As was
proved beforehand (see Appendix 2.B.2), a flexible firm would never produce
both products in the ‘up’ situation and only one product in the ‘down’ situation.
This case is always dominated by producing both products in both the ‘up’ and
‘down’ scenario. Eliminating the corresponding scenarios leads to 15 remaining
scenarios given in Table 2.2.
Given each of the remaining feasible scenarios, the incumbent and the
entrant simultaneously optimize their respective production quantities. Table
1For the case where the incumbent invests dedicated, the production decisions of the entrant
in case of an up- and downwards demand shift is well defined by a strategy. The entrant knows
for each strategy what the outcome in the market will be. In case the incumbent invests flexible
however, the incumbent and the entrant decide simultaneously about the outcome in a Nash
equilibrium. For each production decision of the entrant, there are several possible market
outcomes, depending on the production decision of the incumbent. Therefore, for the case that
the incumbent invests flexible, we introduce the notion “scenario". A scenario is defined to be
the combination of two possible outcomes, corresponding to an up and downwards shift of the
market, when demand realization is not yet resolved.
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IM IN IO IP UX
JN JP KO KP UY
LP QS QT RT VY
Table 2.2: Feasible scenarios given that the incumbent invests flex-
ible.
2.4 summarizes the equilibrium production quantities for all feasible scenarios
for the incumbent and entrant. However, one should realize that even though
the firms simultaneously optimize production quantities, they are not symmetric
due to the incumbent-entrant setting. Hence, first we optimize for each scenario
the optimal capacity size for the entrant, given the corresponding optimal
production quantities. These are stated in Table 2.3. The profit of firm j,
j ∈ {I , E}, under market outcome N after demand realization is denoted by
π j,N . The capacity choice of flexible firm j that employs scenario M is denoted
by KF, j,M , and of a dedicated entrant by K1,E,M and K2,E,M . The production
quantities of flexible firm j are denoted by q1, j,N ,M for product 1 and q2, j,N ,M for
product 2.
In order to solve the production game, the following game in normal-form
has to be solved in the ‘up’ and ‘down’ situation respectively:
Up:
Decision Entrant




(πI ,I ,πE,I) (πI ,J ,πE,J ) (πI ,Q,πE,Q) (πI ,U ,πE,U)








(πI ,M ,πE,M ) (πI ,N ,πE,N ) (πI ,S ,πE,S) (πI ,X ,πE,X )
(πI ,O,πE,O) (πI ,P ,πE,P) (πI ,T ,πE,T ) (πI ,Y ,πE,Y )

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In the production game, the incumbent decides whether it produces only one
(F1) or both (F2) products. The entrant has four options: produce only one (F1)
or both (F2) products with the flexible capacity, produce up to the dedicated
capacity (D), or stay out of the market and produce nothing (0). No firm should
have the incentive to deviate from the occurring outcome. Therefore, all Nash
equilibria of this game have to be determined. The equilibrium where the
market ends up in, will satisfy that both the optimal capacities of the firms, as
well as the equilibrium quantities of the second product, have to be nonnegative
(Table 2.3 and 2.4). Proposition 2.3 summarizes the feasibility conditions for
each strategy that have to be satisfied to be a feasible Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2.3
The equilibrium production capacities of the entrant are stated in Table 2.3. Table
2.4 gives the unique equilibrium quantities of product 2 for both firms. For the
case that the incumbent invests in product flexibility, the feasibility conditions for
scenario JN is stated in Table 2.5. Feasibility conditions for the other scenarios
can be obtained similarly.
Sce- Optimal flexible capacity of entrant KF,E
nario
IM 12 (θ − KF,I ,I M − CF )
IN 16+2γ
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(0.625+ 0.375α)θ + 18 (1−α)h−
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2 (1+ γ)KF,I ,LP − CF
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Table 2.3: Optimal capacities of the entrant for all feasible scenar-
ios.
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Sce- Out- Quantity product 2 incumbent Quantity product 2 entrant
nario M come N q2,I ,N ,M q2,E,N ,M
IM I 0 0
M 0 0



































































































































































QS Q 0 K2,E,QS
S 0 K2,E,QS
UX U 0 0
X 0 0
















Table 2.4: Optimal quantities for product 2 of the incumbent and
the entrant for all feasible scenarios. The optimal quan-
tity of product 1, if a firm does not produce product 2,
is equal to the total capacity of this firm. If the optimal
quantity of product 2 is strictly positive, the quantity of
product 1 is simply the total capacity of the firm minus
the production quantity of product 2 in that scenario.
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Strategy JN
E[πI ,JN ]≥ E[πI ,ϕ] ∀ϕ ∈ {J P, LP} E[πI ,JN ]≥ 0


























(1+γ) − KF,I ,JN
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Table 2.5: Feasibility conditions for strategy JN. The feasibility con-
ditions for the other strategies can analogously be ob-
tained.
Table 2.3 shows that the optimal capacities that correspond to scenario IN
and IP (KF,E,IN and FF,E,I P) are the same. Under strategy IN and IP, both firms
invest in the flexible production. However, in case the market goes down, the
incumbent firm produces only product 1 under scenario IN while it produces
both products under scenario IP. The optimal production quantities of the
incumbent are not affected by the capacity choice of the entrant (KF,E,IN or
KF,E,I P). These optimal incumbents optimal production quantities are inserted in
the entrants expected future profit function, which it maximizes with respect to
capacity choice. As a result, the capacity size of the entrant is also not affected
by the choice of the incumbent to produce either one or two products. For the
same reason we also find that the optimal capacities, corresponding to scenario
JN, JP and LP, are equal.
The incumbent first chooses its capacity. Hence, the incumbent again enjoys
the first mover advantage with respect to the capacity choice (note that the
production game is played simultaneously). As in Section 2.3.1, each scenario
gives the incumbent many different boundary and interior solutions, of which
it chooses the optimal one. Besides that, also expected profit expressions are
messy, which makes an analytical solution for the incumbents optimal capacity
choice impossible. We solve this using the software program Mathematica.
32 Dedicated vs Product Flexible Production Technology Chapter 2
2.4 Results
2.4.1 The Value of Flexibility Versus the Value of Commitment
Earlier literature shows that increasing demand uncertainty substantially raises
the value of flexible production systems. This holds for several types of flexibility
(Hagspiel (2011), Chod and Rudi (2005), and Anupindi and Jiang (2008), Yang
et al. (2011)). In this chapter we consider product flexibility. The advantage
of product flexibility is that it enables a firm to shift production around within
one production line. This gives value to a firm, i.e. the value of flexibility. On
the other hand, dedicated production systems generate a value of commitment.
Combined with the market clearance assumption, an incumbent with a ded-
icated production system commits to the production amounts it has chosen
initially when deciding about the capacity level. The entrant is aware of this in-
flexibility and adapts to the production choice of the incumbent. Therefore, the
dedicated incumbent will enjoy the Stackelberg first mover advantage (Anand
and Girotra (2007)). Besides this form of commitment value, we find a new
type of commitment, namely commitment on the side of the entrant. This
happens when the incumbent invests in a flexible capacity and the entrant in a
dedicated capacity. Here, the incumbent cannot influence the quantity decision
of the entrant in the production game, which gives additional value to the
entrant.
There are two ways in which a firm can produce, either a firm invests
dedicated or a firm invests flexible. This leads to two possible objective values.
Comparing these objective values will make clear what dominates, the value of
flexibility or the value of being committed to produce one specific technology.
However, we cannot present a consistent formula for the value of flexibility and
the value of commitment, since the tradeoff between these values is discussed
differently in different subsections of the results.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the tradeoff between the two explained types of com-
mitment value and the value of flexibility. Notice that the substitutability
parameter is chosen to be low (γ=0.2). When the substitutability parameter
is high, the products are so similar that both firms want to produce just the
more profitable product 1 for all considered market situations. This holds for
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both the dedicated and the flexible production technology. However, if the
substitutability parameter is low, it might be optimal to produce both products.
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Figure 2.5: The profit of the incumbent (upper graph) and the
entrant (lower graph) for the four possible occurring
market situations. Parameter values are γ=0.2, θ=100,
CF = CD=10 and f =0. Not all lines are visible in the fig-
ures. This indicates that some market outcomes result
in the same profit. For the two upper graphs, the profit
of a dedicated incumbent that faces a flexible entrant
overlays the profit when it faces a dedicated entrant,
for all levels of uncertainty. The thick lines indicate
the profit corresponding to the resulting technology
equilibrium.
The two left graphs in Figure 2.5 illustrate the case where profitability of
product 2 is relatively low (α=0.2). In combination with a low product sub-
stitutability (γ=0.2), Hagspiel (2011) has shown that in such a case the value
of flexibility is larger. Therefore, the incumbent will in equilibrium invest in
the flexible production technology. The lower left graph of Figure 2.5 illus-
trates that, given the flexible technology choice of the incumbent, the entrant’s
equilibrium investment choice depends on the level of uncertainty. For low
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levels of uncertainty the entrant prefers to be in a symmetric market, and will
also invest in the flexible production technology. However, for high levels of
uncertainty both firms obtain a higher profit when the entrant invests in the
dedicated production technology. Here, the incumbent prefers to be the only
firm with the flexible capacity in the market and makes a sufficiently high ca-
pacity investment, which forces a flexible entrant to make a production choice
that is less profitable than when it would have chosen to be dedicated. The
downward jump in the entrant’s profit function and the kink in the incumbent’s
profit function, when both firms invest in the flexible capacity, is caused by
the fact that for lower levels of uncertainty the entrant is the only producer of
product 2, and the incumbent after the kink (see left hand plots around h =40).
The right graphs of Figure 2.5 illustrate the case when the profitability
of product 2 is high (α=0.8). These graphs illustrate where the value of
commitment dominates the value of flexibility for the incumbent, as well as for
the entrant. The region where the incumbent’s value of commitment dominates
its value of flexibility, is seen in the upper right graph. It shows that investing
dedicated is more profitable for the incumbent for a less uncertain environment.
A dedicated incumbent can fix its capacity at time t=0. The entrant has to
adapt afterwards to these production quantities. This gives the incumbent so
much value that it prefers to invest dedicated over flexible (despite all its well
known advantages). However, in case of a very uncertain market environment,
the value of flexibility will dominate, and the incumbent will prefer the flexible
production technology.
Result 2.1
Under some market conditions (economic environment not very uncertain, similar
profitability of both products, low substitutability) it is more profitable for the
incumbent to invest in the dedicated production technology.
The region where the entrant’s value of commitment dominates its value of
flexibility is shown in the lower right graph of Figure 2.5. When the incumbent
invests in the flexible production technology and an intermediate demand un-
certainty is considered, the entrant obtains a larger profit from investment in
the dedicated capacity than from investment in the flexible capacity. Here, it is
less profitable for the entrant to also invest in the flexible capacity, because a
flexible incumbent can influence the optimal quantity decision of the flexible
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entrant in the production game, which lowers the entrant’s optimal quantity
and therefore its profit. Therefore, the entrant fixes production to its dedicated
capacities, before uncertainty is resolved. However, when the demand uncer-
tainty is somewhat higher, the value of flexibility is so high that also the entrant
obtains a higher profit from investment in the flexible production capacity.
Result 2.2
When the incumbent has invested in the flexible capacity, it is for some market
conditions (intermediate levels of uncertainty, similar profitability of both products,
low substitutability) more profitable for the entrant to invest in the dedicated
production technology.
Equilibria 2.4.2
Where our incumbent-entrant setup results in sequential capacity choice, Goyal
and Netessine (2007) consider a simultaneous capacity game. They show that
when the flexible and dedicated capacity are equally expensive, an economic
environment with low uncertainty results in a market where either both firms
invest in the dedicated capacity, or one firm invests dedicated and the other
firm flexible. For inbetween levels of uncertainty, the two firms choose to
be symmetric and invest in the same production technology. For high values
of uncertainty, the firms choose in equilibrium to both invest in the flexible
production technology, or one firm invests flexible and the other firm invests
dedicated.
Contrary to Goyal and Netessine (2007), we can show that a sequential
game will never lead to an equilibrium where both firms invest in the dedicated
capacity. This we see in the two considered market situations in Figure 2.5.
Proposition 2.4 states that this result holds for all market conditions.
Proposition 2.4
In a market with sequential investment, both firms investing in the dedicated
production technology will not be an equilibrium.
Entry Accommodation and Entry Deterrence 2.4.3
The incumbent can react in several ways to an entry threat. In particular, we can
distinguish between entry accommodation, entry deterrence, and blockaded
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entry (see e.g. Tirole (1988)). With blockaded entry, the optimal monopoly
capacities of the incumbent already cause that the entrant will not enter the
market. Entry deterrence also prevents the entrant to enter the market. To
achieve this however, the incumbent needs to overinvest (invest in more capacity
than a monopolist would do) in order to prevent entry. Entry accommodation
will occur when the investment that is necessary to prevent entry is too large,
i.e. it is too costly, so that it is better for the incumbent to take entry of the
competitor for granted.
Entry deterrence and blockaded entry have as consequence that the entrant
will not enter the market. Therefore, those strategies correspond for a dedicated
incumbent to ‘strategy GH’, and for a flexible incumbent to ‘scenarios UX, UY
or VY’.
We now derive the minimal level of fixed entry cost, denoted by f ∗, that leads
to entry deterrence. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 illustrate the results for an uncertainty
level h =20, in case of a dedicated and a flexible incumbent, respectively.
Note that in the situation of low demand uncertainty it is more difficult for
an incumbent to deter a flexible entrant than a dedicated entrant (as is also
illustrated in Figure 2.5). For some levels of entry cost f , the incumbent
manages to deter the dedicated entrant, but not the flexible entrant. Therefore,
the incumbent faces a flexible entrant for a fixed cost of entry slightly smaller
than f ∗.
α ↓/γ→ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0 43.5 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.1 50.15 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.2 56.8 49.1 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.3 60.3 55.1 48.2 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.4 62.3 58.25 53.45 47.3 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.5 62.25 59.6 56.25 51.95 46.5 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.6 61.4 59.1 57.1 54.35 50.6 45.8 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.7 62.5 58.95 56.34 54.45 52.5 49.4 45.15 43.4 43.4
0.8 65.8 61 57.2 54.1 51.9 50.3 48.2 44.5 43.4
0.9 71.28 65.55 60.7 56.55 53.2 50.3 48.2 46.6 43.95
1 78.9 72.35 66.8 62 57.9 54.3 51.1 48.3 45.7
Table 2.6: Minimal level of fixed entry cost, f ∗, for which the dedi-
cated incumbent is able to deter entry. Parameter values
are θ=100, h=20, and CD = CF=10.
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α ↓/γ→ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0 125.8 93.5 61.05 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.1 137.6 110 80.1 49.45 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.2 142.1 120.9 96.1 68.1 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.3 138 124.6 106.4 83.8 57.1 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.4 133.8 118.6 109.3 93.7 72.9 46.8 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.5 118.7 115 107.1 95.7 82.5 63 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.6 113.4 103 97.2 92.7 83.7 72.6 53.9 43.4 43.4
0.7 101.6 97.9 89.7 82.6 79.6 72.8 64 44.7 43.4
0.8 86.8 83.4 79.9 77.1 71.7 65.6 63.9 56.3 43.4
0.9 76 70.8 67.7 64.5 62.3 60.1 57.7 52 49.5
1 78.9 72.35 66.8 62 57.9 54.3 51.1 48.3 45.7
Table 2.7: Minimal level of fixed entry cost, f ∗, for which the flexi-
ble incumbent is able to deter entry. Parameter values
are θ=100, h=20, and CD = CF=10.
Tirole (1988) has shown already that an incumbent is unable to deter entry
when, upon entry, the entrant does not need to incur any fixed entry costs. We
confirm this result. In the presence of positive entry costs, however, we find
the following result stated in Result 2.3. It is easily shown mathematically that
a lower f ∗ (minimum entry cost to deter the entrant) corresponds to a lower
over-investment level needed to deter entry for the incumbent.
Result 2.3
When demand uncertainty is relatively low, a dedicated incumbent overinvests less
than or equal to that of a flexible incumbent, in order to deter the flexible entrant.
If the incumbent invests dedicated, it chooses both the production quan-
tities and the capacities in the initial period t=0, while the flexible entrant
determines production quantities once demand realization is resolved. Hence,
the incumbent makes its production decision before the entrant does so. The
production decisions are made sequentially, and therefore one has to derive a
Stackelberg equilibrium, with the incumbent as leader. On the other hand, if the
incumbent invests flexible, it can make its production decision once demand un-
certainty is resolved (i.e. after its capacity decision). Then the two firms decide
simultaneously, in the last stage of the game, about the production quantities.
Consequently, a Nash equilibrium has to be derived. Therefore, the dedicated
incumbent can deter entry for a lower minimal level of fixed entry cost.
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If the incumbent chooses for the dedicated capacity, the value of commitment
is easily understood for the case ofα = 0, i.e. the second product it not profitable.
Assume that substitutability is low. Table 2.7 shows that in that case it is very
difficult for a flexible incumbent to deter entry. Table 2.6 however shows that
for these parameter values a dedicated incumbent can deter entry relatively
easy, i.e. entry deterrence is already realized for low values of the fixed entry
cost. Investing dedicated makes the incumbent stronger, in the sense that it can
restrict to produce just product 1 in the first stage already. The entrant knows
this and has to adapt its production quantities to the fixed quantities of the
incumbent. With the flexible capacity, the incumbent places itself in a weaker
position since it allows the entrant to have as much influence on the (Nash)
equilibrium as itself. When the capacity of a flexible incumbent is very high, it
might be more profitable for a flexible firm to give some of product 2 away for
free, than to produce too much of product 1. (Recall that the market clearance
assumption forces a firm to produce up to capacity.) A flexible incumbent thus
produces a positive amount of a non-profitable product, while a dedicated
incumbent will only produce the profitable product. Therefore, a dedicated
incumbent can deter entry already for lower fixed entry cost.
The results presented in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 give us further insights: In
the upper right triangle, the same fixed entry cost, i.e. f ∗=43.4, is needed
to prevent entry. The combination of low profitability of product 2 and high
substitutability causes that only two strategies are feasible for the entrant: to
produce only product 1 in the two possible market scenarios, or do not invest at
all. Producing product 2 is never feasible for the dedicated entrant. Therefore,
small changes in substitutability, profitability and uncertainty will not change
the profit of the entrant here. Furthermore, there is no difference between
a dedicated incumbent and a flexible incumbent for this parameter ranges.
Consequently, for all situations where the entrant will produce only product 1
or invest not at all, the minimum fixed entry cost where deterrence will occur
stays the same.
Second, the effect of profitability of product 2 on f ∗ is non monotonic. Con-
sider the case that the incumbent invests in the dedicated production technology
(see Table 2.6). Here, the entrant is the only firm that will enjoy the advantages
of shifting production of the two products within the flexible capacity. For a
very low value of α, the entrant only produces the more profitable product
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in both market scenarios. For a somewhat higher value of α, also product 2
becomes more profitable. In this case, the entrant produces product 1 when the
market goes ‘up’, and both products when the market goes ‘down’. That is, the
flexible capacity becomes valuable for the entrant and a higher fixed entry cost
f ∗ is needed to deter the entrant. For higher values of α, the profitability of
product 2 is such high that the firms always produce both products. In this case,
the entrant cannot not use the advantage of the flexible production technology.
This results in a lower fixed entry cost is needed to deter the entrant. For very
high values of α, the profitability of the second product is such high that the
entrant can obtain a high profit by entering the market and producing two
products. For those values of α, a higher fixed entry cost is needed to deter the
entrant.
Next, we consider the case where the incumbent invests in the flexible
production technology (see Table 2.7). The incumbent has the first mover
advantage in the capacity game and is able to enjoy the advantages of the
flexible capacity even more than the entrant. In the case that the profitability
of product 2 is very low, the incumbent produces only product 1, but allows
the entrant to shift the production of two products within the flexible capacity.
Hence, a higher fixed entry cost f ∗, is needed to deter the entrant. For a
higher level of the profitability of product 2, the flexible capacity becomes
more valuable and the incumbent chooses its capacity such that it is optimal
to produce 1 product when the market goes ‘up’ and both products when the
market goes ‘down’. Under this capacity choice, it is optimal for the entrant to
produce both products in the two market scenarios, and it is not able to use the
advantage of its flexible technology. Therefore, the dedicated incumbent can
deter entry for a lower minimal level of fixed entry cost.
Third, comparing the bottom rows of Tables 2.6 and 2.7 shows that it does
not matter for the incumbent whether it invests flexible or dedicated when both
products are equally profitable (α = 1). The minimum fixed entry cost, f ∗, that
is necessary for the incumbent to be able to deter entry is the same in this case.
The reason is that the firms have no incentive to produce one product over the
other, if both products are equally profitable. The firms will always produce
both products and assign half of their capacity to each product. Therefore, it is
optimal to keep this assignment fixed, even if a firm invests flexible.
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2.4.4 Entry Deterrence Facing a Highly Uncertain Economic Environment
Proposition 2.4 shows that it is never optimal for an entrant to invest in the
dedicated production technology when it faces a dedicated incumbent. There-
fore, when we create a similar table as Table 2.6 for a high level of uncertainty
(h =80), at f ∗ the incumbent faces a flexible entrant. However, Figure 2.5
shows that a flexible incumbent can face a dedicated entrant for a high enough
level of uncertainty. Table 2.8 and 2.9 illustrate the minimal level f of fixed
entry cost that leads to entry deterrence in case of a dedicated and flexible
incumbent, respectively, for a high level of uncertainty (h=80).
α ↓/γ→ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0 312.8 272.6 228.9 182 132.7 87.9 54.5 43.4 43.4
0.1 301.4 269.8 233.1 192.1 146.7 99.7 61.7 43.4 43.4
0.2 280.8 258.7 231.0 197.4 158.0 112.9 70.7 44.7 43.4
0.3 251.5 238.4 220.1 195.7 164.4 125.7 81.5 48.7 43.4
0.4 219.4 210.1 200.6 185.6 164.0 133.9 94.1 55.3 43.4
0.5 190.9 181.2 173.4 166.6 154.7 135.1 105.1 64.4 43.4
0.6 160.8 155.6 147.5 141.0 136.1 126.9 108.9 76.3 44.1
0.7 129.6 126.6 123.4 117.9 112.4 108.6 102.0 84.4 49.2
0.8 99.2 97.6 95.9 93.9 91.6 87.6 84.1 80 59.4
0.9 79.6 74.9 71.4 69.2 68.0 66.9 65.6 63.2 60.4
1 78.9 72.35 66.8 62 57.9 54.3 51.1 48.3 45.7
Table 2.8: Minimal level of fixed entry cost, f ∗, for which the dedi-
cated incumbent is able to deter entry. Parameter values
are θ=100, h=80, and CD = CF=10.
It seems counterintuitive that when the economic environment is very
uncertain, an entrant that faces a flexible incumbent, prefers to invest in the
dedicated capacity. However, in a highly uncertain economic environment it is
very profitable for the incumbent to be the only firm in the market with flexibility.
It will set its capacity so high that the entrant rather wants to invest in the
dedicated production capacity, than later compete with the flexible incumbent
in the production game. Therefore, for a fixed cost of entry slightly smaller
than f ∗, the incumbent faces a dedicated entrant2.
2In case an intermediate levels of uncertainty is considered (h = 40), the incumbent can face
a flexible or a dedicated incumbent, depending on the levels of substitutability and profitability
of product 2. For low level of substitutability and low profitability of product 2, the incumbent
faces in general a flexible entrant. For most parameter choices, entrant is indifferent between the
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α ↓/γ→ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0 69.9 66.2 62.6 59.3 56.2 53.3 52.6 50 43.4
0.1 86.6 66.2 62.6 59.3 56.2 53.3 51.8 50.2 43.4
0.2 108.2 75.8 62.6 59.3 56.2 53.3 50.8 50.0 43.4
0.3 124.7 96.3 62.6 59.3 56.2 53.3 50.6 49.6 45
0.4 131 111.2 86.6 59.3 56.2 53.3 50.6 48.9 46.1
0.5 123.4 114 87 78.6 56.2 53.3 50.6 48.1 46.6
0.6 111.6 103.8 98.6 89.5 72 53.3 50.6 48.1 46.6
0.7 103 97.6 86.3 84.1 78.9 66.6 50.6 48.1 46.1
0.8 85.8 82.2 81.2 76.6 69.3 67.8 61.5 48.1 45.6
0.9 76.3 71.2 67.2 64.1 61.9 60.8 52.1 54.4 45.6
1 78.9 72.35 66.8 62 57.9 54.3 51.1 48.3 45.7
Table 2.9: Minimal level of fixed entry cost, f ∗, for which the flexi-
ble incumbent is able to deter entry. Parameter values
are θ=100, h=80, and CD = CF=10.
Comparing the results presented in Table 2.8 to Table 2.9 one can conclude
that Result 2.3 does not hold in case of a highly uncertain economic environment.
Given that demand uncertainty is high, it is more difficult for a dedicated
incumbent to deter a flexible entrant, than for a flexible incumbent to deter a
dedicated entrant.
Result 2.4
For a market with highly uncertain demand, a dedicated incumbent has to overin-
vest more than a flexible incumbent, to be able to deter the entrant, except when
the profitability of product 2 is low and substitutability between the products is
high.
Analyzing the differences of the results in Table 2.6 and Table 2.8 shows
that in a market with high uncertainty it is harder for the dedicated incumbent
to deter a flexible entrant. The high uncertainty makes the entrant a strong
competitor, because the value of flexibility is high.
Comparison of Table 2.7 and 2.9, for the case where products are highly
substitutable and profitability of product 2 is low, shows the same result. This
flexible and the dedicated production facility. For only a few parameter choices, the incumbent
faces a dedicated entrant for a fixed entry cost slightly smaller than f ∗. Here it is more difficult
to deter a dedicated entrant that has a high revenue from the production of two products,
where this strategy is not feasible for a flexible entrant (see Tables 2.10 and 2.11 in Appendix
2.C).
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is the scenario where production of product 2 is the least appealing. The upper
right corner of Table 2.7 shows that the minimum fixed cost of entry to deter
is equal to f ∗=43.4, in this scenario both firms produce product 1. A market
environment that is very uncertain causes that product 2 is still an interesting
production option for the incumbent. Therefore, in the upper right corner of
Table 2.9, it is illustrated that the opportunity of the flexible incumbent to
also produce product 2 makes it more difficult to deter the dedicated entrant
that is fixed to its capacity of just product 1. This is another example of the
value of commitment on the side of the entrant. However, the combination of a
high profitability of product 2 and a low substitutability, is the best scenario
for producing product 2, and therefore the flexible capacity is in favor for the
incumbent. In this situation, a higher uncertainty leads to a lower minimum
fixed cost of entry that is necessary to deter the dedicated entrant.
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter employs a three-stage game with two firms and two products
considering uncertain demand. In the first stage, the incumbent invests in a
product flexible or a dedicated production technology. The product flexible pro-
duction technology gives the incumbent the opportunity to assign the available
capacity freely to either one of the products. With the dedicated production
technology, it will produce both products, each on a separate production line.
In the second stage the entrant decides whether it will also invest in this market
and if so, it chooses its optimal production technology and capacity level. After
that, demand is revealed and a production game will be played in the last stage.
The product flexible firm(s) optimize(s) the(ir) production amounts, given that
the firms produce up to the capacity level.
Our results differ for two situations, a more uncertain and a less uncertain
economic environment. When the economic environment is not very uncertain,
we confirm the results of Anand and Girotra (2007), that investing dedicated
can give an incumbent such a high ‘commitment value’, that the dedicated
production technology is preferred over the product flexible production technol-
ogy. Here the entrant always chooses for the product flexible technology. The
commitment of the dedicated incumbent to its production quantities implies
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that the entrant has to optimize its production quantities given the (fixed)
production quantities of the incumbent. Therefore, the incumbent needs to
charge a lower fixed entry cost to deter the product flexible entrant with the
dedicated production technology than with the product flexible production
technology.
When the economic environment is more uncertain, the entrant chooses for
the dedicated production technology. A higher demand uncertainty results in a
higher value of flexibility that is large enough for the incumbent to prefer to be
the only firm in the market profiting from the advantages of flexibility. There-
fore, the incumbent makes a sufficiently large capacity investment that places
the entrant in an unattractive production scenario. Therefore, the dedicated
capacity is more profitable for the entrant, because it gives the entrant the first
mover advantage in the production game.
Goyal and Netessine (2007) show that two dedicated firms can be the
equilibrium if the firms simultaneously make their capacity and technology
choice. However, we show that this situation will never occur when the firms
make these choices sequentially. The only reason for the entrant to invest in
the dedicated technology is that it gives the firm a first mover advantage in
the production game. This advantage disappears when the incumbent already
invested dedicated. When, however, the entrant faces a product flexible in-
cumbent, we show that for some scenarios also the entrant can profit from the
value of commitment. If the entrant uses the dedicated capacity, the incumbent
cannot influence the entrant’s production choice in the last stage. This results
in a higher profit for the entrant compared to the choice of a product flexible
capacity.
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2.A Proof of Propositions
2.A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
For the case of strategy BD, considering Assumption 2.1, the corresponding
expected profit of the entrant is equal to:
E(πE,BD) = 0.5πE,B + 0.5πE,D − CF KF,E,BD − f ,
where
πE,B = (θ + h− (q1,E,B,BD + K1,I)− γ(q2,E,B,BD + K2,I))q1,E,B,BD+
(α(θ + h)− (q2,E,B,BD + K2,I)− γ(q1,E,B,BD + K1,I))q2,E,B,BD
s.t. q1,E,B,BD + q2,E,B,BD = KF,E,BD,
and
πE,D = (θ − h− (q1,E,D,BD + K1,I)− γ(q2,E,D,BD + K2,I))q1,E,D,BD+
(α(θ − h)− (q2,E,D,BD + K2,I)− γ(q1,E,D,BD + K1,I))q2,E,D,BD
s.t. q1,E,D,BD + q2,E,D,BD = KF,E,BD.
Substituting the conditions q1,E,B,BD = KF,E,BD − q2,E,B,BD and q1,E,D,BD = KF,E,BD −
q2,E,D,BD in the respective profit functions πE,B and πE,D gives the following
expressions:
πE,B = (θ+h−(KF,E,BD−q2,E,B,BD+K1,I)−γ(q2,E,B,BD+K2,I))(KF,E,BD−q2,E,B,BD)+




(α(θ − h)− (q2,E,D,BD + K2,I)− γ(KF,E,BD − q2,E,D,BD + K1,I))q2,E,D,BD.
(2.A.2)
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We maximize both expression (2.A.1) and expression (2.A.2) with respect to
the variables q2,E,B,BD and q2,E,D,BD respectively, and solve the obtained first
order conditions simultaneously. This yields optimal production quantities
q∗2,E,B,BD(KF,E,BD) and q
∗
2,E,D,BD(KF,E,BD), and we subsequently find q
∗
1,E,B,BD(KF,E,BD) =
KF,E,BD − q∗2,E,B,BD(KF,E,BD) and q
∗











with respect to the capacity KF,E,BD. Setting the first order condition equal to
zero, and solving for KF,E,BD leads to the optimal capacity K
∗
F,E,BD.
For the cases where the entrant uses strategy AD or AC, similar steps lead
to the optimal quantities and capacities for the entrant. Remember that for
strategy AD the entrant’s quantity of product 2 is equal to zero, when the market
goes ‘up’. For strategy AC, the entrant’s quantity of product 2 is equal to zero,
for both ‘up’ and ‘down’ scenarios. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2 2.A.2
Consider the case where the entrant uses strategy BD. Under Assumption 2.1
and after substitution of the optimal quantities of the entrant, the expected
profit function of the incumbent is equal to:
E(πI ,BD) = 0.5πI ,B + 0.5πI ,D − CD(K1,I + K2,I),
where,
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The optimal capacities can be derived by maximizing E(πI ,BD) with respect to
the capacities of the incumbent (K1,I , K2,I). The resulting optimal capacities are
given by equations (3) and (4) in Proposition 2.2.
However, if those optimal capacities lie outside the area of strategy BD,
the incumbent would choose a capacity level on the boundary of the region
belonging to strategy BD. The boundary solution for the case that the production
choice of product 2 of the entrant is equal to zero can be found by solving
q∗2,E,B,BD(K1,I , K2,I , K2,E,BD) = 0 for K2,E,BD. Then we substitute the optimal K2,E,BD
into the entrant’s expected profit function E(πI ,BD). Next, we derive the first
order condition of this expected profit function with respect to K1,E, and solve




2,E,BD are the optimal capacities under the
assumption that the production quantity of product 2 of the entrant is zero.
Similar steps lead to the optimal boundary solution for the case where
either the capacity choice or the profit of the entrant is equal to zero. For those
boundary solutions, we solve K∗F,E,BD(K1,I , K2,I) = 0 and πI ,BD(K1,I , K2,I) = 0,
respectively, for K2,E,BD, and substitute into the expected profit function E(πI ,BD).
The next steps follow analogous to the previous case (that the production choice
of the entrant is set equal to zero). 
2.A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
For the case where the entrant faces scenario JN, considering Assumption 2.1,
the corresponding expected profit of firm j ∈ {I , E} is equal to:
E(π j,JN ) = 0.5π j,J + 0.5π j,N − CF, jKF, j,JN − f ,
where
π j,J = (θ + h− (q1,E,J ,JN + q1,I ,J ,JN )− γ(q2,E,J ,JN + q2,I ,J ,JN ))q1, j,J ,JN+
(α(θ + h)− (q2,E,J ,JN + q2,I ,J ,JN )− γ(q1,E,J ,JN + q1,I ,J ,JN ))q2, j,J ,JN
s.t. q1, j,J ,JN + q2, j,J ,JN = KF, j,JN ,
and
π j,N = (θ + h− (q1,E,N ,JN + q1,I ,N ,JN )− γ(q2,E,N ,JN + q2,I ,N ,JN ))q1, j,N ,JN+
Section 2.A Proof of Propositions 47
(α(θ + h)− (q2,E,N ,JN + q2,I ,N ,JN )− γ(q1,E,N ,JN + q1,I ,N ,JN ))q2, j,N ,JN
s.t. q1, j,N ,JN + q2, j,N ,JN = KF, j,JN .
Substituting the conditions q1, j,J ,JN = KF, j,JN − q2, j,J ,JN and q1, j,N ,JN = KF, j,JN −




θ + h− (KF,E,JN − q2,E,J ,JN + KF,I ,JN − q2,I ,J ,JN ) (2.A.3)
− γ(q2,E,J ,JN + q2,I ,J ,JN )

(KF, j,JN − q2, j,J ,JN )
+

α(θ + h)− (q2,E,J ,JN + q2,I ,J ,JN )
− γ(KF,E,JN − q2,E,J ,JN + KF,I ,JN − q2,I ,J ,JN )





θ + h− (KF,E,JN − q2,E,N ,JN + KF,I ,JN − q2,I ,N ,JN ) (2.A.4)
− γ(q2,E,N ,JN + q2,I ,N ,JN)

(KF, j,JN − q2, j,N ,JN )
+

α(θ + h)− (q2,E,N ,JN + q2,I ,N ,JN )
− γ(KF,E,JN − q2,E,N ,JN + KF,I ,JN − q2,I ,N ,JN )

q2, j,N ,JN .
We maximize both expression (2.A.3) and expression (2.A.4) with respect to the
variables q2, j,J ,JN and q2, j,N ,JN respectively, for j ∈ {I , E}. The obtained first order
conditions have to be solved simultaneously for both firms, which yields optimal
production quantities q∗2, j,J ,JN (KF, j,JN ) and q
∗
2, j,N ,JN (KF, j,JN ), and we subsequently
find q∗1, j,J ,JN(KF, j,JN) = KF, j,JN − q
∗
2, j,J ,JN(KF, j,JN) and q
∗
1, j,N ,JN(KF, j,JN) = KF, j,JN −
q∗2, j,N ,JN (KF, j,JN ). We maximize, for both firms j ∈ {I , E},
E(π j,JN (q∗1, j,J ,JN (KF, j,JN ), q
∗
2, j,J ,JN (KF, j,JN ), q
∗
1, j,N ,JN (KF, j,JN ), q
∗
2, j,N ,JN (KF, j,JN )))
with respect to the capacity KF, j,JN . Setting the first order condition equal to zero,




Expressions of the optimal quantities and capacities for the other cases are
obtained similarly. 
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2.A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4
We will prove in two steps, that it is a dominant strategy for the entrant to
invest in the flexible capacity, when it observes an incumbent with a dedicated
capacity. First we show that a dedicated investment of the entrant (strategy EF)
in two products is dominated by the strategy BD (see Figure 2) when it would
invest in the flexible capacity. Second, we show that a dedicated investment in
only one product is dominated by strategy AC of a flexible entrant.
First, assume that both firms invest in the dedicated production technology
(strategy EF), and that it is optimal for the entrant to invest in a positive amount
of both products. In this case, the profit of the entrant is equal to
πE,EF =
(C2F − (1+α)CFθ )(1− γ) + 0.5(1+α
2 − 2αγ)θ 2
8(1− γ2)
.
When only the incumbent invests in the dedicated capacity and the entrant
invests in the flexible capacity, producing both products in both scenarios
(strategy BD) gives the entrant a profit equal to
πE,BD =
(C2F − (1+α)CFθ )(1− γ) + (1−α)
2h2(1+ γ) + 0.5(1+α2 − 2αγ)θ 2
8(1− γ2)
.
Comparison of these profits show that πE,EF < πE,BD. Therefore, when both
situations are feasible, the entrant will always obtain a higher profit from
investment in the flexible capacity. Next, we show that when there exists a
nonempty region for strategy BD in the (K1,I , K2,I)-plane, the feasible region for
strategy EF will be a subset of the region belonging to strategy BD. A strategy is
feasible when it implies positive capacities, and positive production quantities.
We find that strategy EF and BD result in the same total optimal capacity:
K1,E,EF + K2,E,EF = KF,E,BD =
(1+α)θ − (1+ γ)(K1,I + K2,I)− 2CF
2(1+ γ)
.
Solving q2,E,B,BD(K1,I , K2,I) = 0 for K2,I results in boundary KBD2,I for the region
belonging to strategy BD. Similarly, solving K2,E,EF(K1,I , K2,I) = 0 for K2,I re-
sults in boundary K EF2,I for the region belonging to strategy EF. Then, capacity
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K2,E,EF(K1,I , K2,I) and quantity q2,E,B,BD(K1,I , K2,I) are given by
K2,E,EF(K1,I , K2,I) =
θ (α− γ)− (1− γ2)K2,I − (1− γ)CF
2(1− γ2)
,
q2,E,B,BD(K1,I , K2,I) =
θ (α− γ)− (1− γ2)K2,I − (1− γ)CF − 0.5(1−α)(1+ γ)h
2(1− γ2)
.
Because K2,E,EF(K1,I , K2,I)> q2,E,B,BD(K1,I , K2,I), it holds that KBD2,I > K
EF
2,I . There-
fore the feasible region for strategy EF is a subset of the feasible region for
strategy BD. Together with the fact that strategy BD always gives a higher profit
than strategy EF for the entrant, we can conclude that strategy BD dominates
strategy EF.
Second, assume that it is optimal for a dedicated entrant to invest only in
product 1. When both firms invest in the dedicated production technology, the





When only the entrant invests in the flexible production technology, and pro-
duces only product 1 in the up- and downward scenario (strategy AC), the




(θ − 3CD + 2CF)2.
Since we consider the case where investment costs per unit of capacity are
equal for the two types of capacities, we find that πE,EF = πE,AC . Therefore,
for the case where it is optimal for the entrant to invest only in the dedicated
capacity of product 1, it is indifferent between investing dedicated and investing
flexible (with strategy AC). For the parameter combinations for which it is only
feasible for the entrant to invest in only the dedicated capacity of product
1, it might be feasible with the flexible capacity to invest in strategy BD, AD
or AC. We have shown that the entrant’s profit with strategy AC is equal to
strategy EF. Performing strategy BD or AD implies that the entrant will also
optimally produce a positive amount of product 2, therefore the entrant’s
profit corresponding to these strategies are bigger than from strategy AC. This
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indicates that an entrant will always obtain a higher profit from investing in
the flexible production technology, when it observes a dedicated incumbent. 
2.B Additional Proofs
2.B.1 Stochastic discount factor equal to h
Lemma 2.1
The standard deviation of the price intercept at time t = 2 is equal to h.
Proof
Define the price intercept at time t = k by θt=k for k ∈ {0, 1, 2}. At time t = 0
and t = 1 demand is still uncertain, only at time t = 2 demand uncertainty is
resolved. We find that
θt=2 =
¨
θt=0 + h with p =
1
2 ,














2.B.2 Elimination of Strategy BC
Lemma 2.2
Production strategy BC of the entrant (i.e. produce two products when the market
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makes an upward move, and one product when the market moves downward) is
an infeasible strategy.
Proof
We first show that the following inequality holds:
E(πE,BD(K1,I , K2,I))−E(πE,BC(K1,I , K2,I))≥ 0 ∀(K1,I , K2,I). (2.B.1)
We take the first order derivatives of E(πE,BD(K1,I , K2,I))− E(πE,BC(K1,I , K2,I))
with respect to K1,I and K2,I . The first order derivative with respect to K1,I is
zero. We set the derivative with respect to K2,I equal to zero, in order to derive
the stationary points. Then we show that the difference in these expected profit










s.t. K1,I ≥ 0.














One can easily see that it is positive-semidefinit. Consequently, this function
is convex and the minimum location is given by the expressions in equation
(2.B.2). Substituting those into E(πE,BD)−E(πE,BC) gives:
E(πE,BD(K1,I , K∗2,I))−E(πE,BC(K1,I , K
∗
2,I)) = 0.
Since E(πE,BD)− E(πE,BC) is convex and the inequality of expression (2.B.1)
holds in the minimum location, we conclude that the inequality of expression
(2.B.1) holds for all capacity choices of the incumbent, i.e. the expected profit
from strategy BD is always higher than the expected profit the entrant would
get choosing for strategy BC.
However, strategy BD is not always feasible. When the entrant plays strategy
BD, it will always produce both products, no matter if the market goes ‘up’ or
‘down’. The optimal quantities of product 2 should not be negative, otherwise
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strategy BD would be infeasible. If the market goes ‘up’, the production quantity
of product 2 will always be less than the production quantity of product 2 when
the market goes ‘down’, i.e. q2,E,B,BD < q2,E,D,BD, where q2,E,B,BD is the production
quantity of product 2 of the entrant that plays strategy BD (and situation
B arises), when the market goes ‘up’. Consequently, regarding the optimal
quantities of strategy BD it only needs to be checked whether q2,E,B,BD > 0 for
this strategy to be feasible.
Strategy BC can only be the best feasible strategy if there exists a situation
where strategy BD is not feasible and strategy BC is feasible (and better than all
other strategies). We will show below that for all situations for which strategy
BC is feasible, strategy BD will also be feasible. Consequently, strategy BC will
never be chosen because strategy BD will always give a higher profit.
First we derive the thresholds for which strategies BD and BC are on the








1+γ =Ûq2,E,B,BC , strategy BC has a positive quantity
of product 2 in case situation B occurs. This is a necessary condition for strategy







1+γ =Ûq2,E,B,BD, strategy BD has a positive quantity
of product 2 in case situation B occurs. This is a necessary condition for strategy
BD to be feasible.



















⇔ 2 > 1+ γ⇔ 1 > γ.
Therefore, it holds that the range of values of K2,I for which strategy BC is
feasible is smaller than for strategy BD. 
2.C Additional Tables
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 illustrate the minimal level f of fixed entry cost that leads
to entry deterrence in case of a dedicated and flexible incumbent, respectively,
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α ↓/γ→ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0 79.7 57.5 44.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.1 91.8 72.6 52.2 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.2 98.0 83.9 66.2 47.8 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.3 98.0 89.1 76.8 60.3 44.8 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.4 97.2 88.9 81.3 70.5 54.9 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.5 93.0 87.9 80.6 74.1 64.8 49.7 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.6 86.0 82.8 78.9 73.4 67.5 69.6 45.4 43.4 43.4
0.7 77.5 75.5 73.2 70.5 66.8 61.5 55.0 43.4 43.42
0.8 72.5 68.5 65.7 64.0 62.2 60.0 56.1 50.8 43.4
0.9 72.9 67.5 62.9 59.1 56.2 54.2 52.8 51.0 46.9
1 78.9 72.35 66.8 62 57.9 54.3 51.1 43.4 43.4
Table 2.10: Minimal level of fixed entry cost, f ∗, for which the
dedicated incumbent is able to deter entry. Parameter
values are θ=100, h=40, and CD = CF=10.
α ↓/γ→ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0 104.5 74.2 70.9 65.8 58.2 47.0 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.1 118.6 91.2 69.9 66.3 60.5 51.5 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.2 127.3 104.6 67.8 65.8 61.8 54.9 43.4 43.4 43.4
0.3 133.3 112.5 92.5 64.2 61.8 57.0 48.3 43.4 43.4
0.4 131.7 117.4 99.9 82.1 60.6 57.8 51.8 43.4 43.4
0.5 120.5 113.9 103.4 88.9 73.2 57.1 53.6 43.4 43.4
0.6 110.0 102.1 97.9 91.1 79.3 65.5 53.7 48.9 43.4
0.7 102.2 94.4 88.1 82.3 78.9 70.8 58.8 50.2 43.4
0.8 87.9 83.1 79.4 75.6 70.8 67.1 62.8 53.0 46.1
0.9 76.7 72.2 68.6 65.3 62.3 59.9 56.9 54.2 47.9
1 78.9 72.35 66.8 62 57.9 54.3 51.1 43.4 43.4
Table 2.11: Minimal level of fixed entry cost, f ∗, for which the
flexible incumbent is able to deter entry. Parameter
values are θ=100, h=40, and CD = CF=10.
for an intermediate level of uncertainty (h=40). If the incumbent invests
flexible, it can face a dedicated and a flexible entrant, depending on the level of
substitutability and profitability of product 2 (see Table 2.11). The parameter
combinations that result in a scenario with a flexible entrant are shaded in
darker grey and the parameter combinations that result in a dedicated entrant
in lighter grey. The entries in Table 2.11 are unshaded for the parameters where
the entrant is indifferent between the flexible or the dedicated capacity.

3Sensitivity of Demand FunctionChoice in a Strategic Real Options
Context
This chapter is based on Boonman and Hagspiel (2014).
Abstract
This chapter studies the effect of three commonly used demand functions on
the investment decisions of two potential entrants in a new market model. Two
of these demand functions are linear and known in the literature as additive
and multiplicative demand. The third is the iso-elastic demand function.
We show that the result of the second firm investing in a larger capacity
size than the first investor is mainly robust concerning the choice of demand
model. However, in case the economic environment is very uncertain, there are
high fixed costs with the investment and if the demand is multiplicative, the
capacity of the first investor is larger. Furthermore, when variable investment
costs increase, for the additive demand case we find that firms invest later
and in a larger capacity, whereas for the multiplicative and iso-elastic demand
functions the firms also invest later but then in less capacity. We also find under
exogenous firm roles that for the additive demand function the first investor
always applies an entry deterrence strategy.
Introduction 3.1
In the early nineties, the fast food chain Boston Chicken was a good business.
The firm added restaurants at a staggering rate, resulting in an average growth
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rate of 82% per year. However, by 1998, the firm grew so fast that it was unable
to maintain the quality expectations of consumers, and could not compete
against the increasing numbers of rival firms. Later that year, the fast food
chain had to file for bankruptcy in 1998 (Ross et al. (2006)). This example
highlights the necessity of firms carefully estimating the size and growth of
the potential market, and thereupon adapting what they believe about their
demand structure. The outcome for Boston Chicken might have been different
if it had realized that the potential market was limited and had to be shared
with its competitors.
This chapter wants to emphasize the importance of choosing the correct
demand structure when evaluating investment decisions, under the general
framework of competition, capacity optimization and optimal timing of in-
vestment. We consider a duopoly game where the firms produce a single
homogeneous type of goods. The optimal level of capacity is chosen alongside
the optimal timing decision. The market leader has the advantage to use its
capacity size to deter the entrant, and maintain its monopoly situation a little
longer.
When capacity or quantity optimization becomes an issue, one has to specify
the demand function in more detail. Most papers in this field only introduce
a specific type of demand function, but refrain from explaining their choice.
Aguerrevere (2003) and Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) study optimal capacity
investment in a real options setting under the assumption of a demand function
with a linear additive demand shock. The additive demand structure is defined
by Pt = At −ηQ t , where Pt denotes the price at time t, Q t the demand, and At
the demand shock parameter that follows a specified distribution. Grenadier
(2000) and Goto et al. (2008) are examples that consider competition in a
real options setting using a multiplicative demand shock structure. They define
their price function as the demand shock multiplied by a function that depends
on demand: Pt = At ∗ D(Q t). Similar to Huisman and Kort (2014), we define
D(Q t) more specifically by assuming that D(Q t) = 1−ηQ t . Furthermore, one
can categorize a third major type of demand function, which is a specific form
of the multiplicative demand function, i.e. the iso-elastic demand shock. This
model is used, in Aguerrevere (2009) and Marx (2007). The iso-elastic demand
model is defined by Pt = AtQ
−1/γ
t , with γ > 1 being the elasticity of demand.
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To our knowledge, there are two papers that explicitly address the impact
of the demand function choice on optimal investment decisions. Anupindi
and Jiang (2008) categorizes demand functions into two streams for different
demand shocks, multiplicative and additive. However, their results with respect
to the two types of demand shocks focus on the comparison of a dedicated and
flexible production technology and not on determining the optimal capacity
size. Despite considering stochastic demand, their model does not allow them
to derive the optimal timing of investment either. Furthermore, their approach
differs from ours by considering symmetric firms, while this paper takes into
account a leader-follower setting. Ming-Gao et al. (2011) extends the work of
Fontes (2008) that distinguishes between three types of flexibility (i.e. contract
capacity - switch to a lower capacity level; expand capacity - switch to an upper
capacity level; or both contract and expand capacity), by comparing results for
the multiplicative and additive demand function. They find that the capacity
flexibility premium is significantly higher under the additive demand function.
While those papers emphasize that the choice of a specific demand function
can have a significant impact on their results, we have not found a paper that
elaborates on the explicit impact of the demand function choice on the timing
and capacity of an optimal investment decision. This is where we want to make
a contribution to the literature. We study the effect of three commonly used
demand functions, i.e. additive, multiplicative and iso-elastic, on the optimal
investment decisions of two competing firms. Initially, we study the firm’s
investment decision under exogenous (i.e. predetermined) firm roles. Here,
the leader can use two strategies, entry deterrence and entry accommodation.
Entry deterrence can be achieved by overinvestment. This gives the leader a
period of monopoly profits. Under entry accommodation, overinvestment is
too expensive and it allows the entrant to invest simultaneously with the leader.
Later we study endogenous firm roles, where the firms compete for the position
of leader. By construction, this results in an entry deterrence situation.
Where we assume a duopoly model, other market structures such as a
monopoly or oligopoly are also discussed in the literature. The monopolistic
model of Manne (1961) lies at the heart of the capacity management literature,
which initially focussed on capacity expansion. It finds that installed capacity
should be of a larger size under uncertainty compared to the deterministic case.
Hagspiel (2011) and Dangl (1999) confirm this result, showing that increasing
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uncertainty does not just lead to investment in larger capacity but also delays
investment. Yang and Zhou (2007) based their research on the framework of
Dangl (1999) and extend this additive demand model by introducing duopoly
firms. Similar to what Huisman and Kort (2014) found for a multiplicative
demand structure, their results show that the entrant cannot be deterred by
investment in excess capacity. Eventually, the entrant will invest in the market.
Where this literature analyzes monopoly and duopoly models, Bouis et al.
(2009) emphasizes the importance of a multiple decision-maker framework
(i.e. an oligopoly). Papers that take up this challenge are Kulatilaka and Perotti
(1998) and Grenadier (2000). The latter explains that the impact of competition
drastically erodes the value of the option to wait and leads to investment at
a close to zero net present value threshold. For a further review on strategic
investment under uncertainty, we refer to Chevalier-Roigant et al. (2011).
In the industrial organization literature (Tirole (1988)), entry deterrence
and entry accommodation are concepts that are typically known in two-period
models, where in the first period the incumbent makes its investment decision
and in the second period the potential entrant reacts. By overinvesting, the
incumbent can achieve entry deterrence, which results in a market where the
entrant refrains from entering. Similar to Huisman and Kort (2014), we extend
this concept to a continuous time framework. In this model, entry deterrence
implies that the entrant invests later than the incumbent, which results in a
period of monopoly profit for the leader. With entry accommodation we refer
to the situation where both firms invest at the same time.
We show that the choice of demand function can have a significant impact on
the results. Which explains the fact that this decision has to be made carefully.
We find that under multiplicative demand, the leader invests in a larger capacity
than the follower when the economic environment is very uncertain, and the
fixed costs of investment are sufficiently low. Under additive and iso-elastic
demand however, the opposite result occurs, i.e. the follower always invests in
a larger capacity than the leader.
In order to understand these results, we need to understand the implications
that the structure of the demand function has on the corresponding market size.
The multiplicative demand function has a fixed price intercept, which implies
that there is an upper bound on the market size. Consider for instance the sale
of agricultural machines, e.g. harvesters, in a region like the Netherlands where
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the amount of acres and farmers is limited. This results in an upper bound
on demand. Another example of a market where there is a limited potential
market size is the market of medical equipment. The amount of medical staff
performing their profession is restricted, which also restricts the sale of medical
equipment. However, this holds for many professions that are depending on
their working tools. The additive and iso-elastic demand function on the other
hand, do not pose an upper bound on the market size. This relates to most of
the product markets. A good example is the online shopping branch, which
has been flourishing for quite some years, and is still expected to continue its
growth.
Using this knowledge, we can now understand our results. The multiplica-
tive demand function poses an upper bound on the market size, which has
to be shared among the two firms in the market. The leader can make its
investment decision first, which in combination with the fixed market size
leads to the result that it can achieve the largest capacity in the market. The
negative relationship between market entry and market share is supported
by the majority of related empirical literature (e.g. Kalyanaram et al. (1995),
Uran et al. (1986) and Kalyanaram and Wittink (1994)). The opposite result
occurs for the additive and iso-elastic demand. The advantage of waiting for
the follower’s position is that it can observe the demand realization and thereby
receive more information about the market. Delaying the investment decision
corresponds to investment in a larger capacity (e.g. Dangl (1999), Bar-Ilan
and Strange (1999)). Without the cap on the market size, the follower faces a
market of larger size at the moment of investment, which explains its larger
capacity choice. An example that corresponds to the results obtained with the
iso-elastic and additive demand is the e-commerce company Zalando GmbH
(founded in 2008 in Germany). It began operations abroad by starting offering
deliveries in Austria in 2009 and in the Netherlands and France in 2010. In
France, the competitors at that moment included Spartoo, Sarenza, Otto and
Asos1. Due to an extensive and effective marketing campaign the new entrant
Zalando became the market leader in online shoe sales in France, only one year
after entry. Uran et al. (1986) gives another example in the freeze-dried coffee
market, Maxwell House’s Maxim pioneered the category, but Nestle’s Taster’s
Choice identified a superior position and overtook Maxim. Notice that both
1http://www.eu-startups.com/2011/07/european-shoe-business-zalando-vs-spartoo/
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examples describe a market that has no obvious restriction in its size. Lieberman
and Montgomery (1988) point out that, besides this effect, there are several
benefits which place late movers in a favorable position, i.e. “(1) the ability
to free-ride on first mover’s investments, (2) resolution of technological and
market uncertainty, (3) technological discontinuities that provide ‘gateways’ for
new entry, and (4) various types of ‘incumbent inertia’ that makes it difficult
for the incumbent to adapt to environmental change”. Notice however, that our
model only supports the argument about the resolution of market uncertainty.
Additionally we show that the use of the additive demand structure leads
to a different effect of an increase in the variable investment cost compared
to the multiplicative and iso-elastic demand structure. The results can be
explained by use of a direct and an indirect effect. A slightly higher variable
cost decreases the optimal capacity (direct effect), but also delays investment
which corresponds to a larger capacity amount (indirect effect). Only under
the additive demand structure, a firm faces a higher market size when waiting
with investment to obtain more information about the market. This is thereby
also an extra incentive for a firm to delay its investment decision and justify
the large capacity choice, i.e. the indirect effect dominates. Even though the
iso-elastic demand structure has no fixed market size, like the multiplicative
demand structure, it is not unbounded. A high capacity choice results in a
very low price of the product, which makes it undesirable for a firm to choose
such level of capacity. Therefore, for the multiplicative and iso-elastic demand
function the direct effect dominates due to a limitation in the market size.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The general model is
presented in the Section 3.2. Section 3.3 analyzes the capacity and timing
decision of the two firms, where Section 3.3.1 considers the additive linear
demand function, and Section 3.3.2 treats the multiplicative linear demand
function. In Section 3.4 the iso-elastic demand function is compared to the two
linear demand functions. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
We consider a duopoly game, where two firms produce a single homogeneous
type of goods. The firms are assumed to be risk neutral and value maximizing,
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and future profits are discounted with constant discount rate r. Each firm is
able to undertake an irreversible investment at one point in time. We consider
three different types of inverse demand functions2. These inverse demand
functions are defined by:
Pt,mul t = X t(1−ηQ t), (3.2.1)
for multiplicative demand,
Pt,add = X t −ηQ t , (3.2.2)
for additive demand, and
Pt,iso = X tQ
−γ
t , (3.2.3)
for iso-elastic demand at time t, where the total market output is denoted by
Q t . η > 0 and 1> γ > 0 are constants. Demand uncertainty is modeled by the
process {X t} following the geometric Brownian motion
dX t = µX t d t +σX t dωt ,
with the drift parameter µ, σ the volatility parameter, and dωt the increment
of a standard Wiener process. We assume that r > µ, otherwise it would never
be optimal to invest. The investment costs are modeled similar to Aguerrevere
(2003). A firm that enters the market with capacity size Q t faces investment
costs equal to δ1Q t +δ0, where δ1 denotes the sensitivity of investment costs
with respect to capacity size and δ0 the fixed investment costs. For analytical
convenience, it is assumed in Section 3.3 that δ0 = 0, leaving us with the linear
cost model. Here we compare the investment decision, in a duopoly setting, for
a model with multiplicative and additive demand. In Section 3.4 we consider
the general case, with δ0 > 0. Including constant investment costs enables us
to numerically compare the linear demand models with the iso-elastic demand
model. Since the use of linear investment costs with δ0 = 0 in an iso-elastic
2Under optimal capacity, these demand structures have a different price development. Where
the iso-elastic demand structure results in a flat price, under the multiplicative and additive
demand structure, the price is increasing.
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demand model results in a profit function that is linear in capacity Q t , one
cannot find a finite solution for optimal capacity size Q t .
We impose a necessary assumption with its justification:
Assumption 3.1
Both firms produce up to capacity.
Assumption 3.1, often called the ‘market clearance assumption’, is widely
used in the literature (Chod and Rudi (2005), Deneckere et al. (1997), Anand
and Girotra (2007), and Goyal and Netessine (2007)). Fixed costs, like commit-
ments to suppliers and production ramp-up might make it too costly to produce
below the capacity level (Goyal and Netessine (2007)). An example is the car
industry where firms often decide to rather cut prices and keep production up
to full capacity, than produce below capacity (Mackintosh (2003)). Additional
reasons are strict labor laws that prevent employees from easily getting fired.
Especially in countries with strict laws, companies often have to pay a consid-
erable amount of money for letting employees go. Besides that, knowledge
will be lost. The American Federal Reserve provides detailed information about
US capacity utilization rates on their website3 and shows that these fluctuate
around the eighty percent. The market clearance assumption is posed for ana-
lytical convenience, however this evidence reveals that it lies relatively close to
reality.
3.3 Linear Investment Costs
In this section we consider a duopoly, consisting of a leader and a follower4.
We denote the optimal capacity of the leading and following firm by Q L and
QF , respectively. Once both investors have invested, the total market output is
equal to Q =Q L +QF . In this section we consider investment costs being equal
to δ1Q. At first, the roles of the firms are assumed to be exogenous. In other
words, the leading firm knows that it will be the first investor in the market and
cannot be preempted by the other firm. The other firm is the follower, which
3www.federalreserve.gov
4For the monopoly case, the monopolist’s investment decision is equal to the follower’s
investment decision, where the optimal capacity of the leader is equal to zero. Huisman and
Kort (2014) analyzes the monopoly scenario for the multiplicative demand function.
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knows that it will have to wait with its investment until the leader has invested.
The obtained payoffs in the exogenous firm roles case form the basis of our
analysis of the model with endogenous firm roles, where the market position of
the two firms is not predefined. This section is divided into two subsections,
where we will discuss the effect of the two different types of linear demand
functions.
Additive Demand 3.3.1
In this section we consider the additive inverse demand function, defined by
(3.2.2). We assume that the initial level of demand shock is low enough to fall
below any of the investment triggers derived in this section. We solve this game
backwards, which implies that we start by deriving the optimal investment
decision of the follower, later we consider the investment decisions of the leader.
The follower invests when the leader is already in the market, and therefore the
optimal decision of the leading firm is known to the follower. Consequently, the
optimal investment timing (X F,add(Q L)) and the optimal capacity (QF,add(Q L))
of the follower are functions of the optimal leader’s capacity Q L. The optimal
capacity and investment thresholds of the follower are the content of Proposition
3.1.
Proposition 3.1
Suppose the additive inverse demand function Pt,add = X t−ηQ t . Given the current
level of stochastic demand shock X and the leader’s capacity level Q L, the optimal
capacity level of the follower QF,add(X ,Q L) is equal to:
QF,add(X ,Q L) =
X r − (r −µ)(rδ1 +Q Lη)
2η(r −µ)
. (3.3.1)
The value function of the follower VF(X ,Q L) is given by
VF,add(X ,Q L)=
¨
AF,add(Q L)X β if X < X F,add(Q L),
(X r−(r−µ)(rδ1+QLη))2
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X F,add(Q L) =
β(rδ1 +Q Lη)(r −µ)
r(β − 2)
, (3.3.2)










β − r = 0,
so that




For the same reason as before, we assume that r > 2µ+σ2. That is, β > 2.
Otherwise it would never be optimal to invest.
In the next step we determine the investment decision of the leader. The
leader has two possible strategies. Entry deterrence corresponds to sequential
investments and gives the leading firm a monopoly profit for a period of time
starting right after its investment, till the moment where the follower enters.
Entry accommodation leads to simultaneous investments, where the follower
invests at the same time as the leader. The leader uses its optimal capacity
Q L as a tool to force either one of those strategies. It follows from equation
(3.3.2) that a deterrence strategy occurs when the leader invests in a capacity
size that is larger than Q t . It follows from equation (3.3.2) that the deterrence
strategy occurs when the leader invests in a capacity size Q L that is larger than
ØQ L,add(X ), such that
ØQ L,add(X ) =
r (X (β − 2)−δ1(r −µ)β)
(r −µ)βη
, (3.3.3)
Notice that X F,add(Q L) is increasing in Q L, i.e. the leader can extend its monopoly
period by investing in a larger capacity. Besides delaying investment of the
follower, another incentive for the leader to invest in a large capacity is that
the capacity QF,add(X ,Q L) decreases in Q L (see equation (3.3.1)).
First we give a brief explanation of the leader’s strategies in both cases.
Figure 3.1 serves as illustrative support to the explanations, and shows for
which levels of demand shock X a strategy is feasible. Afterwards, each strategy
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will be discussed.
Entry deterrence
We define entry deterrence as a strategy where the follower invests later than
the leading firm. Here, given the current level of X , a large enough investment
by the leading firm leads to a follower’s investment trigger X F,add(Q L) that is
larger than X . In order for the leader’s capacity to be nonnegative, the current
demand shock X has to be larger than a lower bound X detadd . In case X < X
det
add ,
the demand level is too low for an investment to be profitable.
Entry accommodation
Alternatively, the leader chooses the accommodation strategy, which means
that the leader and follower invest simultaneously. The accommodation strat-
egy can only occur for small capacity investments by the leader, i.e. when
Q L ≤ØQ L,add(X ). In terms of X , entry accommodation only occurs for high levels











Figure 3.1: Location of accommodation and deterrence boundaries
for the additive demand function.
Figure 3.1 presents the three possible regions for the additive demand func-
tion. For low values of X , investment is not optimal. Intermediate values of
X enable the leader to deter entry. In the third region both strategies could
be chosen. The leader will choose the strategy that maximizes its expected profit.
Let us discuss the leader’s two strategies in more detail. We start with the
investment decision by the leader that performs the deterrence strategy. The
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value function of a leader with an entry deterrence policy is given by














For the derivation of this value function, we refer to Appendix 3.B.1. Since
the leading firm uses the entry deterrence policy, it incurs monopoly profits for
a certain amount of time, given by the first two terms of the value function.
The third term represents the investment costs necessary to install capacity
of amount Q L. However, at some point in time, the entrant will enter the
market as well, which decreases the value of the leader. This is represented
by the negative fourth term of the leader’s value function, which describes the
difference between the leader’s monopoly and duopoly profits, discounted from
the moment of the follower’s investment X F,add(Q L) back to X by a discount
factor equal to ( XXF,add (QL))
β .
Given that the leading firm uses the deterrence strategy, it will maximize its
value (given by equation (3.3.4)) with respect to timing (X detL,add) and capacity
size (QdetL,add). Proposition 3.2 states the optimal investment decision of the
leader when it uses the entry deterrence policy.
Proposition 3.2
Suppose the additive inverse demand function Pt,add = X t −ηQ t . In terms of the
demand shock parameter X , the leader will consider the entry deterrence strategy
whenever the current level of X lies within the interval (X detadd ,∞), where X
det
add is











The value function for the leader’s entry deterrence strategy, when the leader invests
at X , V detL,add(X ), is equal to















X r(β − 2)
β(δ1r +QdetL,add(X )η)(r −µ)
β
.












The alternative for the leader is to use the entry accommodation policy,
where it is profitable for the entrant to immediately invest once the leader has
invested. The value function of the leader, using the accommodation policy,
V accL,add , is equal to




η((Q L)2 +Q LQF)
r
−δ1Q L.
The first two terms represent the leader’s expected discounted duopoly profit.
Notice that the leader will not obtain any monopoly profit, when choosing the
accommodation strategy. The third term in this expression is the investment
costs resulting from investment in capacity amount equal to Q L. Proposition
3.3 gives the investment decision of the leading firm when using the entry
accommodation policy.
Proposition 3.3
Consider the additive inverse demand function Pt,add = X t −ηQ t . The leader can
choose the entry accommodation strategy whenever the current level of X is larger





The leader’s value of the entry accommodation strategy, when investment takes
place at X , is equal to:
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The optimal investment threshold and corresponding capacity level for the entry









In case β > 4, it holds that X accadd > X
acc
L,add , therefore the leader will invest at
the accommodation lower bound X accadd (under the condition that it obtains a
higher value from accommodation strategy compared to the deterrence strat-
egy). However, when 2< β < 4, the accommodation boundary X accadd turns out
to be negative, and the accommodation strategy is never possible. In this case
the leader will invest at the optimal deterrence investment threshold X detL,add
(due to assumption β > 2, i.e. r > 2µ+σ2). Figure 3.2 gives QdetL,add , Q
acc
L,add
and ØQ L,add as a function of the demand intercept X . This figure and Figure 3.1
illustrate that for X > X accadd and for X > X
det
add , both strategies are possible for
the leader. However extensive numerical results show that the leader always
chooses entry deterrence over entry accommodation, because it leads to a
higher value. Thus, the accommodation strategy shall never occur under the
assumption of additive demand.
Endogenous firm roles
In the first part of this section we analyzed the investment decisions of the
two firms under the assumption of exogenous firm roles, i.e. both firms have
information about which will be the leader and which will be the follower. In
reality, the market position of two firms is not predefined. The previous results
are however necessary for the analysis of endogenous firm roles, which we will
discuss in the remaining part of this chapter. Under endogenous firm roles both
firms have the opportunity to become the market leader, where the advantage
of being the leader is that the firm can enjoy a period of monopoly profits. Once
it is known which of the two firms invests first, the other firm becomes the
follower. After investment by the leader, the follower acts as if the market posi-
tions are exogenously determined, since there are no strategic aspects related
to its investment decision anymore. Therefore, for the investment decision of
the follower, in case of endogenous firm roles, we can refer to Proposition 3.1.




















Figure 3.2: QdetL,add(X ), Q
acc
L,add(X ) and ØQ L,add(X ) as a function of X .
Parameter values: r =0.1, µ=0.01, σ =0.05, η=0.5,
δ1 =0.3, and δ0 =0.
For any value of the demand intercept at which the leader’s payoff exceeds
the one of the follower, the firms try to preempt each other. As a result, invest-
ment will take place at a preemption trigger XP , i.e. the moment where a firm
is indifferent between waiting with investment until X reaches the follower
trigger, and investing immediately. Among others, Huisman (2000) shows that
the preemption trigger can be obtained by solving the following equation for
XP:
V detL,add(XP ,Q L(XP)) = VF,add(XP ,Q L(XP)). (3.3.5)
A firm does not want to invest at X < XP because in that case it would be more
profitable to invest at the follower trigger. If X > XP , it is more profitable for a
firm to invest immediately and become the leader, than wait with investment.
However, this is the case for both firms. Assume that firm 1 wants to invest at
level X . Then firm 2 would preempt firm 1 and invest at X − ε. The reaction of
firm 1 is to invest even earlier, at X −2ε. This preemption mechanism proceeds
until X − nε = XP , where one of the firms will invest. Because the firms are
symmetric, both have equal probabilities to become the market leader at the
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preemption trigger. Note that, until the preemption moment it was not yet
clear for any of the two firms which would preempt the other firm, or phrased
differently, which would become the leader that invests at preemption trigger
XP , and which would become the follower, that invests at investment trigger
X F .
In case of exogenous firm roles, it can easily be shown that the follower











Since the follower invests after the leader, the market share has grown to
a larger level, and the follower is able to optimally invest in a larger capacity
level. This holds because of the property of the additive demand function that
a larger price intercept (X t) directly results in a larger current market size.
Assuming endogenous firm roles, this result will even be strengthened, because
the leader will invest sooner at its preemption trigger than in case of exogenous
firm roles (Huisman (2000)). This implies that the investment trigger as well
as the optimal capacity of the leader are smaller than the trigger and capacity
of the follower.
Result 3.1
In case of additive demand, the follower invests in a larger capacity than the leader.
Even though the majority of empirical literature states that there is a negative
relationship between market entry and market share (see Kalyanaram et al.
(1995)), there are examples where a later entrant takes the market. For example,
EMI developed the first CT scanner, but lost in the market place because the
firm lacked a technological infrastructure and marketing base in the medical
field. In other instances late movers have been successful largely because they
were able to exploit existing assets in areas such as marketing, distribution, and
customers’ reputation, e.g. IBM in personal computers and Matsushita in VCRs
(Lieberman and Montgomery (1988)). A more recent example can be given
in the online shopping market, where Zalando became the market leader in
online shoe sales in France one year after entry, due to a huge and effective
marketing campaign.
5Notice that the difference in capacity size only depends on β , and is thereby not affected
by the investment cost δ1 and the substitutability parameter η.
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Regarding the two strategies of the leader (i.e. entry accommodation and
entry deterrence), extensive numerical experiments all lead to the result that
entry deterrence is more profitable than entry accommodation under endoge-
nous firm roles. This result is irrespective of the choice of demand structure, in
the next subsection we also find that under the assumption of the multiplicative
demand structure this result occurs.
Multiplicative Demand 3.3.2
In this section we consider the multiplicative inverse demand function, defined
by equation (3.2.1). This case has been elaborately investigated by Huisman
and Kort (2014). We refer to their paper for the derivation of the corresponding
results.
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Figure 3.3: Location of accommodation and deterrence boundaries
for the multiplicative demand function.
Similar to the analysis of additive demand, we first consider exogenous
firm roles, where it is known beforehand which firm will become the leader and
which one the follower. Figure 3.3 illustrates that, in contrast to the additive
demand model, a multiplicative demand function results in an upper bound
X detmul t on X for the deterrence strategy
6. Namely, entry deterrence occurs when,
given a current level of X , a large enough investment by the leading firm leads
to a follower’s investment trigger X F,mul t(Q L) that is larger than X . A lower
bound ÙQ L,mul t can be derived, for which it holds that when Q L,mul t >ÙQ L,mul t
results in the entry deterrence strategy. Translating this in terms of X, entry
deterrence can only occur when the value of demand shock X is below an
6For the additive demand function, we find that there is no upper bound X detadd on X for the
deterrence strategy (see proof of Proposition 3.2). In fact, for all X , it holds that the optimal
capacity level QdetL,add(X ) is such that Q
det
L,add(X ) >ØQL,add . This is intuitive since the additive
inverse demand function, given by equation (3.2.2), is not restricted by a fixed price intercept.
This implies that for X > X detadd it is always optimal for the leader to place a large enough
capacity in the market to deter the entrant.
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upper bound X detmul t , i.e. X < X
det
mul t . Otherwise, the market is large enough,
that it is optimal for the follower to enter immediately once the leader has
invested. Note that, compared to additive demand, it is less worthwhile in
this case to wait and invest in a larger capacity for high X , because the upper
bound of capacity does not increase with X . That is, the multiplicative demand
structure has an upper bound on the total market size. Therefore, compared to
an additive demand model, entry deterrence is more difficult to achieve under
multiplicative demand.
Figure 3.3 shows that there are four possible regions for a multiplicative
demand function, where in the third region both strategies are possible. In this
region, the leader will choose the strategy that maximizes its expected profit.
For some threshold X̂ , the leader is indifferent between the deterrence and the
accommodation strategies, i.e.




L,mul t(X ) = V
acc
L,mul t(X )}.
When X < X̂ , it is optimal for the leader to deter entry in the third region, and
when X > X̂ entry accommodation will occur.
In case of exogenous firm roles, it can easily be shown that the leader turns











Under the assumption of endogenous firm roles, Huisman and Kort (2014)
show that the leader will only have the largest capacity when uncertainty is
sufficiently large (see also Figure 3.4). These roles explain that the preemption
threat forces the leader to invest early, i.e. the market will be very small at the
moment of investment (i.e. at the preemption trigger). However, a high level
of uncertainty generates the value of waiting, which in turn delays the moment
of preemption and therefore also the moment of investment by the leader. This
enables the leader to invest in a larger capacity.
Furthermore, as was explained for additive inverse demand, extensive
numerical experiments reveal that the entry deterrence strategy will be more
7Notice that, also for multiplicative demand, the difference in capacity size only depends on
β .














Figure 3.4: The optimal investment capacities for the leader and
the follower, as a function of uncertainty σ, in case
of multiplicative demand function. Parameter values:
r =0.1, µ=0.04, η=0.5, δ1 =1, and δ0 =0.
profitable for the leader under endogenous firm roles. As a result, simultaneous
investment will not occur, when the firms play the preemption game.
Fixed Investment Costs and the Effect of the Cost Struc-
ture
3.4
In this section, we include a fixed term to the investment costs and assume
that investment costs are equal to δ1Q t + δ0. Including constant investment
costs allows us to take into account the iso-elastic demand model. The analysis
of iso-elastic demand is similar to the analysis of the additive demand case in
Section 3.3. The formulas of the different models that are used to derive the
results in this section, can be found in Appendix 3.B.2.
There are two main effects that explain how increasing costs affect the
firm’s optimal choice of capacity and investment timing. There is a direct
effect present in the sense that higher investment costs make investment more
expensive and will therefore lead to a smaller optimal capacity size. On the
other hand, higher investment costs result in a delay in the optimal moment
of investment, which, in turn, leads to a larger optimal capacity (which is the
indirect effect). Which of these effects dominate, determines whether a firm
will invest in a larger or a smaller capacity amount for increasing investment
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costs. However, considering the timing of investment, the firm always delays
the moment of investment when a higher level of investment cost is considered,
no matter what the choice of demand structure is.
In the following subsections we focus on the fixed and variable cost effect on
the capacity size and investment timing of the two duopoly firms. In summary,
we find that for all demand structures a higher constant cost (i.e. higher δ0)
leads to a higher investment trigger and a corresponding higher capacity level
(i.e. the indirect effect dominates). This result is empirically supported by Bai
et al. (2008) who lend support to the hypothesis that investment in capacity is
positively associated with the proportion of fixed costs in the cost structure8.
However, the demand structures give conflicting results considering the
effect of a higher variable cost. Analyzing the firm’s optimal investment deci-
sions under additive demand, a firm will delay its investment decision when
uncertainty increases, which in turn leads to a larger capacity choice (referred to
as indirect effect beforehand). However, when the iso-elastic or multiplicative
demand is considered, the direct effect dominates, and we observe a decreasing
pattern in optimal capacity for an increase in variable costs. The difference
in results between additive versus multiplicative and iso-elastic demand can
be retrieved from their corresponding structure of inverse demand. In case of
additive demand, a higher level of X corresponds to a larger total market size.
Therefore, a late mover has an extra incentive to wait for a higher level of X
when variable costs are high. Due to the increased market size, the second
entrant can also make a larger capacity investment. For the other two demand
functions, an increase in X only results in an increase in price, since X is a
multiplication with the ‘demand part’ of the price function. By understanding
how a firm makes its investment decision with a specific form of demand, one
could also apply the results to other types of demand functions that are not
examined in this chapter.
3.4.1 Additive Demand
Figure 3.5 illustrates how sensitive the investment decisions of the leader and
follower are with respect to the two cost parameters δ1 and δ0. One can see
8This paper empirically tests this prediction using 6000 department level observations from
California hospitals for the period 1998-2005.
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that for higher constant costs (i.e. higher δ0) the indirect effect dominates.
Here, a firm will delay investment and consequently invest in a larger capacity
amount, when facing a higher fixed cost. The same happens for higher linear
costs (i.e. higher δ1). As discussed earlier in this section, this latter result is due
to the structure of the additive demand, which allows for an increase in market
size, for an increase in uncertainty parameter X . This result also partly relates
to empirical research from Lieberman (1987), who examines the increase in
new chemical plants over the period from the late 1950 through the early 1980s.
Lieberman (1987) reveals that each 1% differential in unit production cost
between small and large scale plants leads to about a 2% increase in the average
size of new plants. His research departs from our findings with additive demand,
when he shows that entrants build smaller capacities than incumbents, where
we can conclude that including constant investment costs does not change the
result of Section 3.3.1, that in case of the additive demand function the follower
invests in a larger capacity than the leader.
Iso-elastic Demand 3.4.2
The iso-elastic inverse demand function, given by equation (3.2.3), does not
impose an upper bound on the total market size. Since the follower invests
later than the leader, the follower makes a larger capacity investment than the
leader, just like the case of the additive demand function. In general, when
market size is not restricted, the follower will invest in a larger capacity than
the leader. An example of a restricted market size (multiplicative demand)
will be discussed in Section 3.4.3. This knowledge can be used for demand
functions not examined in this chapter.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the sensitivity of the optimal investment decisions of
two firms with respect to the two investment cost parameters. An increase of
the constant investment cost parameter (i.e. δ0) will lead to a similar result as
was observed under the assumption of additive demand, i.e the indirect effect
dominates. Higher constant costs delay investment, and therefore lead (both
firms) to a larger capacity investment. The effect of the linear cost parameter
however, will delay investment but results in a smaller capacity investment.
Here, the direct effect of increasing costs related to the optimal capacity size
dominates the indirect effect. Figure 3.6 illustrates this for a specific numerical
76 Sensitivity of Demand Function Choice Chapter 3





















































Figure 3.5: The optimal investment trigger and optimal capacities
for the leader and the follower, as a function of cost
parameters δ1 and δ0, when demand is additive. Pa-
rameter values: r =0.1, µ=0.02, σ =0.1, η=0.5, and
δ1 =1 in the two left-hand graphs, δ0 =0.5 in the two
right-hand graphs.
example. We show the robustness of this result in the sense that extensive
numerical experiments with different parameter values lead to the same result
(see Appendix 3.C).
3.4.3 Multiplicative Demand
Regarding the effect of increasing the constant cost parameter, the result that the
indirect effect dominates the direct effect holds for most cases, and also for the
multiplicative demand function, as illustrated in Figure 3.7. However, regarding
the capacity size of the leader and follower, the result for the multiplicative
demand function is different than in the other two cases. Here the leader
invests for most cases in a larger capacity than the follower. Kalyanaram et al.
(1995) states that one of the emerging generalizations found in the empirical
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Figure 3.6: The optimal investment trigger and optimal capacities
for the leader and the follower, as function of cost pa-
rameters δ1 and δ0, when demand is iso-elastic. Pa-
rameter values: r =0.1, µ=0.02, σ =0.1, η=0.5, and
δ1 =1 in the two left-hand graphs, δ0 =0.5 in the two
right-hand graphs.
literature is that there is a negative relationship between the order of market
entry and market share. Other papers that support this generalization are Uran
et al. (1986) and Kalyanaram and Wittink (1994). However, this chapter finds
that in a theoretical framework, this result is only valid with the multiplicative
demand. One has to be aware that by choosing the demand function, a specific
assumption is made about the (increase) in market size. Therefore a thoughtful
decision about the structure of inverse demand has to be made.
In Section 3.3.2 we explained that the use of the multiplicative demand
function implies an upper bound on quantity, being independent of X , in order to
guarantee a positive output price. Since the leader chooses its capacity amount
first, it is able to take a greater share of the market. This effect dominates
especially in case of high constant investment costs. For relatively low constant
investment costs, the linear investment cost part dominates the total investment
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Figure 3.7: The optimal investment trigger and optimal capacities
for the leader and the follower, as function of cost pa-
rameters δ1 and δ0, when demand is multiplicative.
Parameter values: r =0.1, µ =0.02, σ =0.1, γ =0.5,
and δ1 =1 in the two left-hand graphs, δ0 =0.5 in the
two right-hand graphs.
costs. This implies that the leader, that aims to preempt the follower, will invest
soon and in a small capacity amount. The follower, however, invests at a later
point which enables it to invest in a larger capacity investment than the leader.
The right-hand graphs in Figure 3.7 illustrate the effect of increasing linear
investment costs on the investment decisions of the two firms. The lower right-
hand graph illustrates the tradeoff between constant and linear part of the
total investment costs. When the linear part of the investment costs dominate
the total costs, the follower will undertake a larger capacity investment than
the leader, and when the constant part of the investment costs dominates, the
opposite result occurs. This effect is stated in Result 3.2.
We can observe a third effect (See right-hand graphs of Figure 3.7) that
is strongest for very low δ1, namely a strategic effect. For very low linear
investment costs, the optimal investment threshold of the follower is decreasing
Section 3.4 Fixed Investment Costs and the Effect of the Cost Structure 79
in linear costs. The direct effect explains that for a slightly higher δ1 the leader
invests in a smaller optimal capacity. This gives the follower a better investment
incentive, therefore it will invest earlier in a larger capacity. However, for a
larger δ1, the cost effect dominates the strategic effect, and both firms will
invest later in a smaller capacity.
Result 3.2
For the multiplicative demand function, the effect of cost parameters δ0 and
δ1 determines which firm will have the larger capacity in the market. When the
linear costs dominate the total cost function (δ1 > δ
−1
1 (δ0)), the corresponding low
optimal leader capacity makes the follower the larger firm in the market. When the
constant costs dominate the total cost function (δ0 > δ0(δ1)), the corresponding
high optimal leader capacity forces the follower to invest in a small capacity, which
makes the follower the smaller firm in the market. δ0(δ1) (δ−11 (δ0)) denotes the
level of δ0 (δ1) for which the leader and the follower invest in the same capacity
size. We define δ0(δ1) by:
δ0(δ1) =min{δ0|Qmul tL,det(δ0,δ1) =Q
mul t
F,det(δ0,δ1),δ1}.


















Figure 3.8: The relationship between the optimal quantity of the
leader (Q∗mul tL ) and follower (Q
∗mul t
F ) in case of multi-
plicative demand. Parameter values: r =0.1, µ=0.02,
σ =0.1 and η=0.5.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies the effect of three commonly used demand functions, addi-
tive, multiplicative, and iso-elastic demand, on optimal investment decisions
in a duopoly. We analyze the optimal timing as well as the optimal size of
investment of two firms in the corresponding markets in a real options context.
Essentially, the leader can use two strategies. The deterrence strategy gives a
period of monopoly profits before the entry of the follower, and can be achieved
by overinvestment. On the other hand, the accommodation strategy implies
that the follower invests at the same time as the leader. This will only be the
leader’s strategy when overinvestment is too expensive. We find that for the
additive demand function, the leader will always choose the deterrence strategy,
when exogenous firm roles are considered.
Furthermore, we find that for most market situations the result that the
second investor invests in a larger capacity amount than the first investor, is
robust concerning the choice of demand model. The opposite result holds
however for the multiplicative demand function when uncertainty and constant
costs are sufficiently high. For high uncertainty, there is so much value in
waiting that even in the preemption game the first investor invests so late that
it can make a larger capacity investment. Also, high constant costs correspond
to a large capacity investment by the leader.
Furthermore, we find that the effect of an increase in variable investment
costs can be explained by a direct and an indirect effect. A slightly higher
variable cost decreases the optimal capacity (direct effect), but also delays
investment which corresponds to a larger capacity amount (indirect effect). In
case of the additive demand the indirect effect dominates, i.e. larger linear
costs lead to a larger capacity choice. This is contrary to the multiplicative
and iso-elastic demand function, where higher linear costs result in a later
investment but smaller capacity. i.e. the direct effect dominates.
We made the assumption of a lump-sum investment game. A possible
interesting extension of the current work might be to investigate a firm’s optimal
investment decisions when the leader can gradually extend its initial capacity
when the price moves up. Another extension would be to consider an n-firm
oligopoly framework, and investigate if the duopoly results also hold for a
market with more firms. A useful starting point may be the dynamic oligopoly
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model of Bouis et al. (2009), by including optimal capacity. In addition, it would
be interesting to analyse how our results change when product differentiation
is considered.
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3.A Proof of Propositions
3.A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The follower’s profit in a model with additive demand and linear costs is equal
to
πt,F,add = (X t −η(Q t,F +Q t,L))Q t,F .
VF,add(X ,QF ,Q L) denotes the follower’s discounted expected value when it
invests in a capacity amount of QF . It is equal to:
VF,add(X ,QF ,Q L) = E
∫ ∞
t=0










Differentiating (3.A.1) with respect to QF results into the follower’s optimal
capacity for a given X and Q L:
QF,add(X ,Q L) =
X r − (r −µ)(rδ1 +Q Lη)
2η(r −µ)
. (3.A.3)
Substitution of (3.A.3) into (3.A.1) gives the value function of the follower after
investment:
VF,add(X ,Q L) =
(X r − (r −µ)(rδ1 +Q Lη))2
4rη(r −µ)2
.
The value of the firm before investment, i.e. the value of waiting, takes the
form f (X ) = AX β , where A is a constant to be determined and β is the positive










β − r = 0.
Denote with X F(QF) the investment moment of the follower. Value matching
and smooth pasting the follower’s value of waiting with the value function after
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investment results in solving the following equations:
AF,add X
β


















X F,add(Q L) =
β(rδ1 +Q Lη)(r −µ)
r(β − 2)
, (3.A.4)
so that the follower’s optimal capacity is equal to





Proof of Proposition 3.2 3.A.2
The value function after investment by the leader that uses the deterrence
strategy is equal to













X r(β − 2)
β(δ1r +Q Lη)(r −µ)
β
. (3.A.6)
Substitution of (3.A.5) into (3.A.6) gives









Q L(δ1r +Q Lη)
r(β − 2)

X r(β − 2)
β(δ1r +Q Lη)(r −µ)
β
.
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In order to find the optimal leaders capacity QdetL , we need to take the first
order derivative of this value with respect to Q L, and set it equal to zero, which
results in the following condition:
∂ V detL,add(X ,Q L)
∂Q L
= (
Q L(β − 2)η− rδ1
r(β − 2)
)(
X r(β − 2)







−δ1 = 0 (3.A.7)
Using the envelope theorem gives that
dV detL,add(X ,Q L(X ))
dX
=
∂ V detL,add(X ,Q L)
∂ X
+





∂ V detL,add(X ,Q L)
∂ X
,
since ∂ VL(X ,QL)∂QL is zero, as is shown in condition (3.A.7). Therefore the value








Q L(δ1r +Q Lη)
r(β − 2)
)(
X r(β − 2)









X r(β − 2)
β(δ1r +Q Lη)(r −µ)
)β−1,
and result in the following leader’s investment threshold
X detL,add(Q L) =
β(rδ1 +Q Lη)(r −µ)
r(β − 1)
. (3.A.8)
Solving (3.A.8) simultaneously with (3.A.7), results in the optimal leader’s











To find the boundaries on X , i.e. lower bound X detadd and upper bound X
det
add , we
have to substitute Q L = 0 and Q L =ØQ L,add , respectively, into condition (3.A.7),
and solve for X . ØQ L,add is defined by equation (3.3.3) and can be found by
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)β−1)> 0 for X ∈ (0, X F(0)),






































which indicates that X accadd > X F(0) > X
det
add for β > 4. When β < 4, X
acc
add is
negative and therefore dispensable.
Next we show that X detadd does not exist. Solving condition (3.A.7) for Q L
can lead to either a minimum or a maximum value. Substitution of ØQ L,add into
(3.A.7) leads to a unique value X̄ = δ1β(r−µ)2(β−2) that makes ØQ L,add the capacity
choice that corresponds to a minimum leader’s value. Solving condition (3.A.7)
numerically for the Q L(X ) that leads to a maximum leader’s value, gives as result
that the optimal capacity will always be bigger than the minimum boundary
for Q L, i.e. Q L(X ) >ØQ L,add ∀X . Therefore, there is no upper bound for the
deterrence strategy, considering the additive demand function. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3 3.A.3
The value function after investment, by the leader that uses the accommodation
strategy is equal to




η((Q L)2 +Q LQF)
r
−δ1Q L. (3.A.9)
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Substitution of (3.A.3) into (3.A.9) and maximizing with respect to Q L gives
the optimal capacity size of the leader, as a function of X
QaccL,add(X ) =
r(X − (r −µ)δ1)
2η(r −µ)
. (3.A.10)
Substitution of (3.A.10) and (3.A.3) into (3.A.9) leads to
V accL,add(X ) =
r(X − (r −µ)δ1)2
8η(r −µ)
. (3.A.11)
Solving for the value matching and smooth pasting conditions leads to the










The accommodation strategy can only occur for level of X > X accadd . The leader
can only consider the accommodation strategy if the optimal leader’s capacity
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Additional Proofs 3.B
Derivation of the Leader’s Deterrence Value Function 3.B.1
Before the entry of the follower, the leader has a monopoly position. After entry
of the follower, the monopoly turns into a duopoly. In the following we derive
the value function of the leader. The value function of the leader when the
follower has not yet entered the market is equal to









β represents the shift in value when at some point in time the leader
has to share the market with the follower. The value of the leader when it
produces in a duopoly is equal to







At the investment threshold of the follower, it holds that V monL,add(X ,Q L) =
V J IL,add(X ,Q L). Furthermore, the value function of the leader has to be smooth
in the threshold (X F). Therefore, it holds that














The values QF(Q L) and X F(Q L) are known and can be substituted in equation
(3.B.3):











X r(β − 2)
β(δ1r +Q Lη)(r −µ)
)β . (3.B.4)

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3.B.2 Formulas in Section 4
The solution method towards finding the optimal value and investment deci-
sions of the follower, in case of additional constant investment costs, is similar
to the case with only unit investment costs (see Appendix 3.A.1). The follower’s
optimal capacity and timing of investment for the additive, multiplicative and
iso-elastic demand structure, resulting from the mentioned solution method,
are given in the following. The leader’s optimal investment decisions are found
numerically. We give subsequently for each demand structure the implicit equa-
tions that have to be solved in order to find the leader’s optimal capacity and
timing of investment.
Additive demand.
The investment trigger and corresponding optimal capacity are equal to
X F,add(Q L) =

















Given X F,add(Q L) and QF,add(Q L), the value of the leader is equal to














Take the first order partial derivative of V detL,add(X ,Q L) with respect to Q L, and
set equal to zero. Solving this equation for Q L gives Q L(X ). We set the option
value of the follower equal to the value of the leader. The option value of the
follower is given by:
V optionF,add (X ,Q L(X )) =
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QF(Q L(X ))X F,add(Q L(X ))
r −µ
−
ηQF,add(Q L(X ))(QF,add(Q L(X )) +Q L(X ))
r
− δ1QF,add(Q L(X ))− δ0
 X
X F(Q L(X ))
β
.
As is explained in Section 3.3.1, the leader will invest at its preemption trigger,
which can be obtained by solving the following equation for XP:
V detL,add(XP ,Q L(XP)) = V
option
F,add (XP ,Q L(XP)).









into X F,add(Q L) and QF,add(Q L) gives the optimal trigger and capacity of the fol-
lower. 
Multiplicative demand.
The investment trigger and corresponding optimal capacity of the follower are
given by:
X F,mul t(Q L) =
β(δ1 + 2δ0η−Q Lδ1η)(r −µ) +
p
Amul t
(Q Lη− 1)2(β − 1)
,
QF,mul t(Q L) =






Amul t = (4β
2δ20η
2 − 4β2δ0δ1η(Q Lη− 1) +δ21(Q Lη− 1)
2)(r −µ)2.
Given X F,mul t(Q L) and QF,mul t(Q L), the value of the leader is the following:









X F,mul t(Q L)
)β .
Take the first order partial derivative of V detL,mul t(X ,Q L) with respect to Q L, and
set equal to zero. Solving this equation for Q L gives Q L(X ). We value match
the option value of the follower to the value of the leader. The option value of
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the follower is given by:
V optionF,mul t (X ,Q L(X )) =
X F,mul t(Q L(X ))QF,mul t(Q L(X ))(1−η(QF,mul t(Q L(X )) +Q L(X )))
r −µ
− δ1QF,mul t(Q L(X ))− δ0
 X
X F,mul t(Q L(X ))
β
.
The preemption trigger can be obtained by solving the following equation for
XP:
V detL,mul t(XP ,Q L(XP)) = V
option
F,mul t (XP ,Q L(XP)). (3.B.5)









into X F,mul t(Q L) and QF,mul t(Q L) gives the optimal trigger and capacity of the
follower. 
Iso-elastic demand.
The investment trigger and corresponding optimal capacity of the follower are
equal to:
X F,iso(Q L) =
β(γ− 1)δ0 +Q L(2β − 1)δ1 +
p
Aiso

















Aiso = (βδ0(1− γ) +Q Lδ1)2 − 4Q Lβ(1− γβ)δ0δ1.
The term βγ− 1 in these functions leads to the following restriction: Only for
βγ > 1 it holds that for the iso-elastic demand function the optimal capacity of
the follower is positive. Given X F,iso(Q L) and QF,iso(Q L), the value of the leader
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is given by:
V detL,iso(X ,Q L) =









Take the first order partial derivative of V detL,iso(X ,Q L) with respect to Q L, and set
equal to zero. Solving this equation for Q L gives Q L(X ). We value match the
option value of the follower to the value of the leader. The option value of the
follower is given by:
V optionF,iso (X ,Q L) =
X F,iso(Q L(X ))Q L(X )(Q L(X ) +QF,iso(Q L(X )))−γ
r −µ
− δ1QF,iso(Q L(X ))− δ0
 X
X F,iso(Q L(X ))
β
.
The preemption trigger can be obtained by solving the following equation for
XP:
V detL,iso(XP ,Q L(XP)) = V
option
F,iso (XP ,Q L(XP)).









into X F,iso(Q L) and QF,iso(Q L) give the optimal trigger and capacity of the
follower. 
Additional Figures 3.C
In order to show the robustness of the results from Section 3.4.1, we performed
extensive numerical experiments with different parameter values. A sub-sample
of this numerical analysis is presented in the following. Regarding additive
demand, we show the effect of δ1 and δ0 on the optimal timing and capacity
choice of a firm for different parameter values (r, µ, σ, η). Similar graphs are
given for the multiplicative and iso-elastic demand. Unless stated differently,
take parameter values r =0.1, µ=0.02, σ =0.1, η=0.5, γ=0.5, δ0=0.5, and
δ1 =1.
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4Optimal Capacity Investment inOligopoly: A Real Options Approach
This chapter is based on Boonman et al. (2014b).
Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to study the effect of demand structures and
capacity optimization in a market with three potential entrants. Our chapter
makes three specific contributions. First, we show that the accordion effect,
derived in Bouis et al. (2009), is sensitive with respect to the demand structure
and the presence of capacity choice. The accordion effect can be described
as follows. When three firms decide about the optimal moment to enter the
market, an increase in the market uncertainty leads to an increase in the third
firm’s threshold, a decrease in the second firm’s threshold and an increase in
the first firm’s threshold. We find that the accordion effect never occurs under
capacity optimization. Instead we have a size effect, where higher uncertainty
implies a larger capacity choice which results in a delay of investment. Second,
we are able to show analytically that increasing substitutability has a decreasing
effect on the capacity choice, while it does not affect the timing of investment.
Last, under the assumption of additive demand it can be shown that higher
unit capacity costs leads to a later investment in a larger capacity, where under
the assumption of multiplicative demand this leads to a later investment, but
the optimal capacity choice of the firm remains unaffected.
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4.1 Introduction
For many decades already, economists have been interested in the relationship
between uncertainty and investment. The traditional approach to value invest-
ment projects (the net present value rule) has many flaws. It neglects future
uncertainty, deals poorly with the irreversibility of an investment, and assumes
a now or never decision. Under the real options approach, the possibility of
delay becomes very important in case of an irreversible investment decision,
because there exists a high value of waiting. Real options theory argues that
a higher level of uncertainty increases the value of a firm’s option to invest, it
gives a greater incentive to keep this option open, which delays the investment
decision. The real options approach, has been pioneered by McDonald and
Siegel (1986a), and explained in e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis
(1996).
While early literature placed its focus on monopoly situations, the lack of
strategic interactions in monopoly models makes them unable to take into
account the observed competition in industries. A thorough review of strategic
investment under uncertainty can be found in Chevalier-Roigant et al. (2011).
The focus of this chapter lies on an endogenous oligopoly model with three
firms. Fundamental work of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) explains the principle
of rent equalization (resulting from the preemption mechanism) for a duopoly
in a deterministic setting. A whole stream of literature built further upon
this. Thijssen et al. (2012) extend the duopoly model of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985) by including uncertainty. Other studies that consider the preemption
mechanism in a duopoly setting are Huisman and Kort (2004), Nishihara and
Fukushima (2008), Weeds (2002), Mason and Weeds (2010), Hoppe (2000),
and Pawlina and Kort (2006).
Where this literature analyzes duopoly models, Bouis et al. (2009) explain
the importance to combine the real options literature with a framework where
the number of firms is larger than two. They state that “in the western economies
the extensive process of regulation, combined with a waive of mergers and
acquisitions, has resulted in an oligopolistic structure of a large number of
sectors". A good example can be found in the energy sector, which experienced a
transition from a monopoly supply to a slowly-increasing degree of competition,
Section 4.1 Introduction 107
as a result of successive EU and national legislation designed to liberalise gas
and electricity markets.1
Our work is closely related to Bouis et al. (2009). They analyze lumpy
investment decisions of three symmetric firms that face a simplified version
of multiplicative demand. The preemption mechanism determines optimal
timing of investment, with cost of investment I . They find that when three
firms decide about the optimal time to enter the market, an increase in market
uncertainty leads to an increase in the third firm’s threshold, a decrease in the
second firm’s threshold and an increase in the first firm’s threshold. Hence, the
wedge between the first and the second threshold decreases, and the wedge
between the second and the third threshold increases. This is defined as the
accordion effect. For a highly uncertain market environment, simultaneous
investment between the first two entrants will take place. We elaborate on the
results of Bouis et al. (2009) by extending it to a model that includes capacity
optimization and different types of demand functions. Below we briefly address
these two issues.
Besides timing of investment, also capacity optimization is an important
part of the investment decision. Van Mieghem (2003) surveys the strategic
capacity management literature. Wu (2007) analyzes a duopoly model with
multiplicative demand. That paper obtains that in most cases the first mover
equilibrium strategy is to enter with a smaller capacity than the leader. Huisman
and Kort (2014) also consider multiplicative demand and they show that the
level of uncertainty determines which firm has the biggest capacity in the
market. A highly uncertain market environment results in a market where the
leader invests in the largest capacity. A low market uncertainty, on the contrary,
results in a market where the follower obtains the biggest part of the market
share. An important difference between these two models is that in Wu (2007)
uncertainty only lies at the switching point of market growth to market decline,
where in Huisman and Kort (2014) market size is subject to uncertainty at any
point.
Considering the effect of different demand structures on the firm’s invest-
ment decisions, Anupindi and Jiang (2008) and Boonman and Hagspiel (2014)
are two other papers that shed light on investment decisions from the per-
1http://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/PDFs/Mergers
_in_the_energy_sector_e_competitions.pdf
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spective of different demand structures. Anupindi and Jiang (2008) categorize
inverse demand functions into two streams for different demand shocks, namely
multiplicative demand and additive demand. Boonman and Hagspiel (2014)
include another version of multiplicative demand in their analysis, known as
iso-elastic demand. Even though Boonman and Hagspiel (2014) consider uncer-
tainty at any point in time (just like in Huisman and Kort (2014)), they confirm
the result found by Wu (2007) under additive or iso-elastic demand, contrary
to what Huisman and Kort (2014) obtain with multiplicative demand.
Other extensions of Bouis et al. (2009) are Argenziano and Schmidt-Dengler
(2014) and Zhang et al. (2013). Argenziano and Schmidt-Dengler (2014) con-
sider a model where a finite number of firms optimize timing of an irreversible
investment. They find that for a sufficiently intense preemption race among
late investors, the preemption incentive for earlier investors disappears and two
or more investments occur at the same time. Like Bouis et al. (2009) they use
a simple payoff function, but do not include uncertainty in the model. Zhang
et al. (2013) present a model with an additive demand structure, where three
firms optimize capacity. Production flexibility is incorporated by the assumption
of a price cap. We extend Zhang et al. (2013) by incorporating endogenous
firm roles.
This chapter considers a new market model, where three firms optimize
the level of capacity and the timing of investment. Two types of demand
functions are considered: multiplicative and additive demand. The aim is to
show whether the accordion effect, found by Bouis et al. (2009), will hold under
the assumption of different demand structures and capacity optimization.
We find, under capacity optimization, that the accordion effect as well as an
equilibrium where firms invest simultaneously, do not exist. Firms are asymmet-
ric ex post investment due to the choice of different optimal capacities. Pawlina
and Kort (2006), however, find a simultaneous equilibrium under asymmetric
firm roles. But they acknowledge that this result only occurs due to the existing
market assumption. Since we allow firms to optimize capacity, there is another
effect that plays a role, namely the size effect. The size effect, which has been
recognized by other contributions in the literature (Huisman and Kort (2014),
Dangl (1999), Bar-Ilan and Strange (1999) and Manne (1961)), states that
higher levels of uncertainty result in a delayed investment and a relatively larger
investment size. We find that this size effect is stronger than the accordion ef-
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fect, i.e. the investment gap between all investors increases in a more uncertain
market environment. As a last contribution, we are able to present an analytical
solution for the firm’s investment decision. Hence, we are able to prove ana-
lytically that an increasing substitutability parameter does not affect the timing
of a firm’s investment and decreases its optimal capacity choice. For additive
demand we can show that increasing variable investment costs result in larger
investments, which, however, take place at later points in time. Also under
multiplicative demand, increasing variable investment costs delay the moment
of investment but the optimal capacity choice of the firms are not affected.
This chapter is organized as follows. The general model is presented in
Section 4.2. Section 4.3 describes the value functions and investment decisions
of the three firms, where in the first subsection multiplicative demand is consid-
ered and in the second subsection additive demand. In Section 4.4 the results
are discussed, and Section 4.5 concludes.
The model 4.2
This chapter considers an oligopoly market consisting of three ex ante identical
firms that produce a homogeneous good. Upon investment, the firms have the
opportunity to optimize the timing of investment and determine the optimal
level of capacity. Firms have an incentive to be the first entrant, due to the
resulting temporary period of monopoly profits. The remaining firms preempt
each other in order to enjoy a period of duopoly profits corresponding to the
second entrant’s investment time. For the last firm’s position, there is no entry
threat of a future competitor, and this firm invests at its optimal investment
trigger, not being influenced by strategic aspects. This situation corresponds to
endogenous firm roles, i.e. firms do not know beforehand what will be their
position in this market (first, second or third investor), which is a realistic
reproduction of reality.
Unit investment costs are denoted by c. Investor i, i ∈ {1,2,3}, which
invests in capacity Q i > 0, will therefore have to pay total investment costs cQ i.
Once investment is performed, this firm receives a profit flow equal to
πt,i = PtQ t,i,
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where Pt is the price at time t. We will consider two types of demand structures,
namely multiplicative demand and additive demand, which are given by
Pt = X t(1−ηQ t) (4.2.1)
and
Pt = X t −ηQ t , (4.2.2)
respectively, where Q t is the total supply of the product in the market. If there
are two firms in the market for instance, the total supply is equal to Q t,1 +Q t,2.
X t is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion process
dX t = µX t d t +σX t dωt ,
X0 = x ,
with drift parameter µ, volatility parameter σ and dωt representing the incre-
ment of a standard Wiener process. The inverse demand functions in equations
(4.2.1) and (4.2.2) are also known as the net-price functions. The net price
functions are equal to the gross price functions, pt , subtracted by the variable
costs, i.e. Pt = pt −δ. δ denotes the variable cost per unit of production. The
additive demand structure could lead to a negative price, which would simply
imply that the firm’s production costs exceed its revenue. Furthermore, the
firms are assumed to be risk neutral and maximize the expected discounted
cash flow stream. Firms have a constant discount rate r, such that r > µ.
We assume that a firm produces up to capacity. This concept, known in the
literature as the “market clearance assumption", is widely used in the literature
(Chod and Rudi (2005), Deneckere et al. (1997), Anand and Girotra (2007),
and Goyal and Netessine (2007)).
4.3 Model Analysis
Bouis et al. (2009) show the accordion effect considering a specific type of mul-
tiplicative demand. Namely, the profit flow of entrant k is given by πk = Y (t)Dk,
where Y (t) follows a geometric Brownian motion and the effect of competition
on the profit is reflected in Dk. This chapter considers two different types of
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inverse demand structures, multiplicative and additive demand structure as
in (4.2.1) and (4.2.2), respectively. In this section we analyze the effect of
different demand structures and capacity optimization on the occurrence of the
accordion effect. We consider multiplicative demand in Subsection 4.3.1 and
additive demand in Subsection 4.3.2.
Multiplicative Demand 4.3.1
Sequential Investment
In a sequential game, the first investor obtains a period of monopoly profits, and
after the second investor entered, a period of duopoly profits. After the entry of
the third firm, all firms obtain an oligopoly profit, where the market is shared
with three firms. The value of investor i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is denoted by Vi(X ). This
firm invests in capacity size Q i at the optimal investment moment X i. Due to
the market clearance assumption, the firms produce different quantities of the
product if their corresponding capacities differ. Obviously, this also leads to
different profit flows of firms in the same market position (duopoly or oligopoly).
Here our model differs from the model of Bouis et al. (2009), where firms in
the same market situation obtain the same profit.
According to the standard approach to solve dynamic games, we analyze
the problem backwards in time. Assuming that the first two investors have
invested already, we first analyze the investment decision of the third investor.
Due to the absence of future entrants that could preempt the third firm’s market
position, there are no strategic aspects involved in this investment decision.











r−µ − cQ3 X ≥ X3,
(4.3.1)
where β1 > 1 is the positive solution of the so-called fundamental quadratic,
i.e. 12σ
2β2 + (µ − 12σ
2)β − r = 0 (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). The
term in the first row of (4.3.1) represents the ‘value of waiting’ to become
the third investor (W3(X ,Q1,Q2,Q3)). The value of waiting is given by the
discounted net present value of the revenue after investment, where ( XX3 )
β1
is the stochastic discount factor (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). The following
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proposition presents the optimal investment threshold X3 of the third investor.
All proofs of subsequent propositions can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 4.1
Consider multiplicative demand. The third investor invests as soon as X reaches
the optimal investment trigger X3, given by
X3 =
cβ1(r −µ)
(β1 − 1)(1−η(Q1 +Q2 +Q3))
, (4.3.2)





Next, we analyze the investment decision of the second investor, considering
that the first investor has invested already. The value of the second investor,






r−µ − cQ2 X < X3,
XQ2(1−η(Q1+Q2+Q3))
r−µ − cQ2 X ≥ X3.
(4.3.3)
The first row of (4.3.3), describes the scenario where the third entrant has not
invested yet, the second entrant therefore earns a duopoly profit with optimal
capacity size Q2. However, this firm knows that at X3, it will also have to share
the market with the third entrant, which decreases its profit by ηQ2Q3X3r−µ . The
value of the second entrant, after the entry of the third investor, is stated in the
second row of (4.3.3). Notice that this profit is not the same as the oligopoly
profit of the third entrant, since they produce different quantities.
The second entrant will invest at the moment that it is indifferent between
becoming the second entrant and waiting to be the third entrant. This occurs at
the preemption trigger which is denoted by X2. When X falls below this trigger,
both firms prefer the third entrant’s position. However, when a firm waits until
after X2 with investment, the value of immediate investment is higher than
the value of waiting, and the other firm will preempt by investing just slightly
sooner. This game will continue until W3(X2,Q1,Q2,Q3) = V2(X2,Q1,Q2,Q3),
where W3(X ,Q1,Q2,Q3) is the value of waiting of becoming the third entrant in
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the market (first line of (4.3.1)), and V2(X ,Q1,Q2,Q3) is the value of investing
secondly (first line of (4.3.3)). This implies that the expected payoffs are equal
in equilibrium, which is called ‘rent equalization’ in the literature (Fudenberg
and Tirole (1985)). Along with optimizing the timing of investment, the second
investor also optimizes its level of capacity. That is, it takes the first order
condition of the top row of its value function (V2(X2,Q1,Q2,Q3)) with respect
to its capacity size (Q2) and finds the root that leads to a maximum value. The
following proposition states the equations that need to be solved simultaneously
in order to find the optimal investment decision of the second entrant.
Proposition 4.2
Consider multiplicative demand. The preemption trigger X2 and optimal capacity


























− c = 0. (4.3.5)
Finally we analyze the investment decision of the first entrant. The value




















r−µ − cQ1 X2 < X < X3,
XQ1(1−η(Q1+Q2+Q3))
r−µ − cQ1 X ≥ X3,
(4.3.6)
where the first row represents the monopoly profit of the first investor including
the negative revenue shock at X2 and X3 when the second and third investor
enter the market, respectively. The second line of (4.3.6) represents the duopoly
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profit of the first investor, which differs from the duopoly profit of the second
investor due to different capacity choices. The oligopoly value of the first
investor, after the entry of the final firm is given by the term in the third row of
(4.3.6).
Initially, it is not yet clear which firm will become the first, second or third
investor in the market. All firms try to be in the position of the first investor,
motivated by the period of monopoly profits. The first investor invests when
it is indifferent between waiting for the position of the second entrant and
investing immediately. This preemption moment is denoted by X1. The value




















Preemption trigger X1 is found by solving V1(X1,Q1,Q2,Q3) =W2(X1,Q1,Q2,Q3).
Additionally, the firm optimizes the capacity size in which it will invest. For
this, take the first order condition of the first row of (4.3.6) with respect to Q1,
the root for which this value function obtains a maximum results in the firm’s
optimal capacity choice. The following proposition states the two equations
that lead to the optimal investment decision of the market leader.
Proposition 4.3
Consider multiplicative demand. The preemption trigger X1 and optimal capacity











































2Notice that this value is equal to W3(X ,Q1,Q2,Q3) at preemption trigger X2, the value
of waiting for being the third investor, i.e. W3(X2,Q1,Q2,Q3) = W2(X2,Q1,Q2,Q3) =
V2(X2,Q1,Q2,Q3).
























− c = 0. (4.3.8)
Additive demand 4.3.2
For additive demand, the value functions are constructed in a similar way as
described for the multiplicative demand in Subsection 4.3.1. Here, we shall
shortly summarize the firms’ value functions and its optimal investment trigger
or the implicit equation that has to be solved in order to find the optimal pre-
emption moment.










r − cQ3 X ≥ X3.
(4.3.9)
The optimal investment decision of the entrant is expressed in Proposition 4.4.
Proposition 4.4
Consider additive demand. The third investor invests at optimal investment trigger
X3, given by:
X3 =
β1(r −µ)(cr + (Q1 +Q2 +Q3)η)
(β1 − 1)r
, (4.3.10)
and invests in the optimal level of capacity
Q3 =
cr + (Q1 +Q2)η
(β1 − 2)η
.












r − cQ2 X ≥ X3.
(4.3.11)
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The following proposition states the two equations that lead to the optimal
investment decision of the second investor under additive demand.
Proposition 4.5
Consider additive demand. The preemption trigger X2 and optimal capacity level



































− c = 0.
Finally, we analyze the investment decision of the first investor. The first




























r − cQ1 X ≥ X3.
(4.3.13)
The first entrant needs to prevent that it is preempted by one of the other two
potential entrants. Therefore it will invest when it is indifferent between waiting
for the second investment position, or investing immediately, this preemption
moment is denoted by X1. The following proposition states the two equations
that need to be solved in order to find the optimal investment decision of the
market leader.
Proposition 4.6
Consider additive demand. The preemption trigger X1 and optimal capacity level









































































− c = 0.
Results 4.4
Multiplicative demand 4.4.1
This section considers multiplicative demand. The previous section showed
that in order to find a firm’s optimal investment decision, two equations have
to be solved simultaneously. Often, it is only possible to solve these equations
numerically (e.g. Huisman and Kort (2014), Boonman and Hagspiel (2014)).
However, this section shows that analytical solutions exist for the optimal
investment decisions. The following proposition gives an expression for each
investment decision. It turns out that the investment decisions depend on four
expressions (i.e. χ2(β1), χ1(β1), ϕ2(β1) and ϕ1(β1)), that satisfy a system of
four implicit equations. However, notice that these equations are only a function
of β1.
The following proposition also proves that the optimal investment moment
is not affected by a change in substitutability parameter η. This parameter will
only affect the optimal capacity, i.e. a higher level of substitutability leads to a
strictly lower optimal capacity choice for each firm. This is intuitive, since a
higher substitutability makes the price more sensitive to a change in the level
of production (thus, the level of capacity). Therefore, the firm tries to keep
the price high by investing in less capacity when the substitutability would be
slightly higher. This explains why a firm rather uses its capacity choice as a tool
to deal with a higher level of substitutability, than the timing of investment.
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Furthermore, we find that the optimal capacities are not dependent on the
unit cost of capacity, and the optimal investment trigger increases in the unit
cost of capacity. That is, under the multiplicative demand structure, a firm reacts
on a higher investment costs by delaying its investment. The multiplicative
demand structure assumes a fixed market size and investing later does therefore
not imply an increase in the size of the market.
Proposition 4.7
Consider the multiplicative demand structure. We find that the optimal investment
decision of the first investor is equal to
X1 =







The optimal investment decision of the second investor is given by
X2 =
c(β1 − 1)2(r −µ)χ2(β1)






and for the third investor we have
X3 =
c(β1 − 1)3(r −µ)
(β1 − 1)(1−ϕ1(β1) + β1)(1−ϕ2(β1) + β1)
, (4.4.5)
Q1 =
(1−ϕ1(β1) + β1)(1−ϕ2(β1) + β1)
(β1 + 1)3η
. (4.4.6)
The expressionsϕ1(β1),ϕ2(β1), χ1(β1) and χ2(β1) can be found by simultaneously
solving the following four equations:
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+ 1+ β1 +χ2(1−ϕ2 + β1) = 0, (4.4.8)

χ1(1−ϕ1 + β1)(1−ϕ2 + β1)
(1+ β1)2
β1








(β1 + 1)χ2ϕ2(ϕ1 − 1)
+ (1−ϕ1 + β1) (ϕ1(1− 2ϕ1 + β1) + 1− β1) = 0, (4.4.9)
and

χ1(1−ϕ1 + β1)(1−ϕ2 + β1)
(1+ β1)2














+ϕ1 ((β1 − 1)−χ1(1−ϕ1 − β1)) = 0. (4.4.10)
The investment triggers X1, X2, and X3 are not dependent of the substitutability
parameter η and the optimal capacities Q1, Q2, Q3 are not dependent of the
unit cost of capacity c. Furthermore, there is a negative relationship between
the optimal capacities and η, and a positive relationship between the optimal
investment triggers and the unit cost of capacity.
Based on the expressions in Proposition 4.7 we cannot draw any conclusions
about the effect of uncertainty on the investment decisions. Namely, χ2(β1),
χ1(β1), ϕ2(β1) and ϕ1(β1) still depend upon β1, which in turn is a function
of market uncertainty. The left graph of Figure 4.1 shows the effect of the
market uncertainty on the firm’s investment trigger. The graph on the right
hand side illustrates the corresponding optimal capacities. The effect of market























Figure 4.1: The effect of σ on the firm’s optimal investment trigger
and capacities, when multiplicative demand is consid-
ered. Take r=0.1, µ=0.01, η=0.5, and c =1.
uncertainty on the optimal capacities is interesting. Boonman and Hagspiel
(2014) showed already for multiplicative demand, when there are just two
firms in the market, that the second investor invests in a larger capacity than the
first investor when market uncertainty is low. The opposite situation will occur
when market uncertainty is high enough. In a market with three investors, we
find that there are three possible scenarios.
The firms preempt each other for the first two market positions, and there-
fore they invest sooner than they would have done without the game-aspect.
Investing soon implies that the market is not yet big enough for a large in-
vestment. Due to the structure of the multiplicative demand, a higher level of
uncertainty parameter X increases the price. Due to the Stackelberg advantage
of the first entrant, it can invest in a larger capacity than the second entrant
and thereby occupy a bigger part of the market. When there is just one entrant
left to invest, nobody can preempt this entrant anymore. Consequently, the
third entrant can invest at its non-strategic optimal investment trigger. The
capacity size of the third entrant, relative to the size of the first and second
entrant, depends on the market uncertainty. For low uncertainty, the third
entrant invests in the largest capacity. The other two entrants are forced to
invest so soon, due to the preemption threat, that they are not able to invest in
a larger capacity size. For a somewhat more uncertain market environment,
the value of waiting will go up. This delays the preemption moments of the
first and the second entrant, and enables them to invest in a larger capacity.
Recall that, for multiplicative demand, the first entrant’s capacity is always
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bigger than the capacity of the second entrant, i.e. the Stackelberg advantage.
Therefore, for an intermediate market uncertainty level, the first entrant will
have a larger capacity than the third entrant, and the second entrant will still
have the smallest capacity size. The third scenario occurs for a highly uncertain
market environment. In this case, also the preemption moment of the second
entrant is delayed enough to obtain a larger capacity than the third entrant.
The left hand side of Figure 4.1 shows, for a specific market scenario, that
X2− X1 and X3− X2 are increasing with uncertainty (σ). That is, the accordion
effect does not occur. The fact that the optimal capacities and preemption
triggers are still a function of parameters that can only be obtained by solving
four implicit equations, makes it impossible to analytically prove that this is
a general result. However, extensive numerical analysis shows that the gap
between the first and the second, and the second and the third entrant increases
with uncertainty, for all other parameter combinations.
Result 4.1
Consider the multiplicative demand structure and an oligopoly with three capacity
optimizing firms. We find that the gap between any of the three investors increases
for a higher market uncertainty. Consequently, neither a equilibrium where two
or more firms invest at the same time, nor the accordion effect seem to occur.
Additive demand 4.4.2
The previous subsection gives an analysis of the investment decisions in case of
multiplicative demand. In this subsection we consider additive demand. Again,
it is possible to obtain analytical expression for the optimal capacities and
investment triggers. These are still a function of four expressions in β1, which
can be found by solving four implicit equations. The analytical expressions show
us that the investment moments of all firms are unaffected by substitutability
parameter η, as was also derived for the multiplicative demand structure. Also,
we find that the optimal capacity and optimal investment moments are linearly
increasing in unit capacity cost c. Where a higher unit capacity cost is expected
to have a diminishing effect on the optimal capacity choice, it also has an
increasing effect on the timing of investment. A firm with the additive demand
delays the moment of investment to an extend that it is also able to invest in
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a larger capacity size. Contrary to the multiplicative demand structure, that
has a fixed market size, the additive demand structure allows for an increase in
the size of the market when a firm delays its moment of investment. Therefore,
under the additive demand structure an increase in unit capacity costs leads to
a higher level of capacity, where it has no effect on the optimal level of capacity
under multiplicative demand.
The expressions for the optimal investment triggers with the corresponding
conclusions are formulated in Proposition 4.8.
Proposition 4.8
Consider the additive demand structure. We find that the optimal investment





































Expressions ϕ1(β1), ϕ2(β1), χ1(β1) and χ2(β1) can be found by simultaneously
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(ϕ2(β1 − 2)) (ϕ1(β1 − 2)− 1)
− (β1 − 2) ((2χ1 + 1)(β1 − 2)−χ1β1) = 0.
The optimal investment moments X1, X2, and X3 are not dependent of the substi-
tutability parameter η, and the corresponding levels of capacity, Q1, Q2, and Q3,
are increasing in substitutability parameter η. The timing of investment and the
optimal level of capacity are both linearly increasing in unit capacity cost c.
Since there are still four expressions that have to be solved by use of implicit
equations, we cannot draw any conclusions on the effect of uncertainty, based
on the expressions of Proposition 4.8. Figure 4.2 shows the effect of uncertainty
on the optimal investment moments and corresponding optimal capacities, for a
representative parameter scenario. We find that also for additive demand, due
to the possibility to optimize capacities, the gap between all firms’ investments
increase with uncertainty.
Notice that it always holds that Q1 <Q2 <Q3, contrary to the multiplicative
demand, where there were three scenarios. The difference lies in the fact that
a higher level of X increases the price for both the additive and multiplicative
demand function, but, in addition it also increases the market size for the
additive demand function. Waiting for a higher level of X leads to a bigger
market size, in case of additive demand, which gives an entrant the opportunity























Figure 4.2: The effect ofσ on the firm’s optimal investment triggers
and capacities, when additive demand is considered.
Take r=0.1, µ=0.01, η=0.5, and c =1.
to invest in a larger capacity than the previous entrant. Manne (1961) is an
early contribution that finds, for a monopolistic firm, that it invests in a larger
capacity level when uncertainty increases (size effect).
The accordion effect, found by Bouis et al. (2009) indicates that the preemp-
tion moment of the second investor moves towards the preemption moment of
the first investment, and the investment moment of the third investor increases
for a higher level of market uncertainty. Figure 4.2 illustrates that allowing
firms to optimize capacities makes them all move in the same direction, and
consequently the size effect dominates the accordion effect. Also for the addi-
tive demand, we cannot show analytically that the accordion effect does not
occur under capacity optimization, but our extensive numerical analysis show
that this result holds in general.
Result 4.2
Consider the additive demand structure and an oligopoly with three firms where
each firm optimizes capacity. We find that the gap between any of the three
investors increases for a higher market uncertainty. Consequently, neither the
simultaneous equilibrium nor the accordion effect seem to occur.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter analyzes the optimal investment timing and capacity choice of
three potential entrants, where firm roles are assumed to be endogenously
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determined. We examine how resistent the result of Bouis et al. (2009) is
under the assumption of different demand structures (i.e. multiplicative and
additive demand) and the relaxation of the assumption of given capacity. Bouis
et al. (2009) analyzes optimal timing of investment for three firms under the
assumption of a simplified multiplicative demand structure. They find that a
higher level of market uncertainty increases the third firm’s threshold, decreases
the second firm’s threshold and increases the first firm’s threshold. Hence, the
wedge between the first and the second threshold decreases and the wedge
between the second and the third threshold increases. This is defined as the
accordion effect. For high enough uncertainty, it is optimal for the first two
entrants to invest simultaneously.
Under capacity optimization, both types of demand functions show that all
firms invest sequentially. Furthermore, the first and the second firm never invest
in the same capacity. Under additive demand, later investors invest in a larger
capacity. This is due to a feature of the demand structure, which allows for an
increase in the market size. Under multiplicative demand however, the relative
investment magnitude of the three investors is dependent of uncertainty, as is
also explained by Boonman and Hagspiel (2014) for the duopoly case.
Another point where this chapter contributes to the existing literature, is
that we are able to show analytically that increasing substitutability has a
decreasing effect on the capacity choice, while it does not affect the timing
of investment. Furthermore, under the assumption of additive demand it can
be shown that higher investment costs leads to a later investment in a larger
capacity, where under the assumption of multiplicative demand this leads to
a later investment, but the optimal capacity choice of the firm is unaffected.
The additive demand structure allows for an increase in the market size when
investment is delayed, which stimulates a firm to invest in a larger capacity
in case it delays investment. The market size under multiplicative demand
however, is fixed for all investment moments.
Where Bouis et al. (2009) also consider the multi-firm case, this chapter is
limited to the three-firm case. It is most likely that our results can be generalized
for the multi-firm case. However, this remains to be investigated in future
research. Also, for analytical convenience we proposed the market clearance
assumption. However, it would be interesting to analyze how our results change
under production flexibility.
126 Optimal Capacity Investment in Oligopoly Chapter 4
4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
The value function of the third investor is given by:
V3(X ,Q1,Q2,Q3) = E
∫ ∞
t=0






The value of the firm before investment, i.e. the value of waiting, takes the
form f (X ) = AX β1 , where A is a constant to be determined and β1 is the positive










β1 − r = 0.
Denote with X3 the investment moment of the follower. Value matching and
smooth pasting the follower’s value of waiting with the value function after











Additionally, the optimal capacity of the third entrant is derived by maximizing
the value function with respect to Q3 and solving the first order partial derivative
condition:
X3 (1−η(Q1 +Q2 + 2Q3))
r −µ
− c = 0.
Therefore,
X3 =
c(β1 + 1)(r −µ)
(β1 − 1)(1−η(Q1 +Q2 +Q3))
,







Proof of Proposition 4.2 4.A.2
The second investor invests at preemption moment X2, where W3(X2,Q1,Q2,Q3) =

























W3(X2,Q1,Q2,Q3)− V2(X2,Q1,Q2,Q3) = 0 is equivalent to expression (4.3.4).
Expression (4.3.5) in Proposition 4.2 is found by taking the first order partial
derivative of V2(X ,Q1,Q2,Q3) with respect to Q2. 
Proof of Proposition 4.3 4.A.3
The first investor invests at preemption moment X1, where W2(X1,Q1,Q2,Q3) =



















and V2(X ,Q1,Q2,Q3) is given by
V1(X ,Q1,Q2,Q3) =





















W2(X1,Q1,Q2,Q3)− V1(X1,Q1,Q2,Q3) = 0 is equivalent to expression (4.3.7).
Expression (4.3.8) in Proposition 4.3 is found by taking the first order partial
derivative of V1(X ,Q1,Q2,Q3) with respect to Q1. 
4.A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.4
The concept of this proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.1.
4.A.5 Proof of Proposition 4.5
The concept of this proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.2.
4.A.6 Proof of Proposition 4.6
The concept of this proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.3.
4.A.7 Proof of Proposition 4.7
In Proposition 4.7 we find analytical solutions for the investment triggers of the
three firms. For the last firm, we are able to find analytical solutions for X3 and
Q3. Namely, we simultaneously solve the value matching and smooth pasting
conditions in the proof of Proposition 4.1 and the equation that gives the first
order partial derivative of the V3(X3,Q1,Q2,Q3) with respect to Q3. We obtain:
X3 =
c(β1 + 1)(r −µ)
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When we use these solutions we find
X2 =







for some χ2(β1) and ϕ2(β1). Similarly, we find
X1 =







for some χ1(β1) and ϕ1(β1). Substituting the latter two expressions expressions
into the first four expressions gives the analytical solutions stated in Proposition
4.7. The analytical solutions need to satisfy four equations, namely the rent
equalization formulas (given by equation (4.3.4) and (4.3.7)), and the first


























































− c = 0,
respectively. Substitution of (4.4.1), (4.4.2), (4.4.3), (4.4.4), (4.4.5) and
(4.4.6) into these four equations, gives the implicit equations (4.4.7), (4.4.8)
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and (4.4.9) and (4.4.10) that remain to be solved for χ1(β1), ϕ1(β1), χ2(β1)
and ϕ2(β1) and are stated in Proposition 4.7. 
4.A.8 Proof of Proposition 4.8
The concept of this proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.7.
5Capacity Optimization in anOperational Model with Time-Lags
This chapter is based on Boonman and Siddiqui (2014).
Abstract
In this chapter, we consider a firm that has the opportunity to suspend and
resume production infinitely many times. We contribute to the literature by
allowing a firm to optimize the level of capacity prior to its suspension options
and by incorporating a time lag in which a firm prepares the start of the
production process. This time lag takes place after the decision to resume
production. We find that an increase in the length of the time lag results in an
increase in the optimal capacity level. Capacity optimization also determines
how the length of the time lag affects the optimal investment and operational
triggers. Under the assumption of a fixed level of capacity the length of the
time lag lowers the operational triggers, while under capacity optimization
these triggers can also increase. Namely, under capacity optimization, a larger
time lag results in a larger capacity choice, which can indirectly result in
higher operational triggers and a higher investment trigger. This indirect effect
dominates when the level of market uncertainty is low and the initial time lag
is small.
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5.1 Introduction
Much of the existing literature in the real options field assumes that after
investment a firm will always remain open, regardless of the current market
price or demand (e.g. McDonald and Siegel (1986b), Dixit (1991) and Bouis
et al. (2009)). However, given the volatile nature of deregulated industries,
it would be plausible to assess a firm’s desire to suspend the facility. With the
recession that started in the fall of 2008, the flexibility of such firms to respond
to market conditions is paramount. For example, in December 2008, General
Motors announced that it would “Temporarily close twenty factories across
North America and make sweeping cuts to its vehicle production as it tries to
adjust to dramatically weaker automobile demand"1. Other car manufacturers,
such as Toyota2 and Honda3, were forced to close some of their production
plants. In turn, the global steel market, which also experienced a major cutback
in steel purchases from its customers (e.g. automotive manufacturers), was
also affected by the global economic downturn. To illustrate, in May 2009 the
world largest steel producer ArcelorMittal was forced to idle its Monessen coke
plant4. In the years following, the steel makers were battling back from the
slump that begun when the economy faltered in 2008. Eventually, in 2012
ArcelorMittal announced to resume the production at its Monessen coke plant.
Only two years later the production was ready to take off. Such production
facilities are characterized by some relevant features. That is, once decided to
resume operations, the firm faces a time lag to prepare the production process
for the ultimate production. Also, there are some fixed costs associated with
switching between the operational and the suspension state. These features
should be taken into account when analyzing the optimal timing to resume and
suspend the production in a plant.
Given this background, we assess the problem of a firm with the opportunity
to suspend and resume production infinitely many times in the future against
some positive switching costs (i.e. the mothballing option). Entry and exit
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Schwartz (1985), Dixit (1989), and McDonald (2002). Where these models
place their focus on the optimal triggers for switching towards the other state,
some later extensions take up the additional challenge to optimize endogenously
the firm’s capacity. Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) consider a firm that optimizes
capacity before demand has been resolved. After demand realization, the firm
chooses optimal production quantities, which are constraint by the earlier
chosen capacity size. Dangl (1999) and Hagspiel (2011) extend this model into
a dynamic setting. The continuous time framework allows a firm to optimize
timing of investment along with capacity size. After investment, the firm
optimizes the level of production for each realization of demand, assuming the
same constraints as in Van Mieghem and Dada (1999).
The latter three models provide a contribution to the existing literature
by optimizing the level of capacity. However, they allow a firm to switch
costlessly between the operational and suspension states. In Dixit (1989) and
McDonald (2002), a fixed cost has to be paid for switching between these
two states, which brings the model closer to reality. Laying off employees
or depreciation of unused equipment results in (insuperable) costs when a
firm decides to temporarily close down its business. Furthermore, resuming
production generates costs like overdue maintenance, marketing, and training
that comes with hiring new employees. In case of the steel producer example,
ArcelorMittal even reinvested $50 million in the plant prior to the reopening.
We use the McDonald (2002) model as the baseline model in our paper and
make two contributions to it. First, we introduce an inverse demand structure,
which captures the tradeoff between high capacity and low price in terms of
the revenue. The firm has a one-time opportunity to make a lumpy capacity
investment. This extension comes close to the mothballing models, Dangl
(1999) and Hagspiel (2011), but with additional switching costs. Second, we
introduce a time lag to prepare the production process, which takes place after
the decision to resume production. Even for modest time lags there still is a
significant effect on the optimal triggers to switch from the operational to the
idle state and vice versa. Namely, this time lag will occur repeatedly after every
decision of the production facility to resume production. In related work, Bar-
Ilan and Strange (1996) embed lags in the classic irreversible lumpy investment
model presented by Dixit (1989). They find that for some parameter values,
an increase in uncertainty can actually hasten investment, a result contrary to
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that found in papers without investment lags. We, thus, incorporate a time
lag in McDonald (2002)’s entry and exit model after each decision to resume
production, since a start-up will not occur instantaneously. While the time it
takes to prepare the production process is captured within this time lag, the
decision to stop the production is assumed to be executed immediately. For
example, in case of ArcelorMittal, it took two years between the announcement
of the steel producer to resume production of the Monessen coke plant and the
actual restart of the production.
The paper most closely related to our work is Sødal (2006), who uses the
Dixit (1989) model as a baseline. In Sødal (2006), a firm has infinitely many
options to enter and exit a market against a fixed entry or exit cost. Similar
to our result, he finds that due to the fixed operational costs, a firm should
wait for a strictly higher trigger price than the Marshallian cost. The effect of
a time lag in resuming production implies that increasing uncertainty might
hasten investment when there is a time lag and also lower the entry trigger for
resuming operations. However, these outcomes are not as likely as argued in
Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996). We deviate from the model of Sødal (2006) by
allowing for capacity optimization. Furthermore, we assume that a firm only
once decides about the level of its capacity, at the initial investment moment. In
the operational decisions, following upon this, the firm is limited to this initial
capacity choice.
The introduction of capacity optimization in the flexible operational models
with a time lag changes the results of Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and Sødal
(2006). Under a fixed capacity level, the effect of uncertainty on the optimal
operational triggers is ambiguous. However, under capacity optimization, the
level of capacity dominates the switching triggers. Namely, we find that a
higher level of uncertainty leads to a delay in investment, which allows for
a larger capacity level, and in turn leads to strictly higher switching triggers.
The operational switching triggers occur around the level of price intercept for
which the price is equal to the unit production cost. A higher capacity level
requires a higher price intercept (i.e. trigger) to prevent prices from turning
negative. Furthermore, capacity optimization changes the effect of the length
of the time lag on the optimal investment trigger and the optimal switching
triggers. Where Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) observe that the trigger values
decrease for an increase in the length of the time lag, we find that for low
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uncertainty and a low initial time lag the triggers can also increase. That is, a
larger time lag results in a larger capacity choice, which in turn increases the
trigger values. The larger capacity choice is a result of a truncated downside
of investment and unlimited upward potential. Thus, at the moment that the
firm pursues the production, after the time lag, it expects the profit to have
grown. This result will be amplified under a larger time lag, thereby allowing
for a larger capacity choice.
This chapter is structured as follows. The general model is presented in
Section 5.2. Section 5.3 analyzes the model where a firm optimizes capacity at
the moment of investment. After investment, it has infinitely many options to
suspend and resume the production facility against a fixed switching cost. In
Section 5.4, a time lag after the decision to resume production is added to the
model. Section 5.5 compares the results for the model with and without a time
lag, and Section 5.6 concludes.
Modeling Assumptions 5.2
Herein, we take the perspective a firm that has to decide about capacity invest-
ment in a new market. This involves two decisions, viz. when to invest and
determining the size of capacity. After investment, the firm is in production.
Against switching cost Ss it can decide to temporarily stop the production. In
this state, the profit of the firm is zero. An inactive firm has the option to restart
the production against switching cost Sr . Due to the (positive) switching costs,
a firm will not switch at the price where its profit is equal to zero. Instead, it
converts at some optimal switching triggers, i.e., at some uncertainty level it
switches from the suspension state towards the operational state and at some
other uncertainty level it switches back to the suspension state.
We assume that the inverse demand function is given by:
Pt = X t −ηQ, (5.2.1)
where Q is the fixed annual production of the firm and η the substitutability
parameter with η ∈ (0,1). The uncertainty parameter X t is uncertain and is
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assumed to follow the geometric Brownian motion:
dX t = µX t d t +σX t dωt t ≥ 0,
X0 = x ,
with drift parameter µ, volatility parameter σ and dωt the increment of a
standard Wiener process. Future revenues will be discounted against interest
rate ρ. Variable production cost are denoted by c, so that the profit flow of a
firm in production is given by:
πt = (Pt − c)Q.
For analytical convenience, we propose the “market clearance assumption",
i.e., the firm produces up to capacity. This assumption is widely used in the
literature (Chod and Rudi (2005), Deneckere et al. (1997), Anand and Girotra
(2007)). Unlike Dangl (1999) and Hagspiel (2011), we do not optimize a firm’s
production level; instead, the firm is able to deal with low prices via the option
to suspend the production facility.
Note that we consider additive demand. This demand structure runs the risk
to produce negative prices for very low levels of X t . However, the firm has the
option to suspend the production facility for low prices, i.e., for low levels of X t .
As a result, a firm never produces for those scenarios where prices are below
zero. Following Hagspiel (2011) and Dangl (1999), investment costs are sunk
and equal to I(Q t) = δQλt . Constant δ > 0 denotes the variable investment cost
and constant λ > 0 is assumed to be less than one, thereby implying a concave
investment structure. By adopting the same investment costs, in a later section
we are able to make a comparison between these papers and our results5.
5Hagspiel (2011) additionally shows the scenario where a firm faces convex investment
costs. This paper explains that “the investment cost the firm is facing for the convex case is
significantly higher for larger investments, and therefore installing a large amount of capacity
is more expensive.”
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Operational Flexibility under Capacity Choice 5.3
To illustrate a sequence of decisions made by a firm after investment, consider
Figure 5.1, which illustrates a possible path of the uncertainty parameter X t .
Assume that the considered firm is not producing at the start of the time frame.
We find that the firm resumes the production at time t = τ2k. The firm stays in
production for a while until it suspends production at time t = τ2k+1. After this




















Figure 5.1: A simulated path of uncertainty parameter X t , with
operational triggers X s = 460 and X r = 515.
The Model 5.3.1
Figure 5.2 shows the decision-making time line. At time t = τI the firm invests
in optimal capacity size Q∗. The firm suspends operations at the odd triggers
and resumes at the even triggers, at time t = τ2k+1 and t = τ2k+2, respectively,
for k ∈ N, where τ1 > τI . Since there exists stationary behavior in the shut
down and re-starting decisions, we assume that there is one mutual trigger
for resuming operations, i.e. Xτ2k = X r for all k ∈ N, and one mutual trigger
for suspending operations, i.e. Xτ2k+1 = X s, for all k ∈ N. In order to find
the value functions and optimal decisions of the firm, we will work backwards
through the time line. Since a firm has infinitely many charging and discharging
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Figure 5.2: Decision-making time line for investing, suspending
and resuming operations.
decisions, it is not possible to consider the “last" decision of a firm. Instead, we
shall consider an arbitrary moment on the time line and work backwards from
that moment on.
To start with, assume that at capacity size Q the firm has just suspended
the production at X s at time τ2k+1, and it can now evaluate the decision to
resume operations at level X r at time τ2k+2. The value of this firm is given
by Fs(X t; X s, X r ,Q). Here, X t is the level of the uncertainty parameter at time
t. Taking one step back in the time line, we look at the decision to suspend
operations. Denote the net expected value of a plant that is in operation by
Fr(X t; X s, X r ,Q). X t expresses the level of uncertainty at the time that a firm
considers to suspend the production. Therefore:

















− Ss + Fs(X s; X s, X r ,Q)

. (5.3.1)
The first two terms in expression (5.3.1) represent the expected revenue of
a firm that produces forever. At some point in the future, the firm decides to
suspend operations and loses this revenue. Additionally, it incurs switching























β −ρ = 0.
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By taking one extra step back in the decision-making time line, we (again)
look at the decision to resume operations, occurring at time t = τ2k. The net
expected value of a plant that has just stopped the production and now has the
option to resume is given by:





(Fr(X r; X s, X r ,Q)− Sr) . (5.3.2)
Expression (5.3.2) explains that the firm obtains no profit in the suspension
state, but it has an option to resume operation against switching cost Sr in the
future.
After substitution of Fs(X s; X s, X r ,Q) into Fr(X r; X s, X r ,Q), we find that the
solution for Fr(X r ; X s, X r ,Q). Since this solution is not equal to Fr(X r ; X s, X r ,Q)
as defined in equation (5.3.1), we denote this solution by Gr(X s; X r ,Q).



































Subsequently, we substitute equation (5.3.3) into Fs(X s; X s, X r ,Q). The solution
we denote by Gs(X r; X s,Q):









































We take the first-order necessary condition of Gs(X r; X s,Q) with respect to X r ,
and the first-order necessary condition of Gr(X s; X r ,Q) with respect to X s. We
simultaneously solve these two equations to find the two switching triggers
X s(Q) and X r(Q).
The switching triggers are relevant only after the firm has performed investment.
Now, assume a firm that has not yet invested in the market. Here, X t is the
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level of the uncertainty parameter at the first moment where the firm considers
investing in the market. The value of a firm that has the option to invest at
X t = X I in capacity Q is given by


























We find the optimal moment to invest and the corresponding optimal level of
capacity by optimizing FI(X t; X I ,Q) with respect to X I and Q, resulting in X ∗I
and Q∗. Due to the complexity of the first order derivatives, there is no analytical
solution available for the above stated problem. Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996)
explain that under some simplifying assumptions, it is possible to find closed-
form solutions for X s(Q) and X r(Q). In order to perform the sensitivity analysis
with respect to certain parameters, we use the software program Mathematica.
5.3.2 Results
The upper panel of Figure 5.3 illustrates the effect of market uncertainty on
the switching triggers X s and X r for a fixed level of capacity. Capacity choice
Q is chosen optimal for σ =0.1. The result is in line with the standard real
options result, viz. a higher level of uncertainty delays the firm’s switching
triggers. For a more uncertain market environment, the firm waits for a higher
(lower) level of X t before it switches from the suspended (operational) state
towards the operational (suspended) state. The bottom panel of Figure 5.3
illustrates the effect of capacity choice Q on the optimal switching triggers. Due
to the positive switching costs, the triggers to suspend and resume operations,
respectively, lie below and above the level of X t for which the profit is exactly
zero. The inverse demand function, as defined by expression (5.2.1), shows
that a higher capacity level implies a higher level of X t in order to avoid a
negative price. Therefore, the switching triggers increase for a higher capacity
level as illustrated in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: The effect of uncertainty σ (upper panel) and capacity
choice Q (bottom panel) on the optimal operational
triggers. Take parameter combination Q = 197.81 (for
upper panel), σ = 0.1 (for bottom panel), ρ = 0.1,
µ = 0.02, η = 1, Sd = Ss = 3000, δ = 1000, λ = 0.7,
and c = 200.
Table 5.1 shows the optimal capacity and timing of investment for several
levels of uncertainty. A model that is closely related to our work is the inflexible
model of Hagspiel (2011), in which a firm has to decide when to undertake
the capacity investment along with the capacity size6. In the inflexible model a
suspension option prevents a firm to produce as soon as demand is such that
price will fall below unit production costs. In order to compare our model with
Hagspiel (2011), we have chosen the same parameter values. The optimal
6This model is inflexible compared to another model that Hagspiel (2011) defines, i.e. the
flexible model, where a firm can also optimize production quantities.
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investment strategy for our model, shown in Table 5.1, confirms the optimal
investment strategy illustrated in Figure 2.4 in Hagspiel (2011).
σ X ∗I Q
∗ X s(Q∗) X r(Q∗)
0.1 464.74 197.81 362.57 429.62
0.15 678.30 383.19 547.45 616.33
0.20 1321.21 982.31 1141.31 1221.52
Table 5.1: Investment strategy and optimal operational triggers.
Parameter values are ρ =0.1, µ=0.02, σ =0.1, η= 1,
c = 200, Ss = Sr =3000, δ =1000, and λ=0.7.
The last two columns of Table 5.1 show the effect of increasing uncertainty
on the the switching triggers. In fact, these results can be explained by com-
bining the two graphs in Figure 5.3 with the first two columns of Table 5.1.
A higher level of uncertainty results in a larger capacity investment, which in
turn increases both switching triggers. In effect, a firm speeds up the optimal
moment to suspend production and delays the optimal moment to resume
production (i.e. an indirect effect). Also, we have shown in Figure 5.3 that a
higher level of uncertainty delays both the optimal moment to suspend as the
optimal moment to resume operations (i.e. a direct effect). Table 5.1 shows
that the indirect effect dominates the direct effect.
Our model departs from the inflexible model of Hagspiel (2011) by the
introduction of positive switching costs. As an illustration, Figure 5.4 shows
the scenario where Sr = Ss = 0, which corresponds to the inflexible model
of Hagspiel (2011). Namely, a firm suspends and opens an operation when
passing the level of uncertainty parameter X s(Q) = X r(Q) = 397.8. That is
exactly the level of X t for which the price is equal to the unit production costs.
For positive switching costs, we find that X s(Q) ≤ 397.8 ≤ X r(Q). Then, a
firm shall not immediately suspend (open) operations when the profit turned
negative (positive). It might rather have a small loss (lose some revenue from
potential production) than pay the switching costs. Tsekrekos (2010) confirms
this result. In Figure 5.4 we assume that the fixed level of capacity Q is optimal
for Sr = Ss =3000.
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Figure 5.4: The effect of the switching cost parameters on the opti-
mal operational triggers. Take parameter combination
Q = 197.81, ρ = 0.1, µ = 0.02, σ = 0.1, η = 1,
δ = 1000, λ = 0.7, and c = 200. In the upper panel
take Ss=3000, in the middle panel take Sr=3000.
Time-lag and Capacity Optimization in the Operational
Flexible Model
5.4
In the previous section, a firm was given the opportunity to temporarily close
down production for low prices. This section takes into account that the start-up
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of production is more involved. There is a time lag between the decision to
resume and the start of the operations during which the firm is unable to obtain
revenue from production. The suspension decision, on the other hand, can occur
instantaneously. Contrary to Sødal (2006) and Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996)
we do not consider extremely large time lags, motivated by the necessity to
make an extensive investment at the moment the firm resumes the production.
Instead, we assume that the old production location and equipment is still
available after the restart.
In this section we see how the additional time lag changes the results from
previous section.
5.4.1 Description of the Model
t
τ∗ τ1 τ2k τ2k+1 τ2k+2 · · ·
· · ·· · ·
· · ·
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Figure 5.5: Decision-making time line for investing, suspending
and resuming operations with time lags.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the decision-making time line with time lags. We start
by looking at the scenario where a firm has just made the decision to resume
operations at t = τ2k. There is a necessary preparation time before a firm can
obtain the “old" profit flow. Denote the time that it takes to prepare for the
restart of production, also known as the time lag, by T , i.e., the firm will be
operating by time t = τ2k+T . If the last decision the firm made is the restarting
decision, then the firm now owns the option to suspend operations at its optimal
timing. It could be optimal to stop the production immediately after the time
lag. In this case, the firm observes a price too low to continue production
(i.e. Xτ2k+T ≤ Xτ2k+1). Notice, this implies that the firm has not yet produced
anything, it immediately goes back to the suspended state. Alternatively, the
current price after the time lag is high enough to actually restart production (i.e.
Xτ2k+T > Xτ2k+1), and a firm optimally supends production at time t = τ2k+1.
After one such cycle has been completed, the firm will face similar decisions in
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the subsequent cycle. This is similar for all other previous and future operational
decisions. Due to the stationarity in these decisions, we find that there is one
mutual trigger for resuming operations and one mutual trigger for suspending






















Figure 5.6: A simulated path of uncertainty parameter X t . Assume
resumption and suspension triggers X r = 470 and X s =
428.
Figure 5.6 illustrate the two possible scenarios for suspending operations.
Assume that the firm has invested, and is initially inactive when starting to
evaluate the price process. Almost immediately the firm makes the decision to
resume the production. After the time lag, the firm produces for a while until it
is optimal to suspend the production. Later, the firm resumes the operations
again, but this time the price after the time lag is too low to actually produce,
and production is suspended immediately.
Suspending Operations 5.4.2
In order to find the value functions and optimal decisions of the firm, we work
backwards through the time line. Denote the expected net present value of
a plant that has just resumed operations at time t = τ2k+2 by Fr(X r; X s, X r ,Q)
for some given k ∈ N. By taking one step back in the decision-making time
line, the next step is to look at the suspension decision of the firm. There
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are two opportunities for a firm to shut down the operation. A firm could
immediately suspend after the time lag, i.e. at t = τ2k + T ; in this case, it holds
that Xτ2k+T ≤ X s. Alternatively, the firm optimally suspends operations at time
t = τ2k+1. (To easy the notation, from now on we shall denote Xτ2k+T by XT .)
The net expected value of a plant that has just resumed production and now
has the opportunity to suspend, is denoted by Fs(XT ; X s, X r ,Q) and is expressed
as follows:

































Fr(X r; X s, X r ,Q)

if XT > X s.
(5.4.1)
In case the suspension decision is immediately performed at time t = τr + T
(upper line of expression (5.4.1)), the firm pays switching cost Ss for switching
towards the suspended state and Sr for the previous decision to restart the
operation. Namely, similar to Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and Sødal (2006),
we assume that the entry costs are paid at the end of the time lag. In case the
firm pursues production after the time lag (lower line of expression (5.4.1)), it
obtains a revenue equal to XT Qρ−µ −
(ηQ2+cQ)
ρ , before it suspends production at time
t = τ2k+1. To ease the notation, we shall from now on denote Fs(XT ; X s, X r ,Q)
by Fs(XT ).
5.4.3 Resuming Operations
Since we are working backwards through the decision-making time line, next
we look at the firm’s decision to resume the operation at time t = τ2k, which
is followed by a time lag T . As discussed earlier, time t = τ2k + T is the first
moment where the firm can decide to suspend the production.
The value of the option to resume the operation is in fact just the net
discounted expected value of closing the operation at a later moment in time.
This expectation is discounted back to the moment where the operating decision
is made (at t = τ2k). Fr(X r; X s, X r ,Q) denotes the value of the decision to
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resume the operation at time t = τ2k, and is given by:
Fr(X r; X s, X r ,Q) = e
−ρTE[Fs(XT )|X r]. (5.4.2)
From now on, we shall denote Fr(X r; X s, X r ,Q) by Fr(X r). The expected value
of the option discounted to time t = τ2k in expression (5.4.2) can be written
as:








Fr(X r)− Sr − Ss

























f (XT |X r)dXT ,
(5.4.3)
where f (XT |X r) denotes the conditional probability density function at time
t = τ2k of the price of electricity at time t = τ2k + T , when the production
preparation is completed. Equation (5.4.3) can be rewritten as:





Fr(X r)Φ(v(X s, X r)− β1σ
p
T )eρT




































where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and v(X s, X r)
is defined by
v(X s, X r) =








Appendix 5.A.1 explains the derivation from the expected value in expression
(5.4.3) towards the solution in expression (5.4.4). The following proposition
explains that for T very close to zero, the model described in this section
simplifies to the model of Section 5.3 (See Appendix 5.A.2 for the proof.).
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Proposition 5.1
The value functions of the model that incorporate time lag T move towards the
value functions without a time lag, if T → 0.
5.4.4 Switching Triggers
Following the solution method of McDonald (2002), we substitute expression
(5.4.4) into (5.4.2). Solving for Fr(X r) yields the expression Gr(X s; X r ,Q):
Gr(X s; X r ,Q) =
e−ρT










































Once found a closed form expression for Gr(X s; X r ,Q), this is substituted into
the value function of a closed operation, i.e.





(Gr(X s; X r ,Q))) . (5.4.7)
Notice that both value equations are a function of X r and X s. Next, we take
the first-order condition of Gr(X s; X r ,Q), with respect to X s, and the first order
condition of Gs(X r; X s,Q) with respect to X r:
∂ Gr(X s; X r ,Q)
∂ X s
= 0,
∂ Gs(X r; X s,Q)
∂ X r
= 0.
These equations are solved simultaneously for X s and X r for every Q ≥ 0.
Solutions are denoted by X s(Q) and X r(Q). We use the software program
Mathematica to find a solution to this problem.
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Investment Trigger and Capacity Choice 5.4.5
Suppose that the firm has not yet invested in the market. The option value of
the firm that invests at X I in capacity Q is given by










Fr(X r(Q))Φ(v(Xs(Q), XT )− β1σ
p
T )eρT




































Also after the first decision to start operations, there exists a time lag to prepare
the production process. Similar to what was explained in Section 5.3, the
optimal capacity and investment trigger are found by taking the first order
derivative of expression (5.4.8) with respect to X I and Q. The optimal values
are denoted by X ∗I and Q
∗. Substitution of Q∗ in X s(Q) and X r(Q) give X s(Q∗)
and X r(Q∗).
Results 5.5
In order to compare the results from the model with a time lag (Section 5.4) to
the model without a time lag (Section 5.3), we consider the set of parameters
from Section 5.3. Another set of parameters that we could have considered is
the same set parameters that Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and Sødal (2006)
use. However, since they do not consider a demand function, the choice of η
could determine the differences in results. Note that our model simplifies to the
model of Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and Sødal (2006) by choosing η =0 and
Q =1. Even though we take a slightly different version of the discount factor
approach of Sødal (2006), we can replicate their results (Table 1, p. 1972)
by making the same parameter assumptions, which can be seen as an extra
correctness check for our model.
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5.5.1 Value Functions
The value functions Vs(X t , X s, X r), Vr(X t , X s, X r) and
FI(X t; X I ,Q) are shown graphically in Figure 5.7, where






















































and FI(X t; X I ,Q) as described in expression (5.4.8).
Notice that investment costs are subtracted from the operating and the
closing value function, this in order to value match with the option value to
invest FI(X t ; XT ,Q). Due to the assumption that the entry cost is paid after the
time lag, there is a gap in the value of Sr + Ss = 6000 at X t = X s. However,
when the uncertainty parameter X t hits the trigger X r , the operating and closing
value function value match perfectly. The numerical example from Figure 5.7
assumes that there is no time lag.
It should be noted that under the assumption of a positive time lag, the gap
in value at X t = X s is smaller than Sr + Ss. Here, it becomes possible for a firm
to suspend the operation right after the time lag. This is where total switching
costs Sr + Ss are immediately paid. Alternatively, it is optimal for the firm to
pursue the production, and it just pays entry cost Sr immediately after the time
lag. At a later moment, when it is optimal to suspend the operation, Ss is paid.
The latter case describes the general case without a time lag. However, the
expected discounted switching cost Ss is lower when paid right after the time
lag, resulting in a slightly higher value of an active firm that has the option to
suspend.
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Figure 5.7: Value of the investment opportunity. Capacity Q∗ =
250.23 and triggers X s = 362.6, X r = 429.6 and X I =
464.7 are optimal under parameter combination ρ =
0.1, µ = 0.02, σ = 0.1, η = 1, Sd = Ss = 3000, δ =
1000, λ= 0.7, c = 200, and T = 0.
Switching Triggers 5.5.2
Consider the situation of a firm that has invested and total capacity is known.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the effect of uncertainty (bottom panel) and the length
of the time lag (upper panel) on the optimal triggers to switch from closing
to the operational state and vice versa. Superscript lag highlights the results
that incorporate the time lag. The time lag speeds up the decision to resume
the operation whenever a firm is in the suspended state but delays the optimal
moment to suspend the operation.
First, consider the decision to resume the operation. The firm has the
possibility to suspend the operation for low prices, however the upward potential



































Figure 5.8: The effect of time lag T and uncertainty σ on the opti-
mal triggers X r(Q), X s(Q), X lagr (Q) and X
lag
s (Q). Take
parameter combination Q = 197.81, ρ = 0.1, µ = 0.02,
σ = 0.1, η = 1, Sd = Ss = 3000, δ = 1000, λ = 0.7,
c = 200, and T = 1. (Capacity choice Q is optimal for
T = 0 and σ = 0.1.)
of the market is unlimited. Thus, the firm is expected to have a higher profit
after the time lag. At the moment a firm decides to resume the operation,
it has to wait for T time units before it actually gains revenue. As a result,
it expects that after the time lag the price is already higher than would be
optimal. Taking this into account, it is optimal for a firm to make the decision to
resume production a little earlier. A positive market drift only strengthens this
result7. Secondly, the time lag slightly delays the optimal moment to suspend
the operation. Assume a firm that has to wait for a few months before it gains
7Also under the assumption of a negative market drift, the firm resumes the production at a
lower trigger when it faces a larger time lag. However, this trigger does not diminish as much
compared to the case of a positive market drift. Similarly, the trigger to suspend the production
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revenue from the production facility. Once it is in production, it shall hesitate to
suspend the production facility since it knows that this decision will be followed
by another restart of the operation that includes an additional time lag.
We find that the time lag has a stronger influence on the moment to resume
the operation than on the moment to suspend the operation. The operation
is forced to be inactive for at least the duration of this time lag. Besides the
switching costs that has to be paid from switching from one state to the other,
the length of the time lag is another “burden" for the firm, because it cannot
receive any (potential high) revenue in this period. Thus, for a very large time
lag, a firm is not at all motivated to move towards the suspended state. For
(unrealistic) large time lags, e.g. T=4.4 years, the switching triggers do not
exist and the firm shall not use the opportunity to suspend the operation8.
The bottom panel of Figure 5.8 confirms the result found in Bar-Ilan and
Strange (1996) and Sødal (2006), i.e. a higher uncertainty might hasten a
firms’ entry decision. Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) explain that there are two
effects, where the level of uncertainty determines which one dominates. First,
an increase in uncertainty raises the expected profit over the time lag period,
which might result in an earlier entry. The expected profits can increase due to
the abandonment option that truncates the downside of the market. Secondly,
a higher level of uncertainty increases the likelihood of bad news, which delays
the firm’s decision to resume the production.
Investment Decision 5.5.3
We contribute to the literature by incorporating an initial investment decision
where a firm has the additional option to optimize capacity. Table 5.2 shows for
several levels of uncertainty the effect of the time lag on the optimal investment
decisions and the switching triggers. The conventional result is that a larger
capacity investment corresponds to a delay in the investment decision. This
does not increase as much for a larger time lag under a negative drift compared to the case
with a positive drift.
8The switching levels Xs and X r in Figure 5.8 are relatively large compared to Bar-Ilan and
Strange (1996) and Sødal (2006) due to the higher assumed level of unit production choice.
By definition of the geometric Brownian motion, we know that higher levels of X t result in
larger shocks. Therefore we find in our example, for a time lag larger than 4.4 years, already
that a firm will not use the opportunity to enter and exit the market, where for the examples in
the other two mentioned papers this result has not yet occurred after 8 years.
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σ T X ∗lagI Q
∗lag X lags (Q
∗lag) X lags (Q
∗lag)
0.1 0 464.7 197.8 362.6 429.6
0.1 0.1 470.9 202.5 366.2 432.4
0.1 0.3 469.2 203.1 364.8 428.8
0.1 0.5 469.9 204.0 363.9 425.2
0.15 0 678.3 383.2 547.5 616.3
0.15 0.1 682.6 388.4 539.8 627.9
0.15 0.3 678.1 390.5 536.0 616.2
0.15 0.5 673.9 393.3 534.2 604.7
0.2 0 1321.2 982.3 1119.8 1247.1
0.2 0.1 1317.9 991.9 1113.2 1225.6
0.2 0.3 1295.9 1004.6 1106.9 1174.1
0.2 0.5 1274.7 1017.7 1106.5 1130.4
Table 5.2: Investment strategy and optimal operational triggers.
Parameter values are ρ =0.1, µ=0.02, η= 1, c = 200,
Ss = Sr =3000, λ=0.7, and δ =1000.
result still holds when an increase in uncertainty is considered. However, where
a larger time lag results in an increase in the size of investment, it does not
necessarily lead to later entry. This result is further strengthened for a higher
level of uncertainty. The larger capacity level is related to the expected profit
of the firm over the time lag. Namely, the ability of a firm to suspend the
production means that the downside of the investment is truncated. Therefore,
the firm expects that the market to increase during the time lag, resulting in a
larger expected profit once the firm can pursue the production after the delay.
Thus, a larger time lag further strengthens this result, which justifies the larger
capacity choice.
Result 5.1
Under capacity optimization, an increase in the length of the time lag results in a
larger capacity size.
The effect of the time lag on the optimal timing of investment is ambiguous.
Namely, it can be optimal to delay the investment moment, due the larger
capacity choice. Alternatively, the firm hastens the investment decision, caused
by the first time lag right after the investment decision. As explained for the
upper panel of Figure 5.8, increasing the length of the time lag makes a firm
hasten the entry decision, thus also the first entry decision.
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Capacity optimization also affects the switching triggers after entry, as is
shown in the last two columns of Table 5.2. From Figure 5.8 we know, when
capacity optimization is not an issue, that a larger time lag reduces the level
of both triggers, i.e. the direct effect of an increasing time lag. The switching
triggers are also indirectly affected by the time lag, via the capacity level.
We found that an increase in the length of the time lag results in a larger
capacity level, which in turn increases the level of the switching triggers. Recall
that a higher capacity level implies a higher level of X t for which production
becomes (un)profitable (see the bottom panel Figure 5.3). The indirect effect
only dominates for a small initial level of the time lag and a relatively low
uncertainty.
Result 5.2
Under capacity optimization, the firm chooses a higher investment trigger and
higher exit and entry triggers, when uncertainty is relatively low and the initial
time lag is small.
Counterfactual Effects 5.5.4
Another method to examine the effect of the time lag is to perform a counterfac-
tual analysis. That is, assume that a firm neglects the time lag when it decides
about the optimal triggers for closing and resuming the operation. It will use
the triggers that do not incorporate the time lag. However, in reality there is
a time lag, and therefore, its value is determined by the value functions that
include this time lag. The counterfactual is the percentage loss in value when
the firm does not suspend and resume the operation at the optimal triggers due
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respectively. Here Vs(X t , X s, X r) and Vr(X t , X s, X r) are expressed by (5.5.1) and
(5.5.2) respectively9. Table 5.3 includes the counterfactual values to the results
in Table 5.2. Notice that we are only able to separately evaluate the two value
functions of the firm.
σ T Ds(Q∗,Q∗lag) Dr(Q∗,Q∗lag)
0.1 0 0% 0%
0.1 0.1 0.008% 0.002%
0.1 0.3 0.075% 0.023%
0.1 0.5 0.213% 0.068%
0.15 0 0% 0%
0.15 0.1 0.017% 0.009%
0.15 0.3 0.152% 0.088%
0.15 0.5 0.399% 0.240%
0.2 0 0% 0%
0.2 0.1 0.054% 0.042%
0.2 0.3 0.366% 0.298%
0.2 0.5 0.808% 0.673%
Table 5.3: Investment strategy, optimal operational triggers and
counterfactual effects. Parameter values are ρ =0.1,
µ =0.02, η = 1, c = 200, Ss = Sr =3000, λ =0.7 and
δ =1000.
As expected, the percentage loss in value due to the neglect of the time lag
increases with the length of the time lag. When a firm resumes the production at
the “wrong” (i.e. too high) trigger, it misses revenue due to the forced time lag.
An increase in the market uncertainty also increases the counterfactual effects.
This is indirectly caused by the increase in the optimal capacity choice. For a
firm with a large production quantity, it is very costly to continue production too
long against a negative price. Similarly, a firm misses out on a high profit, when
the decision to continue the production is made later than optimal. Especially
for a very uncertain market environment and a large time lag, it is important
for a firm to incorporate the time lag in the model, in order to find the correct
triggers. The counterfactual values may seem very low, however under a high
9Take X t = X lags (Q
∗lag) for counterfactual value Dr(Q∗,Q∗lag), because the firm optimizes the
option value to resume the operation at some moment in the future, under the assumption that
it has just stopped producing. For similar reasons we take X t = X lagr (Q
∗lag) for counterfactual
value Ds(Q∗,Q∗lag).
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uncertainty the capacity level (and thus the production level) is such high that
0.8% of the total firm value is a big gain in revenue.
Since neither Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) nor Sødal (2006) performed a
counterfactual analysis for their parameter values, we perform this analysis
in Table 5.4. The style of Table 5.4 is similar to the table that is presented in
Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and Sødal (2006), therefore it considers σ2 rather
than σ. Our model can be simplified to their model by posing the additional
assumptions Q = 1 and η= 010.
σ2 T = 0 T = 6





0.00 1.000 1.025 1.000 1.025 0.000% 0.000%
0.01 0.834 1.243 0.793 1.146 1.109% 1.268%
0.02 0.795 1.312 0.736 1.151 1.373% 1.406%
0.03 0.770 1.362 0.697 1.149 1.526% 1.494%
0.04 0.751 1.405 0.666 1.145 1.632% 1.555%
0.05 0.735 1.442 0.640 1.140 1.710% 1.600%
0.10 0.682 1.586 0.551 1.112 1.921% 1.712%
0.20 0.623 1.791 0.450 1.072 2.043% 1.742%
0.30 0.587 1.953 0.388 1.048 2.045% 1.700%
0.40 0.560 2.094 0.342 1.036 2.003% 1.635%
0.50 0.539 2.221 0.308 1.031 1.941% 1.562%
0.60 0.522 2.338 0.280 1.033 1.868% 1.488%
0.80 0.495 2.554 0.237 1.049 1.712% 1.344%
1.00 0.474 2.753 0.206 1.078 1.556% 1.210%
Table 5.4: Investment strategy, optimal operational triggers and
counterfactual effects. Parameter values are ρ =0.025,
µ=0, η= 0, c = 1, Ss = 0, Sr =1, and Q = 1.
Contrary to the model where capacity is optimized, we find that there is a
parabolic effect in the counterfactual values. For intermediate levels of market
uncertainty, the firm has the most benefit from correctly choosing the triggers
for which it resumes or suspends the operation. Namely, for relatively low levels
of uncertainty, the firm is more confident that the price after the time lag is still
high enough to pursue the production, and for very high levels of uncertainty,
10Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) consider the same set of parameters, however Sødal (2006)
detects a small technical error in this analysis of Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and rectifies the
results. Similar to Sødal (2006), we shall give the counterfactual values for several values of
the variance, rather than the standard deviation as assumed in earlier analysis
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the price level is such unpredictable that the exact switching parameter matters
less. The price is expected to reach a large bandwidth, within a short time
frame anyway. However, we saw that when the firm is given the opportunity
to optimize its capacity level, a higher level of uncertainty corresponds to a
steep increase in the capacity level. When a large capacity level is involved,
it contributes to the importance to choose the correct triggers, resulting in a
larger counterfactual effect.
5.6 Conclusion
We extent the literature on entry and exit decisions by giving the firm the
opportunity to optimize the size of its capacity at the moment that it invests
in the market. Capacity is assumed to be lumpy. Therefore, after each entry
decision, it uses the capacity that it initially invested in. We assume that a
restart of an operation cannot occur instantaneously. Namely, it takes time to
find new employees and skill them to the level of the old employees before
suspending the firm. Besides the obvious example of a production facility, we
can also think about a company that provides services, which needs to freeze or
merge some divisions in economical hard times. Reopening a division requires
employing some skilled employees which are able to learn the trick of the trade
to the other newly hired employees. This indicates that it takes time before the
(production)process is set in motion.
We find that the additional opportunity of a firm to optimize capacity changes
the results to great extend. That is, a slightly higher level of uncertainty results
in a delay in the optimal moment to resume the operation and hastens the
supsending decision. The latter differs from the analysis without capacity
optimization (see e.g. Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and Sødal (2006)). They
find the conventional result that a firm delays the decision to suspend the
operation under a higher level of uncertainty. Under capacity optimization,
the firm increases the size of its capacity investment, and thereby also a larger
level of the price intercept is required for a revenue flow equal to zero. Due to
positive switching costs, the firm switches from the operational state towards
the suspended state for a slightly negative revenue flow, which will occur later
under a higher capacity level.
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Furthermore, we find that the length of the time lag positively affect the
size of capacity. Namely, the ability of a firm to suspend the production means
that the downside of the investment is truncated. Therefore the presence of
a time lag causes an increase in the expected profit over the time lag period,
under the assumed uncertainty. Thus, a larger time lag also positively affects
the expected profit, and therefore justifies the larger capacity choice.
Under the assumption of a fixed capacity, we confirm Bar-Ilan and Strange
(1996)’s result that a larger time lag results in lower switching triggers. This
results is not always true under capacity optimization. Namely, besides the
mentioned direct effect, the triggers are also indirectly affected by an increase in
the length of the time lags. A slightly larger time lag results in a larger capacity
choice, resulting in higher switching triggers. This indirect effect dominates for
an initial small time lag.
We assumed the additive demand structure, because this enables us to com-
pare our results with Dangl (1999) and Hagspiel (2011). However Boonman
and Hagspiel (2014) highlight the differences in results between additive and
multiplicative demand structure. Where for the additive demand structure
an increase in uncertainty results in a explosive increase in the capacity level,
this increase is more moderate for the multiplicative demand structure. In this
chapter we find that a higher level of uncertainty results in a higher trigger
value to suspend the operation, which is indirectly caused by the steep increase
in capacity. We leave it to further investigation to find out whether these results
still holds under multiplicative demand. Additionally, it would be interesting to
see how the results are affected under a competitive environment.
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5.A Appendix
5.A.1 Expected Value of the Option to Discharge
When parameter X r follows a GBM, the distribution of XT given X r is log normal,
i.e.




Let us assume that z = log(XT ), g = log(X r) + (µ−
1
2σ
2)T and s2 = σ2T , then
z ∼ N(g, s2).
We are interested in E[X βT |X r] = E[e
zβ |X r]. This is in fact equal to the cal-
culation of the moment generating function. However, when we only need
this expectation for XT ∈ (0, X s), then the βth moment of XT is calculated as
follows:












Define y = z−gs , which implies that z = ys+ g. The substitution rule gives

















Because we know that dzd y = s, we find














Replacement of some terms give
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Finally, the integral is defined as a CDF of variable y that is normally distributed
with expectation βs and variance 1. When we also substitute y = z−gs back in
the integral, we find
E[ezβ |z < log(X s)] = E[X
β




2β2Φ( log(Xs)−gs − βs),
thus

























β −ρ = 0,
we find that e
1
2σ
2β2T+(µ− 12σ2)βT = eρT . Applying this result to several components





































(Fr(X r))Φ(v(X s, X r)− β1σ
p
T )eρT
The solutions for the remaining components in expression (5.4.3) are obtained
similarly. 
Proof Proposition 5.1 5.A.2
We show that expression (5.4.2) moves towards expression (5.3.1) for T → 0.
For this, we introduce a new notation to distinguish the option values for a
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model with a time lag from the option values without a time lag. Fr(X s, T)
denotes the option value of a firm that has just made the decision to resume
production and now obtains the option to suspend at an optimal moment after
the time lag. For the model without a time lag, we define this option by Fr(X s, 0).
We will show that limT→0 Fr(X s, T ) = Fr(X s, 0). Substituting (5.4.4) into (5.4.2)
gives:





















(1−Φ(v(X s, X r)))















Fr(X r , T )

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Since X r ≥ X s, we find that v(X s, X r)< 0, where v(X s, X r) is defined by expres-
sion (5.4.5). For T → 0, it holds that v(X s, X r)→−∞.
Hence, limT→0Φ(v(X s, X r)) = 0 and limT→0Φ(v(X s, X r)− β1σ
p
T) = 0, which
eliminates two terms in expression (5.A.1). For similar reasons we find that
limT→0
 




= 1, limT→0 (1−Φ(v(X s, X r))) = 1 and
limT→0
 




= 1. In order to finish the proof we addi-
tionally have limT→0 e
ρT = 1 and limT→0 eµT = 1.
Hence, we find that:























Fr(X r , 0)

,
which is similar to expression (5.3.1) with X = X r , after substitution of expres-
sion (5.3.2) in which X t = X s. Notice that, due to the assumption that switching
cost Sr is paid after the time lag, Sr is placed in a different position in the above
formula than in expression (5.3.1). However, since T → 0, this does not affect
the results. 
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